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INTRODUCTION

Scholars addressing the problem of discrimination against socially disfavored
groups have distinguished between two types of bias in a variety of social settings:
"conscious," deliberate, or purposeful animus, and "unconscious," inadvertent, or
automatic forms of bias.' Although the idea that some group-based bias may be
"unconscious" or unintentional has been around for some time, the subject has
received growing attention. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that,
as overt bigotry has waned in response to antidiscrimination laws and evolving
social mores, unintentional or "unconscious" discrimination has become the most
pervasive and important form of bias operating in society today.2 This is especially

1. See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
CosTS oFBEINGBLACKINAMERICA 68-80 (1997); Paul Brest, The Supreme Cour4 1975 TermForward:In Defense oftheAntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 HARV.L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1976); Judith
Olans Brown et al., Some ThoughtsAbout SocialPerceptionandEmploymentDiscrimination
Law: A ModestProposalforReopening the JudicialDialogue,46 EMORY L.J. 1487,1493-97
(1997); Martha Chamallas, The Architecture ofBias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA.

L.REv. 463,466-67 (1998); Peggy C. Davis, Law asMicroaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559,1560
(1989); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
RequirementofDiscriminatorylntent 91 MlctHL.REv. 953 passim (1993); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
UnconsciousRacism and the CriminalLaw,73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 passim (1988); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:IntergroupRelationsAfter Affirm ative Action, 86
CAL. L. REv. 1251, 1279, 1286-91 (1998) [hereinafter Krieger 1]; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity,47 STAN. L. RPV. 1161, 1164 (1995) [hereinafter Krieger I]; Charles
R.Lawrence H1,The Id, The Ego, andEqualProtection:Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 passim (1987); Anne C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and
Employment at Will: Toward a CoherentDischargePolicy, 57 01lo ST. L.J. 1443, 1463-73
(1996); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, NegligentDiscrimination,141 U.PA. L. REV. 899,90017 (1993); Michael Selmi, Testingfor Equality:Mer14 Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action
Debate,42 UCLA L. REv. 1251, 1283-89 (1995); David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 960-62 (1989); Jessie Allen, NoteA Possible
Remedy for UnthinkingDiscrimination,61 BRoOK. L. REv. 1299, 1311-15 (1995); Pamela S.
Karlan, Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose andMens Rea: The TorturedArgument of Invidious

Intent,93 YALE L.J. 111, 124-28 (1983).
2. See ARMOUR, supra note 1, at 72-77 (stressing the importance of unconscious bias in
multiple spheres); VRGINIA VALiAN, WIn So SLow? THEADvANCEMNT OF WOMEN 1-9 (1998)
(suggesting that the accumulation of small disadvantages and setbacks from unconscious bias is
the dominant factor impeding women's workplace advancement); Brown et al., supra note 1, at
1492-1503 (same); Krieger I, supra note 1, at 1279, 1286-91 (same); Krieger ILsupra note 1, at
1164-69 (arguing for the central importance of "subtle unconscious bias" in the workplace); see
also, e.g., David K. Shipler, Seeing Through CamouflagedRacism,WASH. POST, Oct. 15,1997,

1999]

DISCRIMINATIONASACCIDENT

true, it is claimed, in the workplace, It is not just that employers are more careful
about engaging in overtly discriminatory behavior, or that they guard against open
declarations of their prejudiced sentiments.3 Rather, the bulk of workplace
discrimination has taken on an entirely new form.'
The focus of this Article is on a type of discriminatory conduct in the workplace
that will be termed "unconscious disparate treatment." Under existing laws
governing discrimination on the job, disparate treatment results when an employer
disfavors a worker "because of' or "based on" that person's membership in a.
protected group.- An employer or his agent may know full well that he is treating
an employee less well because of that employee's race or sex. In that case, the
difference in treatment is deliberate or "conscious." But the employer may be
unaware that he is treating the employee differently than others and oblivious to the
basis for that difference. Through the operation of cognitive mechanisms that the
decisionmaker can neither observe nor control, his perception of a worker's race
or sex may distort the application of neutral and reasonable criteria used to evaluate
that employee. Although the decisionmaker might think he is being "fair," the
inadvertent bias might alter the outcome of a decision about the employee. For
example, a supervisor might unconsciously place more weight on errors in grammar
or spelling in a memo prepared by a Hispanic clerk than in a document submitted
by an Anglo counterpart. Or he might view a female employee's restraint in a client
meeting as manifesting a lack of aggressiveness rather than prudence or good
judgment. In both cases, the "difference" in the employer's reaction ultimately
depends upon the employer's identification of the employee as belonging to a
particular group. This conduct fits the framework of disparate treatment because
observations regarding the worker's protected trait are causally linked to less
favorable judgments, which may result in adverse treatment in the workplace.
This Article seeks to address how the law should respond to the problem of
unconscious disparate treatment in the workplace. It is concerned primarily with the
problem of inadvertent bias in employee performance appraisals. That form of bias
can result from reflexive or unthinking distortions in the application of neutral and
seemingly reasonable criteria to the assessment of employees from disfavored
groups. The analysis is concerned primarily with inadvertent bias against minorities
and women in the workplace.' Specifically, this Article asks whether unconscious

at21.
3. See JOHN 3. DONOHUE II, FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLoYMENT DIscmmNTION LAW 260
(1997) (noting the decline in "direct and indisputable evidence of labor market discrimination,"
and suggesting that the disappearance of open proclamations such as "No Irish Need Apply" has
been "far more thoroughb[ than [the elimination] of discriminatory conduct on the part of
employers').
4. See, e.g., Krieger , supra note 1, at 1164; Selmi, supranote 1, at 1283.
5. The source ofthe proscription against disparate treatment lies in the language of Title VI,
which forbids discrimination "because of" traits such as race or sex. See Civil Rights Act of 1964
§ 703(a), 42 US.C. § 2000e-2 (1994); see also Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1,14 Stat 27
(1866) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983 (1994)).
6. Although this Article deals with a type of inadvertent bias that gives rise to disparate
treatment,its scope is not meantto suggest that there are no other types of workplace conduct that
might properly be categorized as "unconscious discrimination." There may be other important
patterns or conditions, not qualifying as disparate treatment, that make it harder for women and
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disparate treatment should be addressed within the framework established by
current laws covering workplace discrimination, such as Title VII, which allow
individuals and groups to sue employers for equitable and compensatory relief.7 The
method ofthe Article is economic in its concern with rational actors' responses to
the incentives created by the law's allocation of costs and benefits among parties
to social interactions and with whether those responses "will promote, or fail to
promote, social welfare."'
This Article proceeds from the assumption that discrimination against persons
based on group identity inflicts a form of harm on victims. Title VII and other
provisions designed to combat workplace discrimination create a system of liability,
administered by courts, to remedy the harms individual workers suffer from
discriminatory treatment. Title VII represents a judgment that society should take
steps both to eliminate this harm and to provide equitable and legal compensation
to victims.
Although some scholars have found it useful to view statutes combating
workplace discrimination as creating liability systems designed to remedy
individual injury, harm, or loss,9 the problem of unconscious discrimination has not
been systematically analyzed in these terms. Likewise, scholars have not seen fit to
view inadvertent discrimination as a form of workplace "accident." That
classification is apt, because unconscious discrimination is an inadvertent and
unpredictable event that inflicts an undesirable and costly injury on employees as
the side effect of the otherwise useful activity of employing a workforce in a
productive enterprise. Moreover, the analogy is fruitful in inviting the use of
familiar concepts of accident law to shed light on the consequences of legal
interventions that ostensibly are designed to shift the costs of harms to employers
from employees.
Using familiar principles of accident law, this Article concludes that extending
the framework created by existing antidiscrimination statutes to cover unconscious
workplace disparate treatment is not a good idea because it is unlikely to serve the
principal goals of a liability scheme-deterrence, compensation, insurance-in a

minorities to get ahead. Many such practices are best classified as problems of disparate impact,
although some would resist that categorization as well. As discussed below, arguments for deemphasizing liability based on categories of discrimination established under Title VII include the
difficulty of categorizing and distinguishing different sources of obstacles women and minorities
face, as well as the wisdom of developing a unified approach to those problems that does not fit
easily within established remedial forms. See infra Part ILB (discussing complex structural
obstacles to outgroup advancement as an uneasy fit with established concepts of "discrimination!);
see also sources cited supra note 1.
7. This Article does not undertake an analysis of statutes imposing liability for discrimination
based on age or disability, but rather focuses on race, sex, and ethnicity. But much of the analysis
here might be usefully applied in those contexts.
8. A.Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, PunitiveDamages:An EconomicAnaysis, 111
HARv.L. REv. 869, 873 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, The Role ofFault andMotive in DefiningDiscrimination:The
Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943, 978-85 (1984); . Hoult Verkerke,
NoticeLiability in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 81 VA. L. Rrv. 273, 288 (1995); Mark C.
Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to MixedMotive Discrimination,
68 N.C. L. R~v. 495,496 (1990).
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cost effective manner. Holding employers liable will not deter the harm of
unconscious disparate treatment unless employers and their agents can find ways
to reduce that harm. The nature of the phenomenon of unconscious bias is such that
there are no known steps that employers can reliably take to control biases that may
distort the kinds of discretionary or subjective social judgments that must inevitably
be made in the course of managing personnel in the modem workplace. For this
reason, little or no cost-justified deterrence of unconscious bias can be expected to
result from imposing liability on employers for this type of conduct.
The Article goes on to suggest that the intransigence of unconscious bias will lead
employers to respond to the threat of liability for inadvertent bias by overinvesting
in measures that may reduce their exposure to liability, but will do little to purge
unconscious bias from the decisionmaking process. As noted, employers have little
effective control over unconscious bias. They do, however, have comprehensive
control over both actionable (i.e., discriminatory) and nonactionable
(nondiscriminatory) causes of adverse decisions taken against their employees (such
as refusal to hire, demotion, discipline, and termination). They will therefore be
tempted to respond to the threat of liability by, in effect, reducing the number of
adverse actions taken against protected employees in a manner that need not require
the precise elimination of inadvertent bias from the evaluation process.
Alternatively, employers may take steps to override some of the potential effects of
such bias-such as avoiding adverse decisions against protected groups-but in
ways that may bear little relationship to the overall incidence of the targeted harm
of inadvertently biased decisionmaking, and may actually increase the incidence of
discrimination by introducing fresh forms of bias. Firms may, for example, adopt
various types of diversity awareness, diversity action, or affirmative action
programs. Employers will adopt these programs, however, only if they reduce the
risk of liability. Moreover, if introducing these modifications has the effect of
reducing employers' expected liability by an amount that exceeds their cost,
employers will take these steps regardless of whether bias in the workplace has
actually been reduced in a cost-effective manner or at all. This response will be
inefficient because the amount expended on "precautions" against liability will fall
short of abating the targeted harm to a degree that justifies such expenditures.
There are two reasons why any reduction in liability for unconscious bias that
employers can expect from the above-mentioned "precautions" may well exceed
actual harm reduction: First, there are no known methods for effectively controlling
unconscious bias in the workplace. Therefore, any steps that employers take are as
likely to be ineffective as effective. Second, unconscious bias is an intermittent,
subtle, and elusive phenomenon. For this reason, fact-finders will be prone to error
in assessing the actual incidence of unconscious bias, and employers may well
succeed in using the above-mentioned workplace reforms to refute claims of bias
or to persuade fact-finders that unconscious bias has abated. Moreover, even setting
aside the question of whether such workplace modifications are likely to be an
efficient response to holding employers liable for inadvertent bias, a cumbersome
and proof-intensive liability system is a particularly wasteful way to force the
adoption of these types of measures.
Any argument in favor of making the employer pay for unconscious bias also
requires assuming that, as between the firm and its employees, the former can more
cheaply reduce the amount of unconscious disparate treatment in the workplace than
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the latter. This Article suggests that this assumption is unwarranted: there are
reasons to believe that employees are in a better position to minimize the incidence
ofbiased assessments, in which case liability principles would argue for leaving the
costs of such bias where they fall.
Finally, attaching liability to unconscious forins of discriminatory treatment will
do little to advance the cause of fair and accurate compensation for victims. If the
goal is corrective or compensatory justice for victimized individuals, a liability
system for unconscious disparate treatment will be a failure. Legal commentators
have spoken of unconscious bias as "subtle" or elusive, but without giving precise
content to these terms. Research in social and coguitive psychology permits a
more specific, albeit speculative, formulation: unconscious bias appears to occur
unpredictably and sporadically in social interactions, and only sometimes appears
to make an important difference to their outcomes. Such biases, if they operate at
all, may therefore affect the workplace "bottom line" only erratically or
infrequently. This Article argues that if unconscious bias is indeed "subtle" in these
respects, determinations of liability will very often be in error. Depending on the
placement of burdens and the chosen standard of proof, employers and firms will
either be dramatically undercharged or overcharged for their misconduct, and
compensation will often be paid to the wrong employees, with deserving victims
receiving nothing or too little and the uninjured receiving too much. These errors
in compensation will generally be greater in magnitude and frequency than in cases
involving conscious bias. Although a probabilistic approach to liability would
appear to offer some hope for improving on this situation, that promise is illusory.
A probabilistic system will justify itself neither in producing well-calibrated risk
reduction nor in directing compensation to the right persons. Because patterns of
compensation to individuals under any of these schemes will inevitably be
haphazard and bear little relation to actual victimization, those patterns will come
to mimic the effects of affirmative action in the allocation of rewards and
deprivation. But once again, a judicially administered system of individualized
liability, which expends elaborate resources on seeking to identify and verify an
elusive individualized form of harm, is a wasteful and cumbersome way to
implement affirmative action in the workplace. That goal can be accomplished more
efficiently by other means.
This Article concludes that aggressively attacking unconscious workplace bias
with a scheme modeled on Title VII is unlikely to serve the traditional purposes of
a liability system very well. Because this approach will prove both burdensome and
expensive, this Article suggests that the law should attack unconscious bias in the
workplace in other ways, or leave it to the play of extralegal forces.

10. See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
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BIAS iN THE WORKPLACE

A. UnconsciousBias as "MentalContamination"
A law professor has two students in his class. One is very beautiful and the other
quite plain. The professor assigns a grade based on an in-class performance, a
paper, and class participation. He does not plan to assign grades based on students'
physical appearance. Nevertheless, he gives the first student a higher grade than she
would have received if she were as plain as the second. The second student receives
a lower grade than she would have obtained had she been as pretty as the first.
A manager is asked to supervise a black employee. The supervisor observes the
employee's performance in the workplace over many months, taking in a range of
information about him and the work he produces. The supervisor is asked to fill out
an evaluation form for the employee, describing and ranking his on-the-job
performance and the quality of his work based on a range of criteria. Although the
supervisor believes that he is ignoring the employee's race, he is not: in fact, he
gives the black employee a less favorable evaluation than the employee would have
received had he been white.
In both cases, one possible explanation for the scenario is that the decisionmaker
(supervisor or professor) is influenced in his subjective assessment by a "stimulus"
or observed attribute-that is, physical attractiveness or race-of the person being
evaluated. The evaluator is unaware of this influence and, indeed, may fervently
wish to avoid taking the "stimulus" into account Psychologists Timothy Wilson and
Nancy Brekke have described this type of situation as a form of "mental
contamination," which they define as "an unwanted judgment, emotion, or
behavior" influenced by "mental processing that is unconscious or
uncontrollable."" The influence is unwanted if the person making the judgment
would not wish a particular factor to play a role in his judgment.2 One example of
"mental contamination" is the "halo effect"-the tendency to give beautiful people
a higher rating or to evaluate their performance more favorably, even if the overt
criteria for appraising the performance have nothing to do with physical
13
appearance.

11. See Timothy D. Wilson& NancyBrekkeMental ContaminationandMentalCorrection:
UnwantedInfluences on JudgmentsandEvaluations,116 PsYcHoL. BuLL. 117,117 (1994); see
also JohnA. Bargh, The CognitiveMonster: The CaseAgainst the ControllabilityofAutomatic
Stereoype Effec4 in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIEs INSOCLAL PsYCHOLOGY 361, 363 (Shelly Chaiken

& Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (describing how "[t]he mere perception of easily discernible group
features" might "influence judgments of a group member in an unintended fashion, outside of a
perceiver's awareness").

12. See id;see also Kriegerl, supra note 1, at 1285-91 (discussing and endorsing Wilson and
Brekke's "mental contamination" paradigm).
13. See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 11, at 117; see also Note, FacialDiscrimination:
ExtendingHandicapLaw to Employment Discriminationon the Basis ofPhysicalAppearance,
100 HAv.L. Rlv. 2035, 2037-42 (1987) (describing evidence of discrimination based on
physical appeal).
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Mental contamination is but one form of cognitive bias that has been observed by
experimental social psychologists under controlled or "laboratory" conditions. 4
Researchers have speculated that some types of mental contamination may result
from the process of unconscious stereotyping. Stereotypes are abstract structures
of knowledge or understandings that link group membership to a set of traits or
behavioral characteristics. Once stereotypes are activated, "they tend to influence
the construal of information about the target. As a result, the mental representation
that is formed of the target person is likely to be influenced by stereotypical
assumptions, even if the available information provides no direct substantiation for

14. Contamination biases have been observed in three basic types of experiments. In the first
type, experimental subjects are asked to evaluate a person or a person's performance. The rating
is to be based on various forms of information or experience, including an interview, a paper
summary (Le., a rdsum6), an interaction with the person, or an opportunity to observe the person
in action (e.g., participating in a group discussion). Some experiments are specifically designed to
investigate the possibility of inadvertent bias in workplace evaluations. The typical experimental
design attempts to hold the performance constant, but varies a key attribute of the person (race,
sex, age). Oddly enough, studies of this type that look at sex bias far outnumber those that explore
responses to race. See, e.g., Richard F. Martell, Sex Bias at Work: The Effects ofAttentional and
Memory Demandson PerformanceRatingsofMen and Women, 21 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL.
1939, 1940 (1991); John B. McConahay,Modern Racism and Modern Discrimination:The
Effects ofRace, RacialAtitudes, and Context on SimulatedHiringDecisions,9 PERSONALrrY
SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 551,555-58 (1983); Veronica F. Nieva & Barbara A. Gutek, SexEffects on
Evaluation, 5 ACAD. MOMT. REV. 267, 267 (1986) (describing a "common research paradigm

used in studies of evaluation bias" as involving "the description of hypothetical persons who are
identical except for sex, on whom evaluation judgments and personnel decisions are made"); Janet
Swim et al, JoanMcKay Versus JohnMcKay: Do GenderStereotypesBiasEvaluations?,105
PSYCHOL. BULL. 409,419-24 (1989); Henry L. Tosi & Steven W. Einbender, The Effects of the
Type andAmount ofInformation in Sex DiscriminationResearch:A Meta-Anatysis, 28 ACAD.
OFMGMT. J. 712,713-19

(1985) (describing analysis of studies).
In the second type of experiment (known as a "priming" experiment), an experimental subject's
response is assessed following his exposure to an idea or influence. For example, it has been
observed that people's decisions about whether to act cooperatively or competitively towards others
depends on prior exposure to news broadcasts about pro or antisocial acts. See Wilson & Brekke,
supra note 11, at 117. Also, experimental subjects' accounts of the meaning of videotapes of
ambiguous encounters between blacks and whites are influenced by whether those subjects have
been subliminally exposed to words that reflect stereotypes ibout black Americans. See id.; see
also Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji,Automatic and ControlledProcessesin Stereotype
Priming,70 J. PnRsoNALrrY & Soc. PsYcHoL. 1142,1143-58 (1996) (describing priming-type
experiments).
Finally, psychologists have observed that people's responses to a social situation-such as a
shopper dropping a bag of groceries on the sidewalk-will sometimes vary by the race or sex of
the person encountered. See, e.g., Faye Crosby et a., Recent UnobtrusiveStudies ofBlack and
WhiteDiscrininationandPrejudice:A LiteratureReview, 87 PsYCHOL. BULL. 546, 549 (1980).
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these assumptions."" If the process of stereotyping is unconscious, an individual
will be unaware that stereotypical expectancies are at work in his social judgments.
The operation of unconscious mechanisms stands in contrast to discriminatory
treatment that is conscious or deliberate. In that case, the actor means to alter his
judgment of a person precisely because that person possesses a particular attribute
or trait. A person who discriminates consciously is aware of what he is doing: he
knows that the factor of race is "making a difference" in his evaluations of others.
The reasons for his actions are transparent to him, which gives rise to the capacity
for self-report through introspection. 6 To paraphrase Justice Brennan, a person
who is consciously discriminating, if asked about
why he took a particular decision,
17
is able to answer truthfully "because of race.
This discussion of unconscious stereotyping suggests how employment relations
might create opportunities for superiors to discriminate unconsciously against
employees. Supervisors and employers purport to evaluate employees according to
facially neutral criteria and often strive to apply those criteria in an evenhanded
way. But if they have knowledge of the race or sex of the person being evaluated
(which they ordinarily do), their judgments could possibly be affected by cognitive
biases that are triggered by that knowledge. That would happen if the employer or
his agent inadvertently applied categorical mental assumptions about blacks or
women in a way that colors the evaluation of affected employees, leading to
distortions in judgment and a less favorable evaluation. But the employer will not
realize that these cognitive mechanisms are at work and will be oblivious to the way
in which the application of neutral performance criteria, which he is attempting to
apply in good faith, is skewed by his unconscious stereotypes. Such routine
distortions of seemingly benign appraisals could potentially occur at all stages of
the employment relationship, affecting decisions whether to hire, promote,
discipline, assign responsibility, allocate rewards and benefits, or terminate the
relationship altogether. The potential for these types of cognitive mechanisms to
play a role would be greatest when assessments have an important subjective
component-and especially where employers are making complex, multifactorial,

15. Galen V. Bodenhausen & C. Neil Macrae, Stereotype Activation andInhibition, in 11
ADvANCEs iN SocIAL CoGNmoN: STmRTYPE AcrIvATiO AND NBImIoN 1, 16 (Robert S.
Wyer, Jr. ed., 1998) [hereinafter ADVANCES IN SOCiAL CoGNITIoN]; see David L. Hamilton &
Jeffrey W. Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITIoN 1, 3 (Robert S. Wyer,
Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994) (Stereotypes "act as expectancies that guide the
processing of information about the group as a whole and about group members."); David L.
Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive
Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRffMNATON, AND RACISM 133 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner eds., 1986) (stating that stereotyping leads to the evaluation of a person in accordance
with cognitive structures that incorporate "the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations
about a human group") (emphasis omitted); Thomas E. Nelson et al., IrrepressibleStereotypes,
32 J. EB ERImsNTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 14 (1996) ("By stereotypes we mean beliefs or
expectations about the qualities and characteristics of specific social groups.") (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
16. See, eg., Daniel M Wegner & John A. Bargh, Control andAutomaticity in SocialLife,
in ITm HADBOOK OF SOCIALPsYCHOLOGy 446,451-52 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
17. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,250 (1989).
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discretionary judgments about ongoing workplace performance." Yet such
judgments are the stock-in-trade of employing and managing a labor force at all
levels of job complexity, and appear essential to the proper functioning of the
workplace.' 9
B. Unconscious Bias as Disparate Treatment
The form of conduct described above fits comfortably within the paradigm that
lies at the heart of Title VII jurisprudence: disparate treatment. Central to the
concept of disparate treatment in discrimination law is the existence of a causal link
between a person's group identity or group-based trait and an actor's response to
that person. The existence of that link, however, does not require that the actor be
aware of the connection. Where a workplace supervisor's judgment is influenced
by a worker's race or sex without the supervisor's knowledge or even against his
wishes, trait-based disparate treatment can still result. Because the employer or his
agent lacks awareness of this influence, the disparate treatment can be said to be
inadvertent or unconscious.
The notion of unconscious disparate treatment might seem to fly in the face of the
accepted requirement that actionable disparate treatment be "intentional."" But that
term can carry at least two possible meanings. It can narrowly denote a form of
scienter-an actor's conscious awareness of his reasons for acting. But it can also
be used more broadly to refer to a causal link between a mental influence (e.g., the

18. It is possible to imagine ways in which employers can be said to engage in unconscious
disparate treatment through the use of strictly objective criteria. For example, an employer's
decision to adopt or retain a neutral requirement with disparate impact might be unconsciously
motivated by the desire to screen out women or minorities. This story would appear to require
positing an unconscious desire to hurt or exclude-that is, some kind of unconscious negative
motive or animus-rather than, as discussed above, a covert mechanism of cognitive processing
that interacts with information about race or sex to bring about an injurious effect The question
ofwhether the existence ofunconscious animus has any psychological reality or empirical support
is beyond the scope of this Article, and the special case of unconscious "animus-based" selection
of objective, neutral criteria is not its central concern. For a discussion of this type of unconscious
bias, see Brest, supra note 1,at 14-15; Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 900-17; and Strauss, supra
note 1, at 960.
19. Heavy reliance on objective screening devices is most common at the point of hiring, which
generates only a small minority of employment discrimination claims. See John J. Donohue II &
Peter Siegeman, The ChangingNature ofEmployment DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L.
REv. 983, 1015-19 (1991). Once employees are on the job, appraisals and decisions as to

promotion, termination, etc., almost always make some use of subjective criteria. See discussion
infra Part II.C.1.
20. An intent requirement is also recognized for employment claims brought under the Civil
Rights Amendments and for violations of the constitutional requirement of equal protection. See,
e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,390-91 (1982) (outlining
an"intent requirement!'for § 1981 claims); see alsoDaniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in Equal
Protection,41 STAN. L. REV. 1105,1105 (1989). In contrast, there is no intent requirement for
making outa disparate impact claim, and disparate impact and disparate treatment claims are often
distinguished on the ground that the latter require a showing of "intent! whereas the former do not
turn on any mental element. See 1 BARBARA LmDEMANN & PAUL GROssMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRnMNATION LAW 81-114 (ABA Section ofLabor and Employment Law ed., 3d ed. 1996).
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perception of race or sex) and the outcome of a decision.21 On this causal view of
the intent requirement, disparate treatment-treatment that differs "because of' race
or sex-can occur either "on purpose" or inadvertently. A decisionmaker can be
aware of the causal connection, but he need not be. It then becomes possible to
speak of "unconscious disparate treatment" of employees in the workplace, and to
characterize such conduct as "intentional" in the causal sense of that term. 2
C. How ImportantIs UnconsciousDisparateTreatment?
How often do employees fall victim to unconscious disparate treatment in the
workplace? In the current state ofknowledge of human psychology, it is impbssible
to provide a definitive answer to this question. The suggestion that decisions
regarding employees in the workplace might be inadvertently contaminated by
category-based biases or stereotypes is not based on the observed operation of such
biases in real-life workplace settings-nor could it be. Rather, it is based on the
results of highly artificial experiments conducted by research psychologists under
controlled laboratory conditions. Such experiments often present subjects with very
limited information about the "target"-that is, the person or performance to be

21.Agreat deal of semantic and conceptual confusion surrounds the concept of discriminatory
intent in commentary and law, and this confusion infects discussions of unconscious bias. The
term "intent" sometimes carries the connotation of transparent awareness or comprehension of
one's own motives. On this usage, possessing an "intent" to discriminate can be construed as
discriminating "deliberately" or "on purpose," and discrimination that is inadvertent can be
described as "unintentional." The terminological confusion is compounded by usage in the tort
context, where "intentional" is generally taken to mean purposeful or deliberate rather than, more
broadly, causally related to some state ofmind. See supra note 20 and infra note 22 for discussions
of "intentional" and "unintentional" torts and discrimination law.
22. Whether this isthe sense actually adopted under existing employment discrimination laws
such as Title VII is a matter of controversy. See discussion infra Part HA on the scope of existing
workplace discrimination statutes in doctrine and practice.
The principal proponent of the broader, "causal" account of the concept of intent is David
Strauss, who argues that"intentionar" discrimination under current law does, and properly should,
include all forms of disparate treatment, or different treatment "because of' race, whether produced
knowingly or unknowingly. Strauss, supra note 1, at 1015. As Strauss recognizes, the notion of
"intentionality" is capacious enough to encompass decisions or actions undertaken without
awareness on the part of the perpetrator of the role of a protected trait in the decisionmaking
process--so long as race or sex, for example, does in fact make a difference. Id. at 956-57. Strauss
proposes the so-called "reverse the groups" test to determine if a protected trait "makes a
difference" oris the "but-for" cause of a harm. Id. at 956-59. A person discriminates with "intent"
if, ceterisparibus,he would have acted differently in the absence of the protected trait. See id. at
958.
As noted, "intentional" discrimination in the broader sense stands in contrast to actions that
simply create a disparate outcome or impact The fact that the term "intenf' has been made to do
service for the distinction between the presence or absence of self-awareness of motives, as well
as between disparate treatment and disparate impact, has produced some ambiguity in the literature
addressing the scope of the antidiscrimination principle. Thus, a commentator who argues for
doing away with an "intent" element for discrimination appears to be arguing that all
discrimination law should be analyzed using the disparate impact paradigm. See, e.g., McGinley,
supra note 1, at 1463-73; see also supra note 6 (discussing disparate impact).
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assessed. These experimental schemes necessarily depart significantly from the far
richer and more complex situations encountered in the real world.' Moreover,
laboratory-based experiments hold few useful "take-home" lessons for employers
seeking to avoid discriminatory behaviors. Some studies provide evidence for the
negative influence of race or sex on interpersonal assessments. Others elicit a
positive bias from subjects under some circumstances, which can enhance the
prospects of some members of traditionally disfavored groups; yet others
demonstrate no significant influence at all.24 The observed responses are highly

23. See Lee J. Jussim, & Jacquelynne Eccles, Are Teacher ExpectationsBiased by Students'
Gender,Social Class, orEthnicity?, in STEREoTYPE ACCURACY: TOWARD APPRECiATING GROUP
DIFFERENCES 246 (Yueh-Ting Lee et al. eds., 1995) ("The overwhelming majority of social
psychological research on stereotypes has been experimental laboratory studies."). Those studies
"often use artificial or impoverished social stimuli." Id. at 247. Moreover, the experiments are
based on encounters that are "usually with a stranger, for a period of an hour or less. And, of
course, the laboratory studies primarily use college students as subjects." Id.; see also id. at 260
(remarking on the difficulty of using controlled experimental observations to draw conclusions
about everyday behaviors in social settings); Clark R- McCauley, Are Stereotypes Exaggerated?
A Sampling of Racial, Gender, Academic, Occupational, and Political Stereotypes, in
STEREOTYPE ACCURACY: TOwARD APPRECIATING GROUP DIFFERENCES, supra, at 218 (same)
[hereinafter McCauley, Are Stereotypes Exaggerated?];Clark R. McCauley et al., Stereotype
Accuracy: Toward Appreciating Group Differences, in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY: TOwARD
APPRECIATING GRouPDFFERENCES, supra,at 293 (same) [hereinafter McCauley et al., Stereotype
Accuracy]; Martell, supra note 14, at 1939, 1954 ("As with any laboratory study, issues of
generalizability inevitably arise."); Swim et al., supra note 14, at 423 (observing that virtually none
ofthe multiple studies reviewed on the influence of sex-based biases on judgments and behavior
"matched the complexity of real-life hiring or job evaluations decisions").
24. See, ag, Diane Kobrynowicz & Monica Biernat, ConsideringCorrectness,Contrasz and
Categorizationin StereotypingPhenomena,in 11 ADVANCES INSOCIAL COGNITION, supra note
15, at 113 (describing work showing that stereotypes sometimes favor seemingly disfavored
groups); R.D. Arvey & KR. Murphy,PerformanceEvaluationin Work Settings,49 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 141, 157 (1998) (noting that "there is no scientific support for the opinion that the
format or specificity of appraisal systems [(ie., whether subjective or more objective)] has a
significant effect on race or gender bias in performance ratings"); Monica Biemat & Melvin Manis,
Shifing Standardsand Stereotype-BasedJudgments, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYCIIOL. 5
passim (1994); Monica Biemat et al., Stereotypes and Standards of Judgment, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 485 passim (1991); Patricia GT.Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: TheirAutomatic and ControlledComponents,56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYC-oL.
5 passim (1989); Kent D. Harber, Feedback to Minorities:Evidence of a Positive Bias,74 J.
PERSONALITY& Soc. PSYCHOL. 622 passim (1988); Lee J. Jussim, SocialPerceptionandSocial
Reality:A Reflection-ConstructionModel, 98 PSYCHOL. REv. 54, 65 (1991) ("Whether individual
targets are men and women, Blacks and Whites, old and young, or upper class and lower class,
perceivers generally judge them far more on the basis of their observable relevant personal
characteristics than on their membership in these social groups.") (citing numerous studies); Ziva
Kunda & Paul Thagard, Forming Inipressionsfrom Stereotypes, Traits, and Behaviors: A
Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction
Theory, 103 PsYCHOL. REV. 284, 302 (1996) (asserting that "the
evidence that stereotypes dominate impressions is inconclusive at best, and that there are reasons
to believe otherwise"); McConshay, supranote 14,passim;Nieva & Gutek, supra note 14, at 26869 (noting that some studies show "evaluation bias favoring males," others that "women receiven
disproportionately favorable praise compared to men given similar performance," and yet others
that there is "no difference in the evaluation of males and females'); Swim et al., supra note 14,
passin (also finding mixed results in sex bias studies); Tosi & Einbender, supra note 14, at 721.
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variable and context specific and often differ in unexpected and unexplained
directions. The effects of protected attributes often depend on small variations in
the selection of experimental subjects or targets, or seemingly arbitrary
modifications in experimental presentation or design.25 Without the ability precisely
to match real-life to laboratory conditions, it becomes difficult to use experimental
observations to predict with any certainty the degree to which cognitive biases or
stereotyping will influence actual decisionmaking in a particular employment
setting.
In sum, little of practical value is known about the real-life prevalence or
influence of the mental categories that sometimes appear to explain some behaviors
in the experimental setting.26 At best, experimental social psychology suggests the
possibility that hidden cognitive biases or stereotyping might on occasion influence
subjective decisionmaking in the workplace without in any sense proving that such
"mental contamination" is pervasive or that it is operating, or operating in one
direction, in any particular case.
But even if sex or race-based bias does occasionally infect the decisionmaking
process, it does not follow that the bias will make any concrete difference to the
outcome of an actual workplace decision or that it will result in adverse treatment
or denial of benefits in most cases or in any given case in which it plays a part. If
a decision against an employee is influenced by race, it could be influenced to a
variable degree, because race could distort the application of a neutral criterion
only a little or a lot. If subtracting the influence of race would change the outcome
of a decision in a particular case, then race can be considered a "determinative" or
"but-for" cause of the outcome.27 But if eliminating the influence of race would not

See generally23 ADVANCEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990)
(reporting mixed results on experimental studies of stereotyping); 7 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
PREmUDIC: THE ONTARIO SympOsIuM (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1994) (same);
COGNmIvE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND ITERGROUP BEHAVIOR (David L. Hamilton ed.,
1981) (same).
25. See sources cited supra notes 23-24; see also Krieger I, supra note 1, at 1313 (There is
evidence to suggest that "we cannot say that intergroup bias will always cause discrimination to
occur, nor can we predict exactly when discrimination will occur.... In short, we cannot expect
systems in which cognitive or other situation-sensitive forms of bias are operating to present neat,
consistent patterns.') (both emphases in original).
26. See, ag, Nelson et al., supra note 15, at 35 (concluding from a review of the literature that
"social psychology is in a poor position to make any definitive assertions about the overall 'level'
or 'degree' of stereotyping in everyday life").
27. The terminology is Stonefield's. Sam Stonefield, Non-DeterninativeDiscrimination,
MixedMofives, andthe InnerBoundary ofDisriminationLaw, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 85, 94 (1986).
To illustrate the difference, suppose that employees were evaluated for promotion by a committee
ofthree supervisors and rated on a numerical scale. An employee is required to obtain a score of
100-as a sum of the individual supervisors' scores-to win a promotion. Suppose that a black
employee's race caused each of the three supervisors inadvertently to give the employee 10 fewer
points than the employee would have received if he had been white. In the absence of the
unconscious bias, the employee would have scored 80. With the bias, he scores 50. The employee
did not miss out on the promotion "because of' race because he scored too low either way. For
additional discussion ofhow the law should treat differences in treatment that yield no differences
injob outcome, see Ernest F. Lidge I, The MeaningofDiscrimination:Why CourtsHaveErred
in RequiringEmployment DiscriminationPlaintiffsto Prove That the Employer'sAction Was
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in fact make any difference to the assignment of tangible workplace benefits or
rewards (even if it skews the process in some sense) then race could be considered
"nondeterminative" of the outcome. Thus, even if most supervisors are often
unconsciously biased against minority or female employees, it does not follow that
those biases routinely result in disparate treatment in the assignment of tangible or
measurable benefits, or even that they frequently do. The extent to which
inadvertent category-based biases are generally determinative or nondeterminative
of workplace outcomes cannot be known with any degree of certainty. But what is
known about the nature of "mental contamination" suggests that such biases may
often be partial or "subtle" in their effects. This suggests they may play a part in
decisions only intermittently and rise to the level of determining concrete outcomes
2
even less often. 1
As the discussion indicates, the uncertainties surrounding the questions of
whether and how often group-based cognitive biases come into play or produce
tangible harms will prove important in determining whether imposing liability for
this type of conduct is likely to optimize social welfare. As argued below, a system
of individualized liability that seeks to identify hidden biases that may only
infrequently determine outcomes will yield few effective precautions against those
biases, will encourage inefficient overinvestments in precautionary measures, and
will tend to generate large errors in the award of compensation.
D. Rationaland IrrationalUnconsciousBias
For the purpose of the ensuing analysis, it is helpful to draw a distinction between
two general categories of unconsciously influenced actions in the workplace. The
categories track a distinction made in discrimination scholarship between "rational"
or "statistical" disparate treatment, and discrimination that is the manifestation of
"irrational" prejudice.
If average productivity correlates with group membership, then the race or sex
of an employee can be a form of useful, if quite imperfect, information about the
current or projected job performance of that person. The information may be less
useful than more specific and individualized information, but the latter may be
difficult to obtain and interpret. If information is costly and stereotypical
assumptions are roughly accurate for the group as a whole, the employer may be
able to select a more productive workforce more cheaply by relying on race or sexbased generalizations.29 But the use of such "statistically valid" information in

MateriallyAdverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333 (1999).
28. See infra Part H.C.1.
29. For a recent summary of the concept of statistical discrimination with citations to the
economics literature, see Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial
Discrimination?,12 J. EcoN. PERsP., Spring 1998, at 91, 96-97; see also David A. Strauss, The
Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Casefor Numerical
Standards,79 GEo.L.J. 1619, 1622-23 (1991).
There is a growing body of work in cognitive psychology examining the uses of so-called
"accurate" stereotping-that is, cognitive categories or generalizations that reflect factually correct
group differences. See, e.g., STEREOTYPE AccURAcY: TOWARD APPRECIATNG GROUP

DIuPmu

E,supra note 23; Kobrynowicz &Biemat, supra note 24, at 119-123; Jussim, supra
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workplace decisionmaking need not be conscious. Rather, it is possible for
"rational" discrimination to take the form of unconscious stereotyping or
inadvertent bias. An employer may take the most efficient course without meaning
to do so.
On the other hand, trait-based biases that lead to the arbitrary discounting or
skewed application of information pertinent to productivity may result in errors or
mismatches in the selection and management of personnel-mismatches that could
be avoided if bias did not operate. Then racial biases or sexual stereotypes might get
in the way of choosing the "best" or most productive employees or of accurately
evaluating employee performance based on the information otherwise at hand. In
that case, a personnel process administered by unconsciously biased supervisors
would do a worse job of assessing employees than one that used supervisors
unaffected by those cognitive biases. Generally speaking, bias could be considered
irrational if there exists any alternative process for evaluating employees that is both
more neutral (in that the influence of unconscious trait-based biases would be
diminished) as well as more cost effective (in that the balance of input and output
costs in administering the alternative personnel system would be more favorable to
the firm). The alternative processes might, but need not, make use of greater
amounts, or different types, of information about employees.3" In sum, bias is
rational ifthe use oftrait-based generalizations helps the employer make a better or
more cost effective choice than could be made without relying on a stereotypical
assumption." In contrast, irrational bias involves the use of trait-based information
to make a less desirable decision than could otherwise be made by eliminating the
categorical bias.

note 24, at 69.
30. The adoption ofa particular personnel system could improve the position of the firm overall
without necessarily resulting in the retention or promotion of more productive employees. That is
because some highly productive employees might be quite costly to identify and obtain. If slightly
less productive employees could be identified and retained much more cheaply, the employer might
come out ahead despite a decline in individual productivity. See, e.g., MARKYELMAN& GILLIAN
OF STUDENTS wirs
LESTER, JUMPING THE QuEuE: AN INQUIRY rNTo TBE LEGAL TREATmB
LEARNING DISABrLrES 199-208 (1997) (distinguishing between concepts of gross productivity

of employees-which does not take the costs of selecting, sorting and managing those employees
into account-and net productivity, which does); Mark Kelman, Concepts ofDiscriminationin
"GeneralAbility"Job Testing, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1158, 1198 (1991). Kelman suggests that
employers are concerned only with net productivity. Ia. at 1198-1204.
31. A decisionmaking method that is best for the employer need not necessarily be best for
society as a whole. It has been argued that "rational" or statistically valid discrimination, although
generating positive benefits for the employer, produces socially undesirable "negative externalities"
and should be suppressed. See, e.g., Stewart Schwab, Is StatisticalDiscriminationEfficient?, 76
AM. ECON. REv. 228,228 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Three CivilRightsFallacies,79 CAL. L.
REv. 751,758-59 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don 'tStop Discrimination,8 Soc.
PHIL. &POL'Y, Spring 1991, at22,26-29 [hereinafter Sunstein, WhyMarkets]; see also infra note

194 (reviewing arguments that the goal of antidiscrimination law should be to eliminate both
'irational" as well as statistically valid forms of disparate treatment, because both reduce overall
social welfare).
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"Rational" unconscious bias may persist because it is efficient for the employer. 2
Although there is no definitive proof of the operation of "irrational" forms of
unconscious bias in real-life profit-making enterprises, it is nevertheless possible
to give some account of how such irrational biases might arise and persist. Based
on experimental results, some cognitive psychologists have suggested that
vulnerability to "mental contamination" from categorical assumptions and
stereotypes is an intrinsic structural feature of human information processing and
social judgment. But why might people retain these seemingly dysfunctional habits
of thought? Theorists have posited the "cognitive miser" model to explain the
development and habitual application of broad categorical assumptions to social
judgments.3 The mind has evolved methods that strike an overall compromise
between the costs and benefits of attending to the full array of individualized
information available in multiple social encounters. The repeated use of "quick and
dirty" mental rules ofthumb may function most efficiently in the aggregate, but may
not represent the best method case by case. Although producing the best results in
the range of social situations encountered overall,. the rules may "reflect less than
optimal information processing" in an individual interaction or for a specialized
purpose.34 Specifically, entrenched habits of thought might produce less than
optimal management of a labor force. Then a system that indulged those habits could
be considered irrational if a more neutral evaluation system-that is, one less
influenced by category-based cognitive biases-would lower net costs to the firm."
This analysis suggests that eliminating some types of unconscious group-based
biases in the workplace would be a desirable result from the employer's as well as
society's point of view. A rational firm would therefore choose to reduce or

32. See discussion infratext accompanying note 35.
33. See Philip E. Tetlock, Accountabiliy and Complexit4 of Thought, 45 J.PER5ONALITY &

Soc. PSYCHOL. 74,74 (1983) ("A principle of least effort seems to guide much human judgment
and decision making.'); see also Brown et al., supra note 1,at 1495 (discussing the cognitive
miser model of cognition); Neil Macrae et al., Stereotypes asEnergy-SavingDevices: A Peek
Inside the CognitiveToolbox, 66 .PERsoNALrry & Soc. PsYcHoL. 37, 37 (1994) (same); Bargh,
supranote 11, at 362 (discussing the cognitive miser concept and explaining that "[tihe reliance
on simple decision rules and on pigeonholing of individuals into stock characters or categories was
viewed mainly as a matter of strategic necessity, or even as an adaptive way of dealing with our

mental shortcomings as human beings").
34. See Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15, at 55-56.
35. It could be argued that unconsciously biased decisionmaking cannot be regarded as

"irrational" so long as eliminating the distortions in decisionmaking is extremely expensive or
impossible in practice. Since costs are costs, it should not matter whether the costs of eliminating
the use of group identity in the employment calculus would take the form, as with statistical
discrimination, ofdepriving the decisionmaker of valuable information or, as in the "irrational bias"
case, of purging the evaluator's mind of dysfunctional but entrenched cognitive habits. But
regardless ofwhether the practical inability to accomplish the latter result is properly regarded as
a form of "cost!' to the firm, there remains an important and useful-if theoretical-distinction
between statistical discrimination and irrational unconscious bias: the first uses race-based
information to help make a better choice than could be made without it, while the latter uses racebased information to make a worse choice than could otherwise be made without it regardless of
whether such reduced reliance is psychologically attainable in fact. Put another way, if the use of
group-based information could feasibly be eliminated without cost, the employer in the latter case
would choose to do so, but in the former case would not.

1999]

DISCRIMINATIONAS ACCIDENT

1145

eliminate the influence of group-based biases on their personnel process if such a
result could be effectively achieved. In effect, the firm might choose to "reprogram"
its supervisors' brains to eliminate some stereotyped information processing or
otherwise to restructure its evaluation system to minimize the influence of bias if
such changes were feasible and not so costly as to wipe out the gains from the
resulting improvements. These observations raise the question of whether, and how,
such group-based biases, if in fact present, could be eliminated. Subsequent sections
of this Article will take up this question.
E. Discriminationas Accident
The preceding Section describes how mental processes that psychologists have
theorized are part of normal cognitive functioning could possibly give rise to
unconscious disparate treatment in the workplace and could cause "irrational"
unconscious bias to persist. This Section considers how unconscious disparate
treatment can be considered a kind of workplace accident. An accident has been
defined as a "harmful outcomel] that neither injurers nor victims wish[] to occur."36
Perhaps the most important way in which unconscious discrimination is like an
accident is that it creates an "unintended" risk of a particular type of costly harm as
a byproduct of an economically useful activity-that is, the employment of workers
in the service of some productive enterprise. 7
As explained more fully below, race or sex discrimination in the workplace can
be regarded as a type of tortious accident. But discrimination is a peculiar type of
tort. Any adverse action taken by employer against employee, regardless of the
employers' reasons, can be considered injurious to the employees' interests as such.
But under the framework created by existing laws against workplace discrimination,
not all such injuries are actionable. Laws such as Title VII create no generalized
duty to treat employees favorably, but only to refrain from treating employees
differently "because of' race or sex.38 As already suggested, that duty can arguably
be breached if the difference in treatment is consciously (that is, intentionally) or
unconsciously motivated by the forbidden characteristic. The "tort" of unconscious
discrimination is not an "intentional" one-it is not committed for the purpose of
bringing about the harm-but rather is an accidental tort that is the unintended
byproduct of an otherwise useful activity.

36. ST NSHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS oFAcciDEN LAW 1 (1987). Although the term
"accident" is ubiquitous in liability scholarship, commentators rarely define the term. See, e.g.,
GuiDo CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS (1975) (providing no definition).
37. Here the term "intent" is employed more narrowly than in discrimination law. The category
of "intentional tort" is reserved for injuries that are inflicted deliberately and knowingly, in that a
person takes action with the desire orwishto inflict harm. See discussion supratext accompanying
notes 21-23 and infra text accompanying notes 42, 54.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 59,62,64 (discussing breach of duty, compensable
harm, etc. in a discrimination context).
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II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO UNcoNscIous DISPARATE
TREATMENT
Before proceeding to the analysis of whether liability for unconscious or
"accidental" disparate treatment would produce a socially optimal result,-it is
important to consider the preliminary issue of whether, and how, existing laws
governing workplace discrimination currently address the phenomenon of
unconscious disparate treatment.
A. Does CurrentLaw Cover UnconsciousDisparate
Treatment?
Does Title VII already provide a cause of action for the type of unconscious
disparate treatment described above? Some scholars have suggested that there is
nothing in the letter of Title VII that rules out imposing liability for this type of
conduct. 9 As already noted, the statutory language forbidding discrimination
"because of' protected traits is arguably ambiguous enough to encompass both
deliberate and inadvertent forms of causation," and the doctrinal requirement that
'the employer harbor "intent" to discriminate could be construed as capacious
enough.to cover actions inadvertently triggered by protected traits."' Nonetheless,
there is considerable ambiguity in the case law surrounding the scope of the "intent"
requirement for claims alleging disparate treatment. There thus remains some
doctrinal uncertainty as to whether "intentional" discrimination encompasses
42
unconscious as well as conscious "motives" for action.
The most suggestive evidence that Title VII doctrine has evolved towards formally
excluding recovery for inadvertent disparate treatment comes from the operation of
the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary formula in individual disparate treatment
claims.4 3 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can create a presumption of

39. See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 9, at 987-97; Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:
DisparateTreatmentAfter I-cks, 93 MIcH.L. Rav. 2229,2237 (1995); McGinley, supra note
1, at 1463-73; Strauss, supra note 1, at 937-39; D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory
Barriers:BasingDisparateTreatmentAna4'Mson Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S.CAL. L. REV.
733,734-36 (1987).
40. The statute itself also provides remedies for "intent" to discriminate, see Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994), although it does not define that term.
41. See supra text accompanying note 22 for a discussion of David Strauss's work.
42. Linda Krieger argues that courts have effectively narrowed the scope of the "intent"
requirement under Title VIL both in doctrine and practice, to cover only deliberate acts of
discrimination. Krieger 11, supra note 1, at 1164 (arguing that the bulk of unconscious disparate
treatment in the workplace goes unremedied because courts have routinely "constructed" and
applied antidiscrimination statutes in a manner that, although "sufficient to address the deliberate
discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious
forms of bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy') (footnote omitted); see also Chamallas,
supra note 1, at 467 (implying that existing law encompasses only deliberate and not unconscious
disparate treatment).
43. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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discriminatory motive by establishing certain facts.44 The employer is then required
to come forward with a nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken.4 The trier of
fact must then decide whether the reason given was the "true" reason for the
employer's decision, or whether that reason is "pretext"-that is, not the "real"
reason for the decision.4" Alternatively, in so-called "mixed motive" cases, the trier
must decide whether, even ifthere is evidence that the employer relied on both traitbased and non-trait-based reasons for the decision, the outcome would have been
the same in the absence of discriminatory intent. If the same decision would have
been forthcoming, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory or equitable relief.47
The McDonnell Douglas formulation is clearly geared to a narrow view of
discriminatory intent: its operation depends on a defendant's possessing a conscious
or deliberate state ofmind. McDonnell Douglas demands that the defendant supply
reasons or "motives" for a decision or action taken in the employment setting. The
requirement that the actor actually articulate his reasons for action assumes that the
actor is fully aware of why he acted. The idea of pretext-in which an actor tries to
cover up his "true" reasons by supplying false ones-presupposes that the actor's
reasons are transparent to him: he can and does in fact know through introspection
what his reasons really are. If the plaintiff is charged with showing that the
explanation the defendant provides is "false," this suggests that the defendant did
not have the stated reason(s) in mind when he acted, but rather some "invidious"
reason (e.g., race or sex). In effect, the final step in McDonnellDouglas turns on
questions of sincerity and
credibility: Is the defendant lying about his own motives
48
for action, or is he not?

44. These are: that the employee was qualified for a position or benefit; that he was denied it;
andthatthe position remained open orwas filled by a person from another group. See id. at 802.
45. See id.
46.See id at 804. Once the finding of pretext is made, the trier of fact is permitted-but after
the Supreme Court's decision in St Mary'sHonorCenterv. Hicks, 590 U.S. 502 (1993), is not
required-to infer from the evidence that the employer acted with discriminatory intent See
Malamud, supra note 39, at 2234 (discussing the Hicks opinion).
47. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Green, 490 U.S. 228,258 (1998). Prior to the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Title VII was ambiguous on the placement of burdens of production and proof for
the elements of a dual or mixed motive case. The courts had construed the statute to require the
defendant to bear the burden of showing that discriminatory factors made no difference to any
employment-related decision, and such a showing negated liability. See id.at 248. The statute was
amended in 1991 expressly to permit a finding of liability (and possibly an award of attorney's
fees) ifthe plaintiff shows that discrimination was a "motivating factor" in the decision. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994), amended by Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a). No remedy is forthcoming, however, if the employer proves
that the "same action" would have been taken even absent the discriminatory motive. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994), amended by Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b).
48. The faet-finder (which can be judge or jury under current law) is not required to find that
there was discrimination even if it determines that the proffered reason was pretext, since the
defendant may have had other nondiscriminatory reasons for an action. See St Mary'sHonorCtr.,
509 U.S. at 509-11. But the point is that McDonnellDouglas assumes that the question of
discrimination tums only on reasons or motives of which the actor is aware, and on none of which
he is unaware.
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The McDonnell Douglas framework seems all wrong for the task of getting at
hidden cognitive processes. The requirement that defendants give reasons and the
very idea of pretext itself are predicated on the assumption that persons are fully
cognizant of the motives for their actions. 9 Moreover, the idea of a "pretext" is
cartoonish: the decisionmaker has a single motive, which is either suspect or not. He
gives a reason, and he is either lying or not. The introduction of the possibility of
unconscious motivation shows the inadequacy of this framework. To the extent that
the factors that influence human decisionmaking can be identified as "reasons" or
"motives,""0 the reality of human decisionmaking is that multiple "reasons" underlie
every decision in which unconscious processes are at work, and those "reasons" can
take forms that are quite obscure to the actor. The crude polarity between the
conscious and unconscious fails to capture the complex gradation of individuals'
awareness of the antecedents of their decisions, which can represent a tangle of
factors that are half-conscious and partly understood.51 Supervisors may forget, or
be oblivious to, many of the reasons they acted in the first place. Or they may simply
be influenced by cognitive mechanisms of which they are unaware.
Because information about race can operate to distort the application of otherwise
"neutral" criteria, the concept of"pretext"--which goes to what the employer thinks
he is doing-is conceptually irrelevant to whether unconscious bias is at work. 2 The
supervisor may have a perfectly sincere and valid reason in mind for a decision, and
yet still be acting "because of' race. In the typical case in which unconscious bias
infects the process, race is rarely a "sole cause," but rather operates to distort or
"skew" the application of other legitimate factors (or neutral "reasons") that go into
workplace evaluations. For example, the race of the employee may cause the
employer to place more weight on one otherwise legitimate aspect of the employee's
performance, and less weight on another aspect, than if the employee were of a

49. See, for example, Krieger II, supra note 1, at 1164-66, for a critique ofthe assumptions
of"transparency" and rationality of motives that underlie the pretext and mixed motive models in
antidiscrimination law, David N. Rosen & Jonathan M. Freiman, Remodeling McDonnell
Douglas: Fisher v. Vassar College and the Structure ofEmployment DiscriminationLaw, 17
Qumi n'AcL. Rnv. 725, 761-63 (1998) (complaining that the McDonnellDouglasformulation
ignores the fat that "in many cases it is neither useful nor possible to distinguish among employers
who rely on prohibited stereotypes based on the level of their conscious awareness of having done
so").
50. For discussions of the use of the concept of "motive" in antidiscrimination law and
jurisprudence, see, for example, Susan Bisom-Rapp, OfMotives andMaleness:A CriticalView
ofMixedMotive Doctrinein Title Vl Sex DicrninationCases, 1995 UTAHL. REV.1029,103034 (exploring how the mixed motive doctrine fails to capture the social reality of working women);
Brodin, supranote 9, at 987-97 (arguing that a restrictive definition of intent is not consistent with
the legal system's approach and does not facilitate Title VII policy); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond
Causation: The Interpretationof Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 70 TEX L. REV.17,71-82 (1991) (analyzing the mixed motive concept in
law and arguing thatthePrice Waterhouse approach is fundamentally flawed); Welch, supra note
39, at 736-40 (arguing that motive rather than intent should be controlling in Title VII cases).
51. See generally Wegner & Bargh, supra note 16.
52. Itmay not be irrelevant as amatter ofevidence, however. See infra text accompanying note
225.
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different race. The exaggerations or deviations can only be measured against the
decisionmaker's responses under hypothetical "baseline" or counterfactual
conditions-the conditions that would obtain if the employee were of a different race
or if the cognitive biases were absent.
The description of unconscious bias as "skewing" the application of a valid set of
decisionmaking criteria suggests that most decisionmaking in the employment
setting arguably fits better into the "mixed motive" than the "pretext" category of
discrimination claims. When unconscious biases are at work, it can be said both that
the decisionmaker possesses a "valid" reason for action and also that the protected
trait was a "motivating factor" in the decision. But the notion of mixed motives, as
it has been articulated in cases and commentary, is not a very good fit either: people
engaged in evaluating others in the workplace do not generally possess distinct
reasons or motives that run along parallel lines and simultaneously "cause" a
decision or contribute to the cause. The schematic "two-track" image created by
mixed motive analysis fails to capture the operation of unconscious bias in social
judgment. It is closer to psychological reality to say that employers or their agents
apply a set of neutral and often reasonable criteria, but apply them imperfectly,
erratically, inconsistently, or, at times, just plain differently to employees from
53
protected categories.
The foregoing discussion shows that current doctrine is formally at odds with
liability for unconscious forms of disparate treatment. But what about actual cases?
Does McDonnellDouglas or the current treatment of mixed motive cases stand as
an important practical obstacle to the bringing and winning of claims arising from
unconscious disparate treatment? Are there other important impediments to the
prosecution of unconscious disparate treatment claims under current law?54

53. Indeed, this redescription upsets a number of core assumptions about the psychology of
discrimination that underlie current doctrine in general, and the McDonnellDouglasparadigm in
particular. As Linda Krieger points out, not only are motives assumed to be transparent, but
decisionmakers are assumed to be consistent in their biased behavior, because discrimination is
believed to spring from stable tastes or ex ante preferences, rather than from mental schemas with
complex, variable, and context-dependent applications. Krieger , supranote 1, at 1310 (criticizing
as fundamentally at odds with the psychology of unconscious bias the "same actor" doctrine,
which holds that "if the same person who hired an employee makes the decision to fire him, a
strong inference or presumption of non-discrimination arises").
In a similar vein, it is important to recognize that the "irrational" cognitive generalizations that
represent a response to protected traits such as race and sex are not sharply distinct from other
mental schemas, but lie on a continuum with other decisionmaking processes. Generalizations
based on employee characteristics other than those specifically covered by antidiscrimination laws
may trigger deviations from rationality or consistency in some circumstances. Thus, the fact that
a supervisor's decisionmaking practices do not perfectly correspond to the "reasons" given for
action, or are not otherwise explicable on the basis of some employment-related goal, does not
necessarily mean that the supervisor is acting on the basis of a protected trait See infra text
accompanying notes 136-40 (discussing the possibility that employment decisions often deviate
from rationality in ways unrelated to protected traits).
54. Krieger also claims that, apart from the effects of the application of the McDonnell
Douglasframework, there are other important impediments to the prosecution of unconscious
discrimination claims. She argues that courts are hostile generally to unconscious discrimination
claims because they assume that the "intent" requirement entails the need for deliberate or
conscious animus. See Krieger II, supra note 1, at 1161-73. According to Krieger, "the entire
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Although McDonnell Douglas may make it somewhat harder for victims of
unconscious bias to win their cases, there is no reason to think that McDonnell
Douglas serves to shut out all claims that are grounded in subliminal bias. That is
because, as a practical matter, there inevitably will be some degree of overlap in the
evidence that tends to prove "pretext" and the evidence that tends to prove
unconscious bias. That evidence will often take the form of inconsistencies or
disparities in treatment of similarly situated members of different groups. When
those disparities are unexplained or poorly explained, some fact-finders will infer
"deliberate" discrimination. The overlap in proof may cause some fact-finders to
find pretext (erroneously, to be sure) when, in fact, the defendant's conduct was
driven by inadvertency. It may be, however, that the types of stark disparities that
deliberate animus can generate will prove quite rare when motives are
unconscious." The quality and quantity of comparative evidence for "pretext" that
is generally available when unconscious bias operates may make for weaker cases
and fewer holdings in favor of plaintiffs.
This account assumes that the fact-finder will take the requirement that it find
"pretext" seriously. If it does not-if the fact-finder is impressed by unexplained
disparities in treatment with little attention to the form of the motive-then the result
will be that liability will sometimes attach for unconscious disparate treatment. On
the other hand, if pretext is taken seriously, McDonnell Douglas might impede

normative structure of Title VII's injunction 'not to discriminate,' rests on the assumption that
decisionmakers possess 'transparency of mind'-that they are aware of the reasons why they are
about to make, or have made, a particular employment decision." Id. at 1185. For Krieger, the most
telling evidence for the general acceptance of the "assumption of decisionmaker self-awareness"
is the'moment of decision" language from Justice Brennan's Price Waterhouseplurality opinion.
Id.(citing Price Waterhouse v. Green, 490 U.S. 228,250 (1988)). Justice Brennan states:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we
mean that,if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons
were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the
applicant or employee was a woman.
PiceWaterhouse,490 U.S. at 250. As Krieger points out, this language only makes sense on the
assumption that "employment decisionmakers have ready access to the workings of their own
inferential process." Krieger II supra note 1, at 1185. But see Rosen &Freiman, supra note 49,
at 765-67 (suggesting an alternative construction of Brennan's remarks that is more consistent
with coverage of unconscious stereotyping).
Apart from her reliance on Justice Brennan's remarks in Price Waterhouse, however, Krieger's
evidence for ajudicially imposed "conscious intent" requirement is remarkably thin. Discussions
in cases and commentary on the requirement of showing "intent" appear to have in mind the
distinction between disparate treatment claims (which turn on state of mind) and claims of
disparate impact (which do not). See discussion supra note 6 (on disparate impact); see also
General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,388-91 (1981) (holding that §
1981, in requiring proof of "intent," does not contemplate disparate impact claims). Thus, the
argument against an "intent" requirement is often an argument in favor of expanding on liability
for practices with a disparate impact. See, e.g., McGinley, supranote 1, at 1463-73 (stating that
the "intent" requirement is an impossible burden for plaintiffs to meet and advocating the adoption
of a negligence standard); Strauss, supra note 29, at 1644-46, 1654-56 (criticizing the intent
standard and suggesting that it be replaced with a system where employers are fined ifthey do not
hire minority workers in proportion to their representation in the population as a whole).
55. See infra text accompanying note 135.
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plaintiffs' recovery in some cases in which unconscious bias is operating by shifting
the focus away from objective evidence towards an evaluation of the sincerity or
credibility ofthe defendant. If fact-finders take the concept of pretext seriously, they
may be willing to overlook significant disparities in treatment or erratic employer
behavior if convinced of a supervisor's sincerity in denying that "race was the
reason."56 How much of an obstacle McDonnell Douglas poses in individual cases
is thus an empirical question that depends on how 7 the McDonnell Douglas
framework actually plays out on the facts of each case.
The doctrines and practices that have evolved in cases said to involve "mixed
motives" are, if anything, even less hospitable to establishing liability based on
unconscious forms of bias than the conventions surrounding pretext cases. The
"mixed motive" paradigm usually comes into play when there is some evidence
supporting a permissible justification for the action taken against an employee.
Courts then permit the case to go forward only if the plaintiff can supply some form
of "direct" or "anecdotal" evidence that the employer may have acted for
discriminatory reasons as well as legitimate ones. This demand would often rule out
a mixed motive analysis for cases stemming from unconscious bias, because the kind
of evidence that is generally available when motives are unconscious-bare,
unexplained disparities in group treatment-would not ordinarily satisfy the courts'
threshold standard. The types of anecdotal or direct evidence that courts customarily
demand in these circumstances would be available almost exclusively where the
discrimination is self-conscious or deliberate."'

56. Linda Krieger provides a neat illustration ofhowMcDonnellDouglasmight make it harder
to prove unconscious discrimination in the face of evidence of disparate outcomes by making a
case turn on the credibility ofthe defendant's account of why he acted. An ethnic minority worker
is disciplined and fired. He sues for discrimination. Krieger constructs the following hypothetical
sequence: The supervisor denies discrimination and points to the employee's specific
transgressions. Evidence is introduced concerning the treatment of other workers in the plant, and
there is "a subtle, yet discernible pattern of differential treatment emerging from the time records
and personnel files obtained in discovery." Kreiger I, supra note 1, at 1162-63. Krieger contends
that,despite these demonstrable overall disparities in treatment, the defendant prevails because the
trier offact is unconvinced that the differential treatment was consciously imposed because of the
worker's ethnicity. Despite the plaintiff's efforts to prove otherwise, the fact-finder simply refuses
to believe that "the plant manager was a racist and a liar."Id. at 1163. Since pretext has not been
proved, the fact-finder finds no discrimination. See id.

57. Moreover, McDonnell Douglas is only an important factor in individual disparate
treatment claims. Group claims-whether class actions or pattern and practice claims-do not
stand or fall on "pretext," and McDonnellDouglasplays little part in the order of proof of these
cases. See 1 LmEmAANN& GRossMAN,supra note 20, at 44-47; Maurice R. Munroe, The EEOC:
PatternandPracticeImperfect, 13 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv.219, 247 (1995). In the end, group
cases often turn on the cogency of the statistical proof offered by the parties, and the plausibility
of the alternative theories for rationalizing numerical patterns. Because bias that operates
unconsciously can sometimes-ifnot always-generate statistical evidence similar to that available
for discrimination that is practiced "on purpose," it might be possible for some victims of

unconscious discrimination to prevail in pattern or practice claims alleging disparate treatment.See
infra text accompanying note 125 (discussing proof).
58. The circuits are split on the issue of what evidentiary standard should apply to mixed or
dual motive cases. Some circuits have adopted a strict "direct evidence" requirement. This is
generally construed to require direct proof, without inference, that the agent who made the decision
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In sum, although there are no absolute statutory impediments to plaintiffs'
recovery for unconscious forms of bias under current law, current doctrine and
practice are stacked against recovery in many cases. This suggests that, as things
now stand, employees victimized by unconscious forms of bias will only
occasionally succeed under Title VII. This suggests as well that addressing
unconscious disparate treatment more comprehensively might well require a
significant extension or overhaul of the current legal regime. Specifically, either
Title VII would have to be revised expressly to recognize unconscious disparate
treatment claims, or doctrine and evidentiary practice would have to be reformed to
permit the more effective prosecution of such claims.
B. Liabilityfor Unconscious DisparateTreatment: Strict
Liability or Negligence?
This Article has introduced the idea that the effects of unconscious bias can be
viewed as a form of workplace accident. The proposal under consideration could be
viewed as one to reform the existing liability regime for employment discrimination
to more consistently assign the costs of these accidents to the employer. This
proposal can be systematically assessed by looking to the three principal goals of a
liability system for accidental harms: deterrence, compensation, and insurance. As
a first step in investigating whether the proposed reform would further these
objectives, this Section will discuss some preliminary considerations relevant to the
optimal design of a liability rule to deal with unconscious bias-specifically the
choice between strict liability and negligence regimes.
In the discrimination context, the elements going to liability-duty, breach of duty,
and causation-are established by statute. Under the federal antidiscrimination
statute, Title VII, for example, the employer owes a duty to the employee to refrain
from taking any adverse action "because of' race or some other protected
characteristic. The duty as well as the causal relationship are defined as a function
'
of the actor's reasons or motives. The employer is permitted to "injure" or "harm"59

harbored discriminatory animus. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wiltel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508,1515 (10th Cir.
1996); Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Harvard
Univ., 900 F.2d 464,467 (1st Cir. 1990). Several other circuits allow the use of "circumstantial
evidence," but still require that the evidence tend to prove discriminatory animus on the part of the
person involved in the contested employment decision. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115
F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1997); Fields v. New York Office of Mental Retardation & Dev.
Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116,122 (2d Cir. 1997); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366,373-74 (3d
Cir. 1994). Several circuits have stated outright that "statistical evidence by nature does not merit
a mixed motive charge." Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1143 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Ostrowski
v. Atlantic Mut Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171,182 (2d Cir. 1992)); Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d
457,470 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182); see also Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at
182 ("[Plurely statistical evidence would not warrant such a charge .... "). See generally I
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 20, at 40-44.
59. See supra Part I.E (discussing adverse decisions in the workplace as generically
"harmful"). An unfavorable action against an employee operates as a setback to the employee's
interests, decreasing his "total utility" and making him worse off. However, not all "injurious"
adverse actions inflicted by employers against employees are tortious or "actionable" harms under
the employment discrimination laws. In this respect, discrimination differs somewhat in form from
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the employee by taking adverse action against him (for example, by failing to hire,
profinote, or retain him, or by inflicting detrimental treatment of any kind) for other
reasons or no reason at all, but not for reasons linked to protected characteristics."
Acting "because of' those factors gives rise to a breach of duty, and liability. The
statute also prescribes remedies for the breach of the duty not to discriminate. Under
Title VII, individual plaintiffs are entitled to back pay, equitable reinstatement, and
in some cases front pay, compensation for emotional harms, and punitive damages.
Group of claimants, or the EEOC in pattern and practice cases, can sometimes
obtain more complex equitable remedies.6
Existing antidiscrimination laws effectively erect a strict liability regime:
employers or their agents are liable for detrimental actions triggered by improper
motives regardless of whether they exercise "due care."62 Retaining the Title VII
paradigm for unconscious disparate treatment amounts to imposing a type of strict
liability for adverse actions against employees due to unconscious bias. Such a rule
would take no account of the relative costs (to the enterprise) or benefits (to the
enterprise and victim) of eliminating unconscious race-based bias in
decisionmaking. Rather, the rule would be directed at fully charging the costs of the
harms of discriminatory practices to the enterprise by forcing it to bear all costs of.
discrimination regardless of whether eliminating the harm is cost effective or
whether the harms could in practice be eliminated.
The preceding discussion suggests that the first question to ask is whether strict
liability is superior to negligence for unconscious disparate treatment claims.63 If a
negligence standard were adopted, courts would be faced with three tasks: fixing the
standard of care, deciding whether the defendant has met that standard, and
determining causation-that is, determining whether the adverse action against the

othertypes ofworkplace harms for which employers may be strictly liable, in that the employer's
causal responsibility for the injury, without more, establishes liability. See infra text accompanying
notes 67-70 (discussing the practical implications of this difference).
60. This statement is an oversimplification because common law and state law "just cause"
rules create other exceptions. See, e.g., 3. Hoult Verkerke, An EmpiricalPerspectiveon Indefinite
Term Employment Contracts:Resolving the JustCauseDebate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837. It also
overstates the purity of strict liability in practice, since many strict liability regimes, such as
products liability, effectively smuggle in elements of due care. See infra note 75.
61. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (remedies); 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994) (punitive damages); id. § 1981a(bX3) (1994) (compensation for
emotional distress and mental anguish).
62. Fora discussion of negligence and strict liability, see WILLIAMM LANDEs &RICHARDAPOSNER, ThE ECONOMC STRucTus OF ToRT LAw 85-122 (1987); RicHARD A. PosNunz,
ECONOMICANALYSIS OFLAw 163-80 (4th ed. 1992); SHAvELL, supranote 36, at 73-85. A rule
of strict vicarious or enterprise liability applies to cases of ordinary disparate treatment. A different
and more complex rule applies to sexual harassment claims, which are outside the scope of this
Article. For a discussion of enterprise liability in the unconscious discrimination context, see infra
Part ILC.4.
63. The concept of "negligent discrimination" is not unknown in legal scholarship, although
the analyses so far have not made use of concepts of accidents law. See, e.g., Brest, supranote 1;
Oppenheimer, supra note 1; Strauss, supra note 1; Allen, supra note 1.
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employee was taken "because of' a protected characteristic. 4 One important
advantage of the strict liability rule is that it dispenses with the first two of these.6
Since the first two inquiries are likely to be quite complex, cumbersome, and errorprone, the reduction from three to one will almost certainly result in a reduction in
litigation and process costs and perhaps an increase in accuracy as well. One equally
intensive and vexing factual inquiry remains, however: the mental element of
causation. Did the employer base his decision on an impermissible factor-such as
race or sex-or a permissible one?
The question of cause is harder to sort out in discrimination cases than in many
other cases of liability arising from workplace harms. The important distinction here
is between cases in which liability is effectively coextensive with causation by the
agent (e.g., the employer), and cases in which liability requires establishing
causation by the employer of a certain type. In the first type of case, establishing
"internal" causation (i.e., causation internal to the workplace) establishes liability.
Those are the cases in which strict liability almost always creates a huge advantage
in simplicity and ease of adjudication. In the second type of case, it is not enough to
establish that the employer was the agent of the injury, because the employer can
bring about the same adverse result either innocently or tortiously; rather, it is
necessary to distinguish between different types of internal causation. The advantage
of strict liability is dissipated by the need to engage in the additional causal inquiry
to distinguish between actionable internal causation and other kinds. For
discrimination, this exercise is especially difficult because the distinction is
grounded in a mental element. The fact-finder must determine whether the adverse
action was taken "because of' a protected trait or not. That determination is
unusually difficult in the case of unconscious disparate treatment.
As suggested, in most cases in which strict liability turns on the clean distinction
between internal and external causation, it is often quite easy to show that the
employer is responsible for the injury. There is no serious contention respecting the
critical element of causation when a worker's arm is cut off by industrial
machinery." Establishing that the event happened on the job is enough to ground

64. This discussion neglects another element that is arguably relevant to deciding whether
unconscious discrimination should be subject to a negligence rule: whether the harm inflicted by
unconscious bias in the workplace is "reasonably foreseeable." See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry,
Libertarianism,Entitlement and Responsibility, 26 PHIL. & PUB.Ax. 351, 356-57 (1997)
(discussing the importance of the concept of foreseeability in assigning responsibility within
liability schemes). As already suggested, and as discussed infra PartL.C.2, unconscious disparate
treatment is so elusive and difficult to demonstrate in the "real world" (as opposed to in a highly
controlled laboratory setting) that there remains a serious question whether there is any
unconscious disparate treatment in the workplace, let alone how much. It is thus unclear whether
unconscious discrimination can be said to be "reasonably foreseeable" in any accepted sense of that
term.
65. See POSNER, supra note 62, at 175-76. This is an oversimplification, because actual strict
liability regimes often limit the scope of recovery to cases in which the injury was caused by a
"defective" product-a limitation that effectively incorporates a categorical standard of care. But
that limitation is not a necessary feature of any strict liability rule. See supra note 60.
66. Thus, most workplace risks that would expose employers to liability through workmen's
compensation programs, or otherwise, are easy to monitor because there is, for all practical
purposes, absolute liability for those risks: Ifthe accident happened in the workplace-for example,
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liability. But sometimes the external/internal causation distinction is quite difficult
to make: the toxic torts cases are an example.67 In such cases, liability depends on
whether some toxic agent or condition to which the worker was exposed on the job,
as opposed to some influence outside the workplace, is causally responsible for the
injury. Making the distinction between external and internal cause is difficult in
many toxic torts cases because factoring out the influence of external or background
risk for many diseases, such as cancer, is not at all straightforward."
The inquiry for workplace discrimination is more complicated still. As with toxic
torts, there is always a serious possibility that an alternative, and nonactionable, set
of influences is responsible for the adverse event. But for discrimination, all
alternative causes, whether innocent or not, are internalto the workplace. There is
never any question that the employer caused the "injury" in the sense of being
responsible for the adverse event because only the employer can fire or discipline
an employee. But because of the way in which the employer's duty is defined under
the antidiscrimination laws, liability must implicate yet another "layer" of causation:
the plaintiff must show that the employer's action is causally linked to the
employee's race or sex Cases alleging unconscious discrimination in the workplace
thus bear an important resemblance to toxic torts claims in that causation is always
a central issue. There is always the possibility that an alternative and nonactionable
set of influences is responsible for the adverse event. But, unlike with toxic torts, the
causal question is not whether the employer caused the adverse event, as opposed
to some outside influence. Rather, it is what factor within the workplace-the
consideration of race or something else (e.g., incompetence, lack of available work,
personality conflict)-influenced the decision and produced the adverse event.69

a -worker mangles his arm in a machine-it is presumed to be the 'Taulf' of the enterprise,
regardless of the nature of the factors that contributed to it (e.g., worker carelessness). In effect,
all causes internal to the workplace are actionable, whereas those which are not lie outside. In most
cases, this makes causation easy to determine by simple observation. Likewise, it is easy for
employers to monitor potential sources of risk for the actionable events.
67. See, e.g., MCHAEL D. GREEN, BENDETIn AND BIRTH DEFEmrs: Tim CHALLENGES OF
MAss Toxic SUBSTANCES LmGATION 26 (1996); W. KiP Viscusi, EMPLOYTHAzARDS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE 264-70 (1979); Richard . Pierce, Causation in
GovernmentRegulation and Toxic Torts, 76 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1307 (1998); Glen 0. Robinson,
Multiple Causationin TortLaw: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. Rnv. 713, 721 (1982);
David Rosenberg, The CausalConnectionin MassExposure Cases:A "PublicLaw" Vision of
the TortSystem, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 855-59 (1984); Wendy F. Wagner, ChoosingIgnorance
in the Manufactureof Toxic Products,82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 776 (1997).

68. For example, a plaintiff seeking recovery for an occupational disease must address whether
exposure to a chemical at work caused his stomach cancer, or whether he would have gotten
cancer even if he had not been exposed in the workplace. That question must be answered by
recourse to epidemiology, statistical data, and numerical analyses. For a discussion of the
difficulties of sorting out issues of causation in toxic torts cases, see references cited supranote 67.
69. Even in cases of workplace injury in which causation is difficult to sort out-such as the
development of an occupational disease that may be due to toxic chemical exposure on the job-it
is relatively easier for the employer to monitor workplace exposure to the risk once the offending
agent has been identified. Not only do the innocent potential causes (for example, the background

sources of disease risk) remain fairly fixed and outside the employer's control, but it is easy to
verify, monitor, and control suspected sources of exposure to the potentially offending substance

within the workplace. Thus, even if reducing that exposure might be technically difficult and
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In sum, causation is always a central issue in discrimination cases, regardless of
the liability rule. Because causation for unconscious disparate treatment claims is
quite difficult to determine," the "claims costs," or administrative costs of
administering a strict liability rule for unconscious disparate treatment actions will
always be substantial."' Nevertheless, eliminating the need to make fact-intensive
determinations surrounding the standard of care is one highly desirable result of
choosing a strict liability rule and argues in favor of that rule in the absence of
countervailing considerations. One such consideration is that a strict liability rule
might generate a greater volume of claims-and more successful claims 7 2-than a
negligence standard. Although it would appear that this increased traffic could well
outweigh any savings to the system from eliminating the due care inquiry in
unconscious bias cases, in reality it will not. It is not just that the due care inquiry
will be extremely difficult and expensive to carry out. Rather, as the ensuing
discussion makes clear, an efficient level of care against unconscious bias cannot
possibly be established given the current state of human knowledge.73 Strict liability

expensive, the result can be effectively monitored.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 118-32.
71. See LANDEs & PosNuR, supra note 62, at 65. Landes and Posner divide the costs of
establishing a liability regime into two types. Information costs are those that relate to the
difficulties associated with setting a standard of care. See id. Claims costs are incurred in
"processing and collecting a legal claim-that is, [in] determining damages, causation, and other
issues not involving level of care." Id. Information costs would certainly be higher under a
negligence rule, but claims costs-seting aside considerations going to the number of claims-will
be quite high for both strict liability and negligence.
72. See PosNER, supra note 62, at 179 ("If most accidents that occur in some activity are
unavoidable in an economic sense either by taking greater care or by reducing the amount ofthe
activity,. . . the main effect of switching from negligence to strict liability will be to increase the
number of damages claims.'!). There might be a greater number of successful claims under the

strict liability rule if only because a negligence standard requires prcof oftwo elements-failure
to exercise due care as well as causation-whereas strict liability requires proof of only one of these

(causation).
73. Adopting a negligence rule would require fixing a level of "optimal precautions" against
unconscious bias. That level would be the one for which the benefits of taking the precautions (in
reducing the risk ofactionable harm) outweigh the costs. But, as the discussion of precautions for
unconscious bias demonstrates, see infira Part JI.C.1, the problems of determining the level of
"optimal precautions" in this area presents unique conceptual and evidentiary difficulties. First, any
methods for tracking a reduction in the incidence of actionable harm-that is, unconscious
bias-will be quite unreliable. Second, unlike in many other torts contexts, there is no common
sense or common law understanding of what reasonable precautions against cognitive bias might
mean. The determination of which precautions are "reasonable" requires an initial investment in
the resolution of technical questions that can only be answered by cognitive science. Thus, the
"information costs" of setting a standard of care are potentially quite high and the practical
difficulties extraordinarily formidable. See LANDES & PoSNER, supranote 62, at 126-31; infra

notes 115-22. Third, there is no reliable method for assessing the costs of taking precautions

against unconscious bias, because there is no currently available means of reducing cognitive bias
at all. Such expertise is well beyond the reach of psychology in its current state. See infra text
accompanying notes 118-32. Finally, although negligence theory would mandate the broadest
possible inquiry into everything that affects actual risk and the cost of reducing risk in setting the
standard of care, in practice such a comprehensive analysis is not actually undertaken and indeed
is hardly feasible. For example, the due care inquiry does not customarily include consideration of
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almost certainly represents the only reasonable candidate for a workable liability
regime directed against unconscious bias. Assuming for the purpose of discussion
that strict liability will be superior to negligence in this context, we now turn to a
consideration of whether imposing strict liability for unconscious bias will advance
the goals of deterrence, effective compensation, and insurance.
C. Deterring UnconsciousDisparateTreatment

The theory of strict liability is based on a prediction about behavior: ideally, a
rational actor forced to bear the full costs of harms generated by his activities will
invest in taking care up to the point where the marginal cost of reducing the harms
exceeds the reduction in the expected liability payments for the harms.74 The threat
of liability thus produces an economic incentive to invest in risk reduction until that
investment is no longer cost effective for the party creating the risk." The efficiency
of a strict liability rule depends on the compensation the defendant expects to pay
accurately reflecting the social costs of the harm produced by the defendant's
activity. The model assumes that reductions in harm generated by the defendant's
efforts will lead to a proportional reduction in expected liability exposure for that
party.76 Beyond that, deterrence will actually occur only if there are feasible methods
for reducing harm, and those methods are cost-effective-that is, the value of harm

activity levels, although arguably it should. See e.g., Howard Latin, Activity Levels, Due Care,and
Selective Realism in EconomicAnalysisof Tort Law, 39 RUrGERS L. RnV. 487,489-90 (1987).

Nor does it always look at the costs of eliminating sheer inattention or human carelessness. See
Mark P. Grady, Why Are PeopleNegligent? Technology, NondurablePrecautions,and the
MedicalMalpracticeExplosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293,303-07 (1988).

In the same vein, negligence is a poor vehicle for estimating the projected costs of scientific
innovations that might be developed to effect risk reduction in the long term. But see discussion
of innovation infra Part Il.C.5.e. 'Because courts are neither prescient nor scientifically
sophisticated, they are especially prone to error in setting standards of care where the creation of
risk-reduction methods depends on the development of nascent technologies. Where the
development of the science necessary for risk reduction is in its infancy-as it is for unconscious
bias--optimal care calculations cannot feasibly take the costs of such innovation into account.
74. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 878-83 (stating the theory behind
internalizing the costs of harms to the risk creator through strict liability); see also LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 62, at 64; SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 23; Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
PerverseEffects ofCorporateCriminalLiability,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994). Provided
no other party can affect the risk of the actionable harm (which, as discussed infra Part lI.C.7, is
a questionable assumption in the discrimination context), either a strict liability or negligence rule
will induce optimal investments in care, so long as due care is set as the level of care that will
maximize net benefits over costs. With negligence, the potential tortfeasor is liable only if he fails
to take due care, and therefore will invest only enough to comply with the standard of care. The
costs of all other accidents will fall on the victim. But that arrangement is efficient because greater

investment in care would reduce risk only at excessive cost.
75. For example, if a $100 investment in precautions will reduce a party's expected damages
by $150, the party will make the investment If liability will be reduced by only $90, the party will
not make the investment

76. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 878-83. Expected damages are a function
of the overall probability of being held liable for a harm multiplied by the value of the relief
awarded when liability is found. See id. at 874.
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reduction exceeds the cost of precautions. At one extreme, cost effective precautions
may virtually eliminate the risk. At the other extreme, risk reduction may be very
hard to achieve. If cost-effective precautions reduce harm very little, then strict
liability will not necessarily change the level of harm very much or at all.
The first question to consider is whether effective deterrence is a reasonable
prospect for unconscious disparate treatment. Will imposing strict liability on
employers in this context tend to reduce the risk that employees will fall victim to
unconscious bias? The answer depends on whether employers will be induced to
take effective precautions against the offending behavior. But how would employers
take precautions against unconscious bias? Assuming that strict liability as applied
to unconscious bias will preserve the preexisting structure of vicarious liability
structure for agents' discrimination," then either employers must find a way to
reorder the personnel system to minimize the danger of biased decisionmaking
among direct line supervisors, or supervisors must learn to minimize their own
tendencies in this direction and employers must effectively conscript them to this
task. Unfortunately, the state of knowledge in cognitive psychology provides reason
to doubt that firms could devise effective programs to help supervisors escape the
influence of group-based biases. Likewise, direct-line supervisors cannot be
expected to control their own unconscious thought processes to avoid discriminatory
decisions.
1. Precautions Against Unconscious Bias
Research in cognitive psychology suggests that biases in judgment stemming from
categorical generalizations cannot be reliably manipulated or controlled either by
the person harboring those biases or by outsiders seeking to redesign the
decisionmaking process to reduce such bias. Inherent features of human cognition
prevent individuals from detecting or effectively correcting all but the most
egregious biases in their own judgments. And science is not close to achieving an
understanding of the rules of human psychology that would enable outsiders to
manipulate decisionmaking conditions or teach social actors how to control their
own thought processes to reduce or eliminate categorical biases on a systematic
basis.
Two recently published review articles, which summarize and analyze a
voluminous literature in cognitive and social psychology, make the case against the
controllability of "mental contamination"-that is, the unwanted influence of
unconscious group-based stereotypes on discretionary social judgments.7" After
surveying the major experimental evidence on bias control, John Bargh asserts that
"the evidence of controllability is weaker and more problematic than we would like
to believe."79 He suggests that an optimistic stance towards the controllability of
stereotyping is based on an "overestimat[ion of] the degree to which automatically
activated stereotypes can be controlled through good intentions and effortful

77. For discussion of enterprise liability, see infra Part l.C.4.
78. See Wilson &Brekke, supra note 11, at 119-28; Bargh, supra note 11, at 366-78. For
discussion and definition of "mental contamination," see supraPart IIA
79. Bargh, supra note 11, at 361.
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thought."" Bargh concurs8 with the analysis offered by the authors of the other
review, Tim Wilson and Nancy Brekke, who conclude that "due to lack of awareness
ofimental processes, the limitations of mental control, and the difficulty of detecting
bias, it is often very difficult to avoid or undo mental contamination."' Wilson and
Brekke assert that in order for contamination of judgments to be avoided, four
conditions must be met. First, the decisionmaker "must be aware of the unwanted
mental process." That awareness could conceivably stem from "direct introspective
access to the process," or from some type of external evidence indicating that the
bias is operating.' Second, a person must be motivated to correct the error. Third,
even ifmotivated, the decisionmaker "must be aware of the direction and magnitude
of the bias."' Finally, the person must have "sufficient control over [the responses]
to be able to correct the unwanted mental processing.""
The authors explain that in most cases of unconscious mental contamination-and
especially where persons are engaging in the type of multifactorial subjective
assessment that is common to workplace settings and is the central concern of this
Article-these conditions cannot generally be met. First, individuals cannot detect
unconscious mental contamination at work, because they have no introspective
access to their unconscious processes. As Wilson and Brekke state, "When
[persons] form an evaluation of someone, what they experience subjectively is
usually the final product (e.g., 'This guy is pretty attractive'), not the mental
processes that produced this product." ' Observations of the "final product" or the
outcome of a process of assessment are usually of "little help to the lay person trying
to untangle what influenced his or her judgments in everyday life." ' When it comes
to unconscious bias "one is never one's own control group." 8 Trying to detect
unconscious bias from the "outside" by looking at the results of a handful of

80.Id.at 362.
81. Id. at 370-71.
82. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 11, at 117.
83.Id.at 119.
84. Id. at 120.
85.Id.
86. Id. at 121 (parenthetical in original).
87.Id at 122. On this point, see, for example, Bodenhausen & Macrae, supra note 15, at 22,
37; Alan J. Lambert et al., Rethinking Some AssumptionsAbout Stereotype Inhibition:Do We
Need to CorrectOur TheoriesAbout Correction?,in 11 ADVANCES IN SociAL CoGN1TIoN, supra
note 15, at 141; Yaacov Trope & Akiva Liberman, SocialHypothesisTesting: Cognitive and
MotivationalMechanisms,in SOCIAL:PsYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 239,265

(E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996) (noting that "evidential biases may also
contribute to 'wishful thinking," or unwarranted high confidence in desirable hypotheses'); Krieger
I, supra note 1, at 1285-91; Diederik A. Stapel et al., The Smell of Bias: What Instigates
CorrectionProcessesin SocialJudgments?,24 . PERsoNALnTY & SOC. PSYcHOL. 797, 797

(1998) ("[T]here is no phenomenal experience that reliably accompanies the making of a biased
judgment as compared to an accurate judgment People can feel just as confident about their bad
judgments as their good judgments..).
88. Susan T. Fiske, Stereoyping,Prejudice,and Discrimination,in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOClALPsYCHOLoGY,supra note 16, at 357,384; see also id. at 384-91 (stressing the difficulties
in detecting and accurately correcting unconscious biases); Wegner &Bargh, supra note 16, at
469-78 (same); Stapel et al., supra note 87, at 805-06.
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workplace decisions is thus unlikely to yield reliable evidence of mental
contamination. Only repeated experimental trials that observe the fate of large
numbers of employees under controlled conditions can claim to reveal the influence
of unwanted biases on workplace judgments.89 But this "experimental method is of
little help to the layperson who is trying to determine the extent to which a particular
judgment is biased."9"
It is also virtually impossible to identify and correct bias from the "inside"-that
is, through introspective processes. Decisionmakers are generally unaware of the
magnitude and direction of their own automatic biases. Even if they could willfully
activate mechanisms to control and correct for presumed biases, they would have
difficulty calibrating the corrective measures because they cannot gauge the precise
extent to which particular biases are distorting their mental processes. 9 The
decisionmaker's incapacity is grounded in "source confusion"-defined as "the
inability to recognize the exact contribution of all the influences on our
judgments."' Our social responses in everyday life are usually multidetermined: "It
is as if our minds were an inscrutable cauldron of mental activity."9 For example,
our evaluation of a job candidate ordinarily "is based on more than one of the
candidate's many attributes."94 A supervisor who judges a worker favorably does not
really know how much weight he has placed on speed, accuracy, sociability,
responsiveness, aggressiveness, or other attributes. The inability to tease apart
different sources of influence on judgment stems from the hidden and inaccessible
nature of the mental processes at work, which take place automatically and outside
of our awareness. The problem of source confusion is made even worse by the selfconfirming nature of stereotypical thinking, which appears to alter the ways in which
95
social information is noticed, remembered, interpreted, and processed at the outset.

89. See Wilson &Brekke, supra note 11, at 121.
90. Id. at 122.
91. See, e.g., Bodenhausen & Macrae, supra note 15, at 37 (It is difficult to estimate "the
degree of bias already present in one's private impressions." This difficulty impedes an
understanding of "the degree of correction that is required in order to compensate adequately.
Given the fizziness ofimpressional metrics, it may be hard to know exactly how much adjustment
is required.'); see also Stapel et al., supra note 87, at 803 (noting that subjects can respond to
being told that their judgments are biased and need correction, but cannot calibrate their responses).
92.Wilson & Brekke, supra note 11, at 129.
93. Id;see also Fritz Strack &Bettina Hannover,Awareness ofInfluence as aPrecondition
for ImplementingCorrectionalGoals, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACTION: LmnKNG CoGNrTON AND
MoTIvAToN To BEHAvIoR 579, 579-86 (Peter M. Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh eds., 1996).
94. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 11, at 129.
95. Some research suggests that mental categories sometimes guide subsequent information
processing and lead to selective attention and learning that tends to confirm and strengthen
expectations established by preexisting stereotypes. Because the subject is unaware that
information is being ignored or discounted, he has little reason to question the validity of his
assessments. See, e.g., David L. Hamilton et al., Social Cognition and the Study ofStereotpping,
in SOCIALCOGNITIO.NIMPACTON SOCIALPSYCHOLOGY 315 (Patricia (. Devine et al. eds., 1994).

[S]tereotypes tend to bias information processing in ways that maintain and preserve
the existing belief system. People tend to seek and remember information that
confirms their stereotypes, and hence at the level of the perceiver's subjective
experience, those stereotypes are validated by experience. Thus, the use of a
stereotype serves to reinforce its apparent usefulness.
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Because information that defies entrenched categories may be selectively discounted
or ignored, stereotype-contaminated judgments may tend to reinforce themselves
over time.
Given these features of mental contamination, it should come as no surprise that
no known interventions can reliably reduce or eliminate dependence on categorical
thinking in real-life social encounters.96 In general, research directed at modifying
stereotypes or diminishing their influence is riven by rival theories and contradictory
results. The literature reveals that psychologists have taken a range of approaches
in attempting to reduce categorical thinking triggered by group membership. These
include: enhancing the "salience" of protected traits, imposing decisionmaker
accountability, manipulating amount and type of informational inputs, developing
criteria to screen decisionmakers for biased thinking, and inducing intensive selfmonitoring.' On careful inspiotion, none of these methods offers much promise or
provides consistent guidance for workplace actions.
Legal commentators have suggested that enhancing the "salience" of race or
sex-by causing a decisionmaker to notice or think about a target's group
98
identity-can create conditions that depress the tendency to stereotype.

Id.; see also Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15, at 55 ("From the cognitive perspective, the
mechanisms that promote the use of stereotypes can undermine the effectiveness of efforts to
change stereotypical beliefs"; id at 48 ("The perceiver 'sees' a pattern of information that seems
to provide evidence for the 'validity' of the beliefs that themselves influence the way the
information is processed.").
96. In reviewing the literature on "prejudice reduction," Wilson and Brekke state that "in
general, these studies find a wide range of seemingly contradictory effects" from interventions.
Some have no effect while others trigger inadequate or exaggerated responses in varying
directions. Wilson & Brekke, supranote 11, at 129-34 (reviewing studies); see also Hamilton et
al., supranote 95, at 314-15 ("Despite several recent efforts to pinpoint the factors underlying
stereotype change, there still are no good answers."); Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15, at 47
(reviewing the field, and stating that "despite the importance of this question, the problem of
changing stereotypes remains a very real and unsolved dilemma"); Krieger IJ,supra note 1, at
1247 (concluding, after reviewing the literature on bias reduction, that "[w]e need additional
theoretical and perhaps even empirical investigations into how to reduce cognitive sources of
bias"); Allen, supra note 1, at 1323-24 (stating that "[t]here is a surprising lack of available
information about how to reduce any sort ofracism... [since] there is little published information
onthe effectiveness of any given technique'); Bargh, supranote 11, at 361-66 (casting doubt on
the evidence that stereotyping can be controlled).
There are, of course, two reliable methods for eliminating race or sex-based biases in social
evaluation and in occupational settings in particular. One is what Wilson and Brekke term
"exposure control": depriving the discretionary decisionmaker of any information or knowledge
about the target's protected characteristic. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 11, at 134-36. Blind law
school grading is one such mechanism. Orchestra auditions behind a curtain is another. See, e.g.,
CLAUDIA GOLDIN & CEcILIA ROUSE, ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY: THE IPACT OF 'BLIND"

AuDrIoNs oNFEMALEMusIcLANS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5903,

1997). Alternatively, the subjective element in decisionmaking can be completely eliminated by
shifting to exclusive reliance on an objective process, such as multiple choice ability testing, that
leaves no room forthe decisionmaker's discretion. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 30, at 1158; see
also supraPart IA (noting that these options are not feasible in most industrial settings).
97. For general reviews, see Fiske, supra note 88; Wegner &Bargh, supra note 16; Wilson
&Brekke, supra note 11; Bargh, supra note 11.
98. See, e.g., ARMOUR, supra note 1, at 139-40; Johnson, supra note 1, at 1032-33.
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Alternatively, stressing common interests across groups, rather than enhancing
awareness of group identity, may help control stereotypical habits of thought. For
example, the contact hypothesis posits that working conditions that encourage
individuals from different groups to "conceive of themselves as a single,
superordinate group" will reduce categorical judgments about persons from other
groups.99 A close look at the experimental evidence, however, reveals that the
effects of attempting to manipulate the salience of group membership are equivocal
and depend upon specifics of experimental design and approach.' A recent
comprehensive review of the intergroup contact hypothesis, for example, concludes
that attempts to create conditions that encourage solidarity across conventional
group boundaries will sometimes appear to reduce bias and at other times

99. For a recent review of the contact hypothesis see, for example, John F. Dovidio et al.,
IntergroupBias: Status, Differentiation,and a Common In-Group Identity, 75 J. PERsONALrTV
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 109, 109 (1998).
100. Psychologists have tried to make women or minorities more noticeable by manipulating
the ratio of persons of different sexes or races in a social setting or by changing the order of
presentation ofpersons or information to be evaluated. See Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 15, at
157-58; Shelley E. Taylor, A CategorizationApproach to Stereotyping,in COGNrrTvE PROCESsES
iN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 83,89-100.
For example, subjects' responses to "target" persons of a particular race or sex are sometimes
observed to depend on whether the targets are well-represented within a group or are in the clear
minority. In the latter case, persons are said to function as "tokens" or "solos" in a social setting.
In one experiment,token individuals observed interacting at a meeting were judged "as more active
and talkative during the discussion, as having had more influence on the group discussion, and
[were] rated more extremely on personality characteristics." Hamilton & Trolier, supranote 15,
at 135. Experimental subjects also tended-to recall more of what tokens said in the course of a
group interaction. See id.
Other researchers report complex frequency effects in which subjects' evaluations of persons
within a group depend on the ratio of persons of different races present See David L. Hamilton
et aL, The FormationofStereolypic Beliefs: FurtherEidenceforDistinctiveness-BasedIllusory

Correlations,48 J.PERsoNry& Soc. PsYcHoL. 5,14-16 (1985); David L. Hamilton &Robert
K. Gifford, Illusory Correlationin InterpersonalPerception:A CognitiveBasis ofStereotypic
Judgments, 12 J. ExpmmEnn AL & Soc. PsYCHoL. 392,405 (1976); Hamilton & Trolier, supra
note 15, at 136. Yet other studies show that, depending on the behaviors or interactions being
witnessed, subjects generally have a more extreme positive or negative reaction to "solo blacks"
than to black (or white) persons in balanced groups. See Taylor, supra,at 89-100; see also John
B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE,
DIScRuENATION,ANDRACeiS,supra note 15, at 91, 102-10 (noting that black job applicants were
judged more negatively or more positively than white applicants, depending on the order in which
rdsums were presented and whether decisionmaker rates "high-prejudice" or "low-prejudice" on
responses to a questionnaire). Other experiments use "priming" techniques that subliminally
attempt to tigger stereotypical categories by exposing subjects to suggestive words or stimuli. See,
eg., Bodenhausen & Macrae, supranote 15, at 22-34 (Priming of stereotypic thoughts can lead
to initial suppression but later "rebound" effects that make categories harder to forget); Blair &
Banaji, supra note 14, at 1143. The effects of the "salience-enhancing" devices observed in all
these studies are often hard to characterize as positive or negative in their influence on the
"harmful" use of group-based biases. Rather, the results of the experiments are distinctly mixed
and are dependent on context and experimental design in detailed and often idiosyncratic ways that
generate few usable lessons for the range of evaluative situations encountered in the workplace.
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exacerbate it.' In general, the implications of the work on salience and group
mixing for real-life contexts is ambiguous.
Psychologists have also examined the effects of introducing devices designed to
enhance experimental subjects' "accountability." Subjects are asked to explain the
reasons for their evaluative decisions, or are told they will be rewarded for making
assessments that are judged "accurate" or "correct."" 2 The results of this research
have also been ambiguous and have generated few useful lessons for the
employment setting." 3 Others have looked at the effects of exposing the

101. See Dovidio et al., supra note 99, at 110.
102. See, ag., Bargh, supra note 11, at 371-72 (discussing work on "accuracy motivation" in
controlling stereotypes).
103. See Ralph Erber & Susan T. Fiske, Outcome Dependency andAttention to Inconsistent
Information, 47 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 709, 724-25 (1984); Susan T. Fiske,
ControllingOther People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping,48 AM. PsYCHoLOGIsT 621,
The Effect ofApplicantAge,Job Level, andAccountability
627 (1993); RandallA Gordon et al.,
onPerceptionsofFemaleJobApplicants,123 J. PsYcHoL. 59, 61-66 (1988); Steven L. Neuberg
& Susan T. Fiske, MotivationalInfluences on Impression Formation:Outcome Dependency,
PERSONALrrY &Soc. PSYCHOL.
Accuracy-Drlven Attention, andIndividuatingProcesses,53 J.
431, 434-41 (1987); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental

AttributionError,48 Soc. PsYCHOL. Q. 227,230-33 (1985); Tetlock, supra note 33, at 76-80;
Philip E. Tetlock & Jac II Kim, Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality
PredictionTask, 52 J.
PERSONALrrY &Soc. PSYCHOL. 700,702-06 (1987); Thomas E. Nelson
et al., Everyday BaseRates (Sex Stereotypes): PotentandResilient, 59 J.PERSONALrrY & Soc.
PsYcHoL. 664,666-69 (1990).
One example of making subjects "accountable" is to offer a monetary reward for successfully
cooperating in a task with a person the subject was previously required to evaluate. See Fiske,
supra, at 627; Neuberg &Fiske, supra,at 34-35. Alternatively, subjects are asked to justify or
explain their evaluations ofjob applicants to a person in authority. See Gordon et al., supra,at 6164; Tetlock & Kim, supra,at 702-04; Tetlock, supra note 33, at 76-80. According to one of the
leading researchers in the field, some of these studies suggest that accountability "can, under
certain conditions, motivate people to become more vigilant and self-critical information
processors." Tetlock & Kim, supra,at 706. However, it is not clear from the studies discussed
whether the observations of increased "vigilance" correspond to any actual reduction in reliance
on race or sex-based stereotypical assumptions.
Some studies use longer processing times, for example, as a marker for "individuated" rather
than "category-based" processing. See Neuberg &Fiske, supra,at 434. The relationship between
long processing times and prejudice reduction is unexplored. Many of the studies suffer from a
similar absence ofany clear tie between the procedural parameters of "vigilance" or "self-criticism"
and more "accurate" or less biased assessment, and none purport to establish a benchmark for
measuring whether "accountability" interventions result in a better or more "correcf' evaluation of
target persons. Nor do they incorporate any direct measure of changes in reliance on race or sexbased mental categories. Moreover, the results of these studies are erratic, suggesting that
"accountability does not always lead to greater cognitive work." Tetlock, supranote 33, at 75; see,
ag, Nelson etal., supra,at 671 (observing fitility of attempts to induce disregard of base rates for
male and female height through monetary rewards); Nelson et al., supra note 15, at 23-30
(reporting a number of experiments in which "a variety of motivational tactics" failed to
"destereotype"judgments). Indeed, there is evidence that imposing accountability conditions can
sometimes cause subjects to take positions that they believe will please those to whom they are
accountable. See Tetlock, supra note 33, at 80-82 (1983) (reviewing findings that suggest that
"accountability motivates cognitive work only when subjects do not have the lazy option of
expressing views that they are confident will gain the approval of the person to whom they feel
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decisionmaker to greater amounts or a different mix of information about the target.
Although some studies suggest that decisionmakers rarely ignore individuating
information,'" there is no good evidence that simply exposing the decisionmaker to
more detailed information about a target can be relied upon to reduce the influence
of categorical assumptions." 5

accountable"). Finally, in some eases, efforts to impose negative consequences on subjects for
"wrong answers" or inaccurate assessments actually lead to "more stereotypical impressions of all
applicants." Gordon et al., supra,at 59; see Wegner & Bargh, supranote 16, at 473-74 (describing
how accountability and attention to stereotyping can backfire or produce "ironic effects" of
heightened reliance on stereotypes); Fiske, supra note 88, at 390. For extensive reviews of studies
of the effects on judgment of manipulating personal stake or accountability conditions, see Nelson
et al., supra note 15, at 30-32; Trope & Liberman, supra note 87, at 254-58; see also id.at 265
(concluding that "accuracy motivation does-not necessarily eliminate confirmation biases" and that
accuracy incentives "may not prevent implicit evidential biases that favor hypothesis
confirmation").
104. See, e.g., Victor Ottati & Yueh-Ting Lee, Accuracy: A Neglected Component of
StereoopeResearch,in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY: TOWARD APPRECiATING GROUP DIFFERENCEs,

supra note 23, at 29,45 ("In fact,perceivers rarely completely disregard individuating information
about a social category member."); see also McCauley, Are Stereotypes Exaggerated?,supranote
23, at 215, 238-41 (pointing out thatthe influence of cognitive categories does not rule out the use
of individuating information, if available); Kunda & Thagard, supra note 24, at 290-91 (stating
that dominance of stereotypes versus individuating information depends on baseline amount of
information provided and on particular judgment task).
105. As a general matter, research yields an uncertain answer on whether more or less
"individuating" information about targets makes for better or more accurate judgments. See, e.g.,
Arie W. Kruglanski, The Psychology ofBeing "Right": The Problem ofAccuracy in Social
Perception and Cognition, 106 PSYCHoL. BULL. 395, 400 (1989) (noting that the "relation
between the amount ofinformation and accuracy seems complex" and that "processing more and
more seemingly relevant information does not necessarily improve one's chances of reaching a
correctjudgment'"). There is some limited evidence, however, that providing more individualized
information about targets can reduce reliance on stereotypes under some circumstances. See, e.g.,
Nelson et al., supra note 15, at 30-36. But see id. at 32 (noting that even the most suggestive
research "points to continuing category effects, even under conditions that favor individuation").
See also, e.g., Swim et al., supra note 14, at 421 (summarizing multiple studies suggesting that,
in general, "women will be rated less favorably than men when less information is presented," and
that "the amount of information provided may influence effect size"). The studies reported by
Swim and her co-authors generally compare the effect of providing little or no information (except
sex) about a target with providing detailed individuating information. Id. at 422 (citing Anne
Locksley et al, Sex Stereotypes and SocialJudgment,39 J. PERSONAUTY & Soc. PsYcI-oL. 821
(1980)). Clearly this comparison does not mirror the workplace, where employers possess, as a
baseline, a fair amount of information in addition to group identity about both current and
prospective employees. The studies described above can say little about whether providing even
more information on top of substantial amounts already available would have any stereotypeabating effects.
There is evidence from some studies that the degree of stereotyping may vary with the qualities
and attributes reflected in the information provided-including, for example, whether the
information is stereotype consistent or inconsistent See Fiske, supra note 88, at 385-86; Lee J.
Jussim et al., Why Study Stereotype Accuracy and Inaccuracy?,in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY:
TOWARDAPPRECIATING GROUP DIFFERENCES, supra note 23, at 3, 13. This suggests that targets
who acquire outstanding qualifications or otherwise possess attributes that are atypical of groups
otherwise judged negatively might perhaps be assessed in less stereotypical ways. See infra text
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Alternatively, researchers have looked at whether exposure to information that
tends to disconfirm a stereotype might "affect the preexisting stereotypic beliefs."' 6
This work has generated a number of conceptual hypotheses concerning whether,
and how, exposure to "new" information can alter stereotypical thinking. But none
has emerged as the clear winner or produced a workable program for action.'0 7
Attempts to screen out overt bigots likewise do not offer much promise. Cognitive
generalizations and stereotypical thinking can be subliminally triggered in

accompanying notes 240-46 for a discussion of "moving targets." The availability of such
information in real life depends on variations in the actual profile of the person being assessed,
which in turn depends on the target's qualifies, attributes, and qualification. Those parameters are
sometimes within the control of the person being evaluated. See infra note 120. But assuming a
targetwith given attributes (a "fixed" target), it is not possible based on available evidence to say
that more information about that target rather than less always serves the goal of reducing reliance
on group-based biases. And the literature provides very little guidance on when more information
does serve this purpose.
106. Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15, at 49; see alsosupra note 105.
107. According to the "bookkeeping" model of stereotype change, categories are continuously
and gradually adjusted in light of information and experience that "either strengthen[s] or
weaken[s] existing stereotypes by some modest amount" Thus, "stereotypes are constantly in a
state of on-line revision as new information is incorporated." Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15,
at 50; see also Myron Rothbart, Memory Processesand SocialBelief,in CoGNrrIv PRocEss~s
IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 145, 178. The "conversion

model" posits sudden and dramatic paradigm shifts in response to the accumulation of a sufficient
amount of stereotype-disconfirming evidence. See Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15, at 50;
Rothbart, supra, at 176. Finally, the "subtyping" hypothesis predicts that disconfirming evidence
causes broad categorical schema to be broken down into smaller subcategories. The subcategories
do not abolish the influence of preexisting beliefs and assumptions, but lead them to be "applied
less generally." Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15, at 50; see Marilynn B. Brewer et al.,
Perceptionsof theElderly: Stereotypes asPrototypes,41 3. PERSONALrTY &Soc. PsYCHOL. 656,
668(1981).
Evidence for any ofthese models is inconclusive. For example, work on subtyping reveals that
disconfirming information-as with exposure to a person who clearly defies a stereotype-is often
quite ineffective in changing entrenched categorical expectations because people will simply
distinguish the exceptional person from the group. Alternatively, they will classify that person
within an ancillary subgroup or category that leaves larger cognitive categories essentially intact
Hamilton and Sherman give the example of
the football player who earns straight As, prefers fine wine, classical music, and
English literature to beer, hard rock, and comic books, and shows warmth and
sensitivity in his interpersonal relationships. [That person] will not be categorized as
a' joek," but rather as a "sophisticate" who happens to play a sport. That is, because
he so completely violates the "jock' stereotype, he is not perceived as a member of
that category.
Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 15, at 53.
Hamilton and Sherman summarize the evidence in this area as suggesting that "there is a
delicate balance between the extent to which an individual provides stereotype-disconfirming
information and the ability of that information to have an impact on the preexisting stereotype."
Id. at 53. They conclude that "presenting examples of individuals who strongly disconfirm
stereotypic expectancies can be expected to have little, if any, effect, because those individuals will
not be viewed as category members.'Id at 54. Rather, a more effective vehicle of change might
be an individual who "provide[s] some diseonfirmation of the stereotype," is perceived "as a
'good' member of the target group," but does not depart too radically from the stereotype. Id.

1166

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:1129

individuals categorized as both "high prejudice" and "low prejudice" based on
answers to questionnaires or observations of behavior in experimental situations.
Research indicates that persons with tolerant or progressive views of outsider
groups are not immune from behavior that suggests subliminal biases." 8
Finally, some legal commentators have suggested that the adoption of simple or
commonsense mental devices, such as engaging in introspective self-criticism or
attempting to feel empathy for people who are "different," will go a long way
towards banishing cognitive bias from persons' thinking. For example a
decisionmaker should routinely force himself to consider the possibility that bias is
at work." 9 He should attempt to "individuate" the decisionmaking process by
seeking out and relying more heavily on specific information about the person being
evaluated.110 Alternatively, he should try to imagine that he and the employee are the

108. See, e.g., Bargh,supra note 11, at 364-65 (arguing that activation of subliminal stereotypes
does not track tendency to express overt prejudice); Timothy D. Wilson et al.,A Model ofDual

Attitudes,PsYcHoL.REv. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 11, on file with author) (stating that
"a number of studies have found low correspondence between implicit and explicit measures of
prejudice"); Biernat & Manis, supra note 24, at 18 (noting the direction of stereotyping is
unpredictable and incidence erratic); Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced
Responses:ImplicationsforProgressin Prejudice-ReductionEfforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 469,469 (1993) (citing studies which "found that the vast majority of low prejudiced
subjects" were "prone to prejudice-related discrepancies"); see alsoNelson et al., supra note 15,
at 28-29 (noting studies suggesting that gender role ideology is not predictably related to the
tendency to make stereotypical judgments of experimental targets); John Duckitt; Psychology and
Preudice:A HistoncalAnalysisandIntegrativeFramework,47 Am PSYCHOLOGIST 1182, 1189
(1997) ("[T]he cognitive paradigm is seriously incomplete .... [l]t has made little if any
contribution to explaining individual differences in intergroup attitudes and behavior.');
McConahay, supra note 100, at 99 (finding persons who score high on prejudicial sentiments or

altitudes will sometimes discriminate in favor and sometimes against members of minority groups,
depending on context and circumstance); Taylor, supra note 100, at 100 (demonstrating that
subjects vary considerably and somewhat unpredictably in the degree to which they sexstereotype); iad
at 110 (use ofstereotypes is "remarkably fluid and dependent on the features of the
context in which persons are observed'); Wegner & Bargh, supra note 16, at 472-73 (stating that
stereotypic behavioral response to subliminal racial stimuli is "not moderated by participants'
Modem Racism scores").
109. See ARMOUR, supra note 1, at 139-41 (recommending that persons make an effort to
"recall their personal beliefs"when making judgments that might be infected by stereotyping).
David Oppenheimer suggests that, when action is taken against a minority job applicant, the
decisionmaker should "instantly stop and examine his or her own motives." Oppenheimer, supra
note 1, at 970. Oppenheimer asserts that if the decision "cannot be justified with a reasonable
nondiscriminatory reason," then the decisionmaker should conclude that "the decision may have
been negligently reached." Id. Oppenheimer provides no further guidance, however, on how the
decisionmaker is to determine whether the decision was in fact negligently reached, although
aspects of his discussion suggest that perhaps objective validation (that is, the ability to demonstrate

alinkto some kind of result, like workplace productivity) should be the test This would, in effect,
require that all decisions survive a standard reserved for claims of disparate impact See supra notes
20, 54 (comparing disparate impact to disparate treatment claims).
110. See Selmi, supra note 1, at 1297-98.
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same race."' Or he simply should take responsibility for his own intentional acts. 2
The commentators generally assume that these self-help methods will work better
ifthe protected attribute is called to the decisionmaker's attention or is made more
"salient""' But, as already discussed, attempts to enhance the salience of protected
traits produces mixed results."' In any event, the studies cited by these
commentators offer no convincing evidence that decisionmakers' attempts to
manipulate their own mental processes wil enable them to identify judgments
contaminated by group-based generalizations, will produce well-calibrated
reductions in the influence of such biases, or will issue in either more "neutral" or
"better" decisionmaking. Some cognitive and social psychologists do appear to
express greater optimism than Wilson and Brekke about the prospects for avoiding
or correcting stereotypic inclinations in the judgment of specific individuals, but the
evidence that subjects can reliably and precisely control stereotyped thinking is
remarkably thin. Informing subjects that their conclusions are probably infected with
bias, or urging subjects to "try harder" or to "be more careful" has been observed
to induce some subjects, for example, to take more time with decisions or to
consider a broader range of information. But the great majority of pertinent studies
contains no convincing evidence that these shifts in decisionmaking strategy
necessarily make for more accurate or "more neutral" subjective appraisals of
others. The external criteria or experimental controls necessary for drawing such
conclusions are almost always lacking."' This point applies with particular force to

111. See e.g, Sheri Lynn Johnson, RacialImageryin CriminalCases,67 TUL.L. REV. 1739,
1799-1802 (1993); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1032-33.
112. See McGinley,supra note 1, at 1470-71, discussing the work of psychologist Susan Fiske.
Fiske argues in favor ofholding decisionmakers responsible for unconscious bias. She asserts that
the decisionmaker "knows how to individuate" in the assessment of a person's attributes and
qualifications. She also contends that the process of evaluating an employee is "potentially
controllable" because the supervisor could, in some sense, "choose" to evaluate him differently.
See Fiske, supra note 101, at 626; see also Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role ofIntent, in
UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253,276 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989).
Fiske's analysis has been questioned implicitly by other social psychologists and is flawed by
fundamental errors in logic and lack of experimental support See, e.g., Bargh, supra note 11, at
365-66 (calling into question conclusions of Fiske and her coworkers). Wilson and Brekke's
analysis makes clear that, even if a supervisor chooses to focus more intently on "individuating
information" and then determines to alter his judgment, it does not follow that he has succeeded

in badiing unconscious trait-based bias from his thought'processes. See Wilson & Brekke, supra
note 11, at 130-37. By definition, the true character of the supervisor's decision-the causal
antecedents--aro hidden from him. That he can "choose" to act differently does not guarantee he
will act in an unbiased way.
113. See, e.g., ARMOUR, supra note 1, at 139-53.
114. See discussion supratext accompanying notes 96-103.
115. JodyArmour, a leading "precaution optimist," argues that enhancing the decisionmaker's
consciousness of the race or sex of a "target" can help the decisionmaker"consciously monitor
(his] habitual responses," and "resist prejudice-like responses when making judgments about..
.group member[s]."AimouR, supra note 1, at 150. But Armour relies on studies that have little
obvious relevance to assessments of employee performance in the workplace. Rather, those
studies show that using various devices to call race or gender to experimental subjects' attention
will cause the subjects to vary their responses on questionnaires to express fewer overtly
stereotypical attitudes when asked to offer a description ofthemselves or of a target person. See
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the multifactorial, subjective, "clinical" judgments of the type with which this
Article is centrally concerned."" Indeed, for the reasons detailed by Wilson and

id. at 140. Armour ignores equally strong evidence that'hinking harder" or focusing on trying
to avoid bias can backfire by increasing reliance on stereotypes or producing greater errors in
judgment See Fske,supranote 88, at 390 (noting how stereotypes may "rebound with redoubled
force"when they are consciously controlled); Wegner &Bargh, supra note 16, at 473-74 (same);
Timothy D. Wilson et al., IntrospectingAboutReasons Can Reduce Post-ChoiceSatisfaction,
19 PmEONALITY& Soc. PsYcrsoL. BuLL. 331,332 (1993) (same); Wilson & Brekke, supranote

11, at 127 (same); Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much:
IntrospectionCan Reduce the Quality ofPreferencesandDecisions,60 J.
PERSONAUTY & Soc.

PsYcHoL. 181,191 (1991) (same).
A number of cognitive psychologists, including Patricia Devine, Susan Fiske, and their
colleagues, have argued, perhaps in some tension with Wilson and Brekke, that automatic
stereotyping can be controlled at times by conscious processes. Upon close inspection, however,
their evidence for these conclusions consists primarily of observations about the way in which
subjects shift their decisionmaking strategies (e.g., they take more time with decisions, appear to
consider more information, and express opinions or offer descriptions of targets that are more often
at odds with stereotypic expectations). These researchers do not offer any systematic assessment
ofthe kinds of subjective, evaluative judgments that are the central concem of this Article. What
is missing from the studies is a demonstration of the greater accuracy or group-independence of
performance assessments that subjects have attempted to "correct" through conscious efforts to
control stereotypes. Such evidence would require controlled experimental conditions or an
independent criterion of accurate or neutral appraisal. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 24; Erber &
Fiske,supranote 103; Neuberg &Fiske,supra note 103. For a critical assessment of Fiske's work
on controlling stereotypes, with some confounding findings, see Nelson et al., supra note 15, at
15-19, 31. For a critique of Devine's work, see Wilson et al., supra note 108 (manuscript at 11)
(noting that Devine's work focuses "on the activation of stereotypical knowledge about members
of other groups and not on the activation of affect or evaluation") (both emphases added).
116. There is literature suggesting that subjective appraisals can be made more consistent and
reliable by breaking the components of such appraisals down into smaller evaluative units and
assigning those units some kind of scalar or quantitative value. See William M. Grove &Paul E.
Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal
(Mechanical,Algorithmic) PredictionProcedures: The Clinical-StatisticalControversy, 2

PSYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y &L. 293,293-95 (1996) (reviewing the "clinical" versus the "actuarialstatistical"judgment literature). Clinical decisionmaking denotes the application of a loose set of
criteria in an impressionistic, subjective, and discretionary manner to form a holistic judgment
There is no good evidence that clinical judgments are improved by the individual decisionmaker's
efforts to "think harder," to attend to some criteria with greater care, or to change the relative
emphasis on factors in the mix Indeed, as noted, there is evidence that more intensive
introspection leads to less accurate or satisfactory decisions. See Grove & Meebi, sup ra, at 313;
Wilson et al., supranote 115, at 338; Wilson & Schooler, supra note 115, at 191.
Some improvement can be achieved, however, by shifting from holistic clinical methods to
"actuarial" systems. Actuarial systems do not eliminate the subjective element ofjudgment, but
simply try to make it more systematic. In actuarial systems, judges are asked to assign a specific
albeit subjectively derived, rating in discrete categories to the "target" being assessed. Those rating,
are then combined using some kind of fixed quantitative formula. For example, a psychiatrist migh
be asked to make a prediction about the future dangerousness of a mental patient Ordinarily h,
would make a clinical judgment based on an overall impression derived from a range of clinici
information. But it is possible to devise an "actuarial" method for making the same prediction.,
clinician will be asked to rate the patient in discrete categories that are thought to bear on futn
dangerousness (such as "paranoia" or "oral fixation"). Those numerical ratings will then I
combined in some weighted or unweighted manner to yield a precise prediction score.

1999]

DISCRIMINATIONAS ACCIDENT

1169

Brekke and others, it would be surprising if individuals' efforts to control the
influence of group-based categories on their judgments proved to be "effective" in
the sense of being precisely calibrated to correct the problem. This is not to say that
persons lack the power deliberately to alter the outcome of their deliberative
processes: persons who come to believe that irrational group-based prejudices are
influencing their appraisals of others in a particular direction can choose
deliberately to alter or override their bottom-line judgment in a way that they believe
corrects for those prejudices.1 1 7 But the appropriateness of the corrective effort
assumes there is something to correct. The conclusion that correction is warranted
depends, first and foremost, upon knowing which judgments are infected with
group-based biases, and how much and in which direction. Because individuals are
not privy to the factors that influence their judgments, the conclusion that a
particular judgment is in need of correction may or may not be warranted and any
compensatory response will almost surely be imprecise and poorly calibrated. As
likely as not, the judgment will either be overcorrected or undercorrected. Thus, the
wish to be evenhanded and fair in judgment and the power to alter one's own bottom
line response will generally not suffice to "neutralize" social judgments. Individual
decisionmakers cannot know whether their efforts have succeeded in factoring out
the influence of hidden and automatic biases or in moving decisions towards greater
neutrality. There is thus no guarantee that, despite deliberate efforts to make a more
careful and individuated decision, that result has been achieved.
2. Detecting Unconscious Bias
Because the precise workings of the mind's unconscious mechanisms are hidden
from view, a decisionmakers' determination to "be fair" cannot guarantee freedom
from unconscious trait-based biases. In addition, research in cognitive psychology
has failed to generate a degree of understanding that would permit the reliable and
systematic external manipulation of real-world conditions to diminish the influence
of trait-based biases in social judgment. But perhaps it would not matter that
workplace decisionmakers or their supervisors are unable to eliminate bias if
decisions influenced by race and sex could be singled out in other ways. If the
results of biased thinking could be readily identified and monitored, that would
introduce the possibility of decisionmakers calibrating their responses by a type of
The superiority of actuarial systems may be due to the fact that, although ultimately grounded
in subjective judgments, they leave less room for inconsistencies or variations in the application
of criteria as between cases. See Grove & Meehl, supra, at 298-99. Grove's and Meehl's
observations strongly suggest that actuarial methods for evaluating employees in the workplace
might well prove "better" than holistic, subjective judgments. The greater accuracy promised by
adopting these methods even suggests that they may be effective in banishing erratic or irrational
influences, such as group-based stereotypes, from the evaluation process. Testing that hypothesis,
however, requires devising some objective measure or outcome "criterion" that stands apart from
the evaluation process itself. Providing such a criterion in the workplace context is quite difficult,
since there is no ready method for assessing performance that is independent of the subjective
criteria that stand in need of validation. See Arrow, supra note 29, at 96, on the difficulties of
measuring productivity using objective criteria and instruments.
117. See discussion infra at Part .0.5 .b (employer alteration of bottom line judgments on
members of protected groups as away to avoid liability for inadvertent discrimination).
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feedback control. Biased thinking could then be thought of as a "bad habit" that
operates automatically or unthinkingly, but that can be controlled by deliberate
attention to results and effort directed at changing those results."u
The problem with the "bad habit" analogy is that there is rarely if ever available
an external benchmark, lying outside the tainted sphere of subjective assessment,
that indicates when a biased decision has been made. There is no ready way to
determine the degree to which a racial or gender stereotype is operating to distort
judgment in a particular case because there is no readily available baseline measure
of how a particular employee would be assessed if the stereotype did not operate.
The obvious criterion to be applied in the workplace setting is job performance, but
the use of subjective appraisal methods in the first place suggests that objective
benchmarks either do not exist or are thought inadequate to capture what is
important about performance. The absence of adequate, non-subjective methods for
assessing workplace performance makes it almost impossible to assess the claims
that subjective evaluations are biased." 9
Because neither the decisionmaker nor an outside observer can count on knowing
whether a person's efforts to "control" unconscious bias are working, it is virtually
impossible to construct a system of incentives for the reform of the decisionmaker's
"bad habits."' The difficulty of developing external criteria of unconscious bias,
which makes it hard to distinguish "tainted" decisions from others, is a problem that
confronts both employer finms facing liability for discrimination,' and a judicial
system attempting to administer a liability system that targets unconscious bias.
Although employers and courts face somewhat different issues, constraints, and
circumstances in trying to identify bias, the challenge of demonstrating the type of
unconscious disparate treatment of concern here-that resulting from the good faith
application of overtly neutral but largely subjective criteria-is fundamentally the
same in both settings." As noted, rarely will conditions observed in the workplace

118. See ARMOUR,supra note 1, at 134-39 (analogizing prejudiced responses to "bad habits"
such as nail-biting or smoking, which are driven by unconscious compulsions but can be brought
under conscious control).
119. See, e.g.,
Arvey & Murphy, supra note 24 (detailing the difficulties of validating subjective
assessment methods); see also Grove &Meehl, supra note 116.
120. This suggests why Jody Armour's analogy to "bad habits" breaks down. ARMOUR, supra
note 1, at 134-39. When a person has managed to stop smoking, he immediately knows he has
accomplished this goal. Success can be easily verified both by the person himself and by others.
This allows a person to adjust his behavior by a continuous process of trial and error. But a
supervisor, or his manager, has no similarly reliable way of knowing whether the supervisor has
broken the "bad habit" of biased subjective judgment.
121. For a discussion ofvicarious enterprise liability for workplace discrimination, see infra Part
II..4.
122. The difficulties employers face are of a different order than those confronting judges. The
latter hear evidence tailored to allegations of specific violations centered on discrete conduct, and
must depend on parties to supply the information upon which to base their judgments. Although
employers are ina better position to monitor the full sweep of workplace practices over the long
haul, many are poorly equipped to collect and analyze the data that would suggest subtle
discrimination, or consider it a burdensome distraction to do so.
Fundamentally, however, both employers and courts are hobbled by the absence of criteria for
good performance untainted by potential biases. Moreover, as Linda Krieger points out, judges and
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supply direct evidence of unconscious discrimination, because rarely will there be
some objective or "untainted" measure of employee success, desirability, or
productivity.i"a In the absence of such benchmarks, decisionmakers are necessarily
thrown back on the only evidence that is probative of unconscious motivation: data
showing disparities in treatment. Thus claims of unconscious disparate treatment
must stand or fall on the ability to compare the fates of different individuals in the
workplace: If unconscious bias is subtle or erratic-if it determines outcomes
infrequently or intermittently or makes only a small difference overall' 2 '-the
disparities in treatment of otherwise similar employees may be minor and hard to tie
to impermissible bias.
Real employees are, of course, rarely comparable: individual employees, the jobs
they occupy, and their background risks are often too dissimilar to permit employees
to serve as others' controls for determining the risk of unconscious discrimination.
Statistical methods like hypothesis testing and regression analysis are often applied
to try to correct for factors that may account for differences in treatment. But the
effective use of such techniques often requires large cohorts for comparison and
analysis. This problem is made worse by the fact that most unconscious bias cases
will surely involve not hiring but rather the treatment of current and former
employees whose qualifications and on-the-job trajectories will rarely match.125 In

juries, no less than employers themselves, are vulnerable to expectancy-based biases in considering
the evidence before them, whether that evidence relates directly to employee performance or to the
possibility that a performance was evaluated in a biased manner. See Krieger I, supra note 1, at
1305.
Unfortunately, the same biases in causal attribution that commonly distort intergroup
perceptiori and judgment.. . can be expected to distort fact-finder determinations as
to whether discrimination has occurred in any particular case. We cannot expect the

strength or direction of intergroup decision-maker bias to vary significantly from the
strength or direction of intergroup fact-finder bias.
Id.
123. See Arrow, supra note 29, at 96 (suggesting that many issues of proof in discrimination
law stem from the fact that 'the ability to observe a measure of the individual's marginal
productivity... do[es] not in general exist!).

124. Seesupratext accompanying note 6, PartsIC, ILC.1, and infra p. 1176, on evidence from
cognitive research that patterns of expectancy-influenced judgments are context-specific and
unpredictable.

125. As Wilson and Brekke point out, the only sure device for "measur[ing] how much people's
judgments and inferences are biased" is

the experimental method, whereby people are randomly assigned to a condition in
which they are exposed to a potential contaminant or a control condition in which
they are not By comparing the average judgments of the two groups, researchers can
determine whether a certain kind of information has affected people's judgments.
Wilson & Brekke, supranote 11, at 121. For a general review of attempts to isolate discrimination
as a cause of intergroup economic and occupational disparities, see William A. Darity, Jr.,
IntergroupD4parity:Economic Theory andSocialScience Evidence, 64 S. ECON. . 805 (1998).
One way of overcoming the limitations of "natural experiments" is to carry out prospective
social science experiments that seek to isolate or control for key variables. The Urban Institute has

conducted 'Job tester" studies by sending out job applicants of different races. An attempt is made
to match the "tester pairs" for age, experience, education, and demeanor. In some cities in which

the experiments were conducted, employers were somewhat less willing to hire minority
candidates, although the effects were not large. The methodology of these experiments has been
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those cases, the potential for statistical techniques to reveal unexplained differences
in treatment comes up against the limits inherent in "natural experiments": even in
firms employing large numbers of workers, there may be too few workers and
decisions of a particular type to control for potentially relevant variables across
cases.
The premise behind the demand for statistical analyses in discrimination cases is
that differential outcomes for different groups do not alone prove bias. The
expectation that a system free of race-based disparate treatment will achieve almost
identical outcomes for minority and non-minority employees in rank, remuneration,
success, authority, and other rewards and incidents of employment, although
indulged to varying degrees as a convention of employment discrimination litigation
in the past,'26 is open to serious question in reality.'27 Mere chance alone produces
random variations in the operation of systems of selection on target populations.'
Beyond chance, there is always the possibility of unidentified "systematic

criticized. See James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, The UrbanInstitute Audit Studies: Their
Methods and Findings, in CLEAR AND CoNvINcING EvmENcE: MEASUREMENT OF
DIsCRIuMINATIoN IN AtvmRICA 187, 212-18 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993)
(describing and criticizing studies); see also Brown et al., supra note 1, at 1498-1504 (describing
studies); Katherine Q. SeelyeAgens to Go Undercoverin Detection ofHiringBias,N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 7, 1997, § 1, at 31 (same). As already noted, the usefulness of such devices, or "tester"
programs generally, for documenting employer bias (whether conscious or unconscious) is severely
limited because bias against existing employees rarely lends itself to controlled examination.
126. See, ag, IntemationalBhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)
("[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will
in time result in a work force more or less representative ofthe racial and ethnic composition of
the population in the community from which employees are hired.'); see also Munroe, supra note
57, at 227 (discussing the assumption of equal representation absent discrimination as a
background convention in employment discrimination litigation); Strauss, supra note 29, at 1640
(arguing that productivity differences among groups, if they exist, must be viewed as the transient
products of discrimination); cf., e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, StatisticalProof ofDiscrimination:

Beyond "Damned Lies," 68 WASH. L. REv. 477, 477 (1993) (noting and criticizing the
presumption of equal representation absent discrimination as a starting point for litigating
employment discrimination claims); Douglas Laycock, Statistical Proof and Theories of
Discrimination,LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1986, at 97, 98 (noting and criticizing the
presumption of equal representation absent discrimination as fundamentally inconsistent with
disparate impact theory).
The assumption that all groups are equally qualified and productive, or would quickly become
so absent discrimination, also serves as the basis for some defenses of affirmative action. See, e.g.,
McGinley, supra note 1, at 1472 ("[O]ne could argue that employers should be strictly liable for
their failure to hire, maintain, and promote a number of members of the protected classes
proportional to their presence in the labor pool.'); Selmi, supra note 1, at 1276 (defending
affirmative action by arguing that there is no evidence of skill or productivity differences between
groups that would justify their different representation in the workplace); Strauss, supra note 29,
at 1654-57 (defending numerical standards for hiring).
127. See Arrow, supra note 29, at 96; William A. Darity, Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence of
Discriminationin Employment, . EcoN. PEsP., Spring 1998, at 63, 82; James . Heckman,
DetectingDiscrimination,J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 101, 101.
128. See DoNoHUE, supra note 3, at 262-74; Browne, supra note 126, at 500; Kingsley R.
Browne, The Strangely Persistent "TranspositionFallacy". Why "Statistically Significant"
Evidence ofDiscriminationMay NotBe Significant,14 LAB. LAW. 437, 437-38 (1998).
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differences between the relevant populations as a whole."'" For jobs from lowest
to highest, it is always an open question whether the persistence of unexplained
variations in job placement and success can be attributed to race or sex, to neutral
factors that enhance productivity or have little to do with it,' 3' or to criteria that
simply correlate with protected traits.' So-called "hidden variables" that account
for disparate representation can be quite subtle and mysterious even to the employer

129. Browne, supra note 126, at 500; see also Laycock, supra note 126, at 98-99. See
generaltyArrow,supra note 29 (discussing group differences); Darity &Mason, supranote 127.
(same); Heckman, supra note 127 (same).
Many factors going to the background or "baseline" risk of unfavorable workplace outcomes
are within the control of employees themselves. See Glen 0. Robinson,ProbabilisticCausation
LEGAL STUD. 779, 797 (1985) (discussing the driverandCompensationforTortiousRisk, 14 J.
plaintiffs' control of accident risk as complicating statistical proofin the Ford Pinto litigation). The
possibility that victims' own behavior can influence their treatment in the workplace, by
introducing a variable that is hard to track, not only compounds the difficulties of making
comparisons among employees, but also threatens to undermine the efficiency of assigning liability
exclusively to the employer. See the discussion of victims infra Part II.C.7.
130. Correlations between employee attributes and desirability to the employer are hard to
demonstrate because workplace demands vary so much and because, as noted, productivity is
notoriously difficult to measure. See FAmNws INEMPLOYMENT TESTINGpassm (John A. Hartigan

& Alexandra K. Wigdor eds., 1989); Arrow, supra note 29, at 96; Linda S. Gottfredson,
Educationas a Valid butFallibleSignalof Worker Quality, 5 REs. Soc. EDUC. & SOCIALIZATION

123,136 (1985, Kelman, supranote 30, at 1204; E. Douglas Williams &Richard H. Sander, The
Prospectsfor "PuttingAmericato Work" inthe Inner City, 81 GEo. L.J. 2003, 2030 (1993)

(commenting on the difficulty ofdeveloping good data on individual productivity, especially across
different firms). But see Barbara Lerner,EmploymentDiscrimination:Adverse Impac4 Validity,
and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT.REv. 17, 32. In any event, the absence of a clear link between
workplace rewards and productivity is never dispositive. Employers may harbor irrational biases.
Or informational limits or other cognitive distortions may cause the employer to make mistaken
or imperfect choices that correlate with protected traits but are not based on these traits. See infra
Part ILC.6.
131. This difficulty works both ways. If unconscious bias takes the form of "statistical
discrimination," see infra Part ILD,it may be quite difficult to show that race influenced the
process because, by hypothesis, the employees selected are more productive than the ones passed
over. See Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, LendingDiscrimination:Economic Theory,
EconometricEvidence,andheCommunityReinvestmentAct, 85 GEO. L.J. 237,252 (1996) ("If

race is a relatively good proxy for the information the statistical discriminator does not collect, then
the more information an empirical researcher collects in order to test for racial discrimination, the
less evidence there will be of discrimination .... ."). Conversely, if an employer uses valid neutral
criteria that correlate with race and thus have a racially disparate impact, the employer may
mistakenly be judged to have engaged in race-based disparate treatment See, e.g., PHILIPMoss
& Crcus TILY, WHY BLACK MEN ARE DOING WORSE IN TIE LABOR MARKET: A RE VIEW OF
SUPPLY-SIDE AND DEMAND-SIDE EXPLANATIONS 45 (1991) ("[Tlhere is no statistical way to
distinguish between growing demand for unmeasured skills that are correlated with race, and
growing levels of racial discrimination."); Williams & Sander, supra note 130, at 2029 (The
observation that whit earn higher wages even after controlling for obvious sources of differential
productivity is "often taken as strong evidence of employment discrimination, but this
interpretation suffers from an important weakness: the real possibility that some of the independent
variables measuring worker 'quality' are systematically biased along racial lines."). In sum, in the
real world there are many ways in which race can masquerade as neutral criteria and neutral
criteria as race.

1174

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:1129

himself. Or they may represent factors, such as motivation or demeanor, that
employers routinely notice but that are difficult to measure systematically after the
fact. Finally, "hidden variables" might include elements that actually influence
decisions in practice but that have received little play for historical or political
2
3

reasons.

Perhaps the most important factor impeding the detection of unconscious bias is
the nature of the phenomenon itself. As already stated, whether unconscious traitbased bias is an important influence on workplace decisionmaking is unknown and,
in the current state of knowledge, unknowable. Ifresearch on the psychology of
"mental contamination" reveals anything, it suggests that trait-based stereotyping
is not a constant or predictable feature of social interactions. Rather, it is an erratic
and inconstant feature of human judgmerit."3 Even on those occasions when bias
distorts judgment, it may do so only a little, with no measurable deprivation of
concrete benefits or rewards. Unconscious bias thus may not be "determinative" of
a harmful outcome in every case in which it can be said to play a part. 34 Bias that
only intermittently infects decisionmaking or only occasionally determines a harmful
outcome will be harder to detect than bias that is often "determinative," because

132. For example, measured general intelligence and performance on various tests of aptitude
may correlate with traits employers value. There is evidence that measures of intelligence and
aptitude correlate with job-related performance over a broad range of occupations. A spate of
recent papers shows that controlling for scores on tests thought to measure intelligence or aptitude
causes a persistent "wage gap" between black and white employees to narrow or disappear. See,
e.g., Alexander Cavallo et al.,
The Hidden Gender Restriction:The Needfor ProperControls
when Testingfor RacialDiscrimination,in INTLiGENCE, GENES, AND SucCESs: ScIENTISTS
RESPOND TO Tm BELL CURVE 193, 195 (Bernie Derlin et al. eds., 1997); George Farkas et al.,
Cognitive Skill, Skill Demands of Jobs, and EarningsAmong Young EuropeanAmerican,
AfricanAmerican, andMexicanAmericanWorkers, 75 Soc. FORCEs 913,935 (1997); DerekA.
Neal & Wlliam R. Johnson, The Role ofPremarketFactorsin Black-White WageDifferences,
104 J. POL. ECON. 869, 892 (1996); June O'Neill, The Role ofHuman Capital in Earnings
DifferencesBetween Black and White Men, 4 J.Ecoil. PERSP., Fall 1990, at 42; see also Darity

& Mason, supra note 127, at 67-68 (summarizing regression evidence on relationship between
aptitude, earnings, and discrimination); Linda S. Gottfredson, ReconsideringFairness:A Matter
ofSocialandEthicalPriorities,33 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 293, 294 (1988) (discussing evidence
for group differences in capability); Heckman, supranote 127, at 106-07; John E. Hunter & Frank
L. Schmidt,Intelligence and Job Performance:Economic andSocial Implications,2 PsyC-OL.
PUB.POL'Y &L. 447,447 (1996) (exploring evidence of a strong relationship between aptitude,
intelligence, and job performance); Darity, supra note 125, at 809-14. Cf Selmi, supra note 1, at

1261-76 (casting aspersions on evidence of observed correlations between test performance,
productivity, and race).
133. See discussion supra at Parts LC and .C.1. See, e.g., Krieger I, supra note 1, at 1258
("Intergroup bias increases or decreases in response to contextual, environmental factors which
shapes how social actors perceive, judge, and make decisions about members of their own and
other reference social groups."); Bargh, supra note 11, at 376 (stressing the evidence "that
automatic stereotype activation does not occur for everyone" and that "there may be individual
differences in whether [a] stereotype is activated" under different circumstances).

134. See discussion of determinative versus ngndeterminative discrimination supra text
accompanying notes 27-28 and infra Part I.D.1.
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proportion of all decisions involving protected group members will be
only a small
13
affected.
Moreover, even when decisional outcomes are affected, the pattern of disparities
generated by unconscious bias may make it quite difficult to detect. The magnitude
of the effect may be quite small for each victim, and bias will often be a minor factor
in the decisional mix. For this reason, differential treatment influenced by
unconscious factors will rarely appear arbitrary on its face or wholly unwarranted.
The claimant may assert that the discipline he received was somewhat too severe or
extreme, or that his smaller bonus resulted from somewhat too much weight being
given to his shortcomings and not quite enough to his strengths. In sum; unconscious
discrimination may be "subtle" or elusive in the following ways: it may play a part
only in some decisions and not in others; where it plays a part, it may make a
detectable difference in only some cases; and where it makes a detectable difference,
that difference may be small. Furthermore, the differences in treatment that this
pattern of bias creates may show little apparent rhyme or reason. Similar individuals
may be subject to quite different degrees of unconscious bias due to subtle
differences in presentation or context that are difficult to detect after the fact. All
these factors will make it hard to demonstrate bias against a particular individual or
against a group overall using conventional methods of proof in discrimination cases.
The low "signal-to-noise" ratio that results will contribute to the already formidable
difficulties of demonstrating unconscious motives using standard methods of
statistical proof.
3: Conscious and Unconscious Bias Compared
The previous discussion suggests that no one knows how to selectively eliminate
race or sex-based cognitive biases from subjective evaluation processes. Neither
workplace decisionmakers nor their supervisors can detect or correct "mental
contamination." But it would then seem to follow that incentives aimed at bringing
about this result by internalizing the costs of harm to the relevant actors-here
employers-will generally be ineffective. Because employers do not know how to
respond constructively to such incentives, there is no reason to believe that the risk
of unconscious discrimination will be reduced by encouraging employers to take
steps against decisionmaking bias. Put bluntly, liability for unconscious
discrimination will not deter unconscious discrimination.
This discussion begs the question of how the analysis differs for conscious and
unconscious bias. This Section suggests that the potential for deterring

135. It is possible to imagine the existence of evidence for "bias in the process" that operates
short of making a "but for" difference to the allocation of tangible rewards or benefits. For
example, a plaintiffcould seekto show that minorities receive lower ratings on a subjective scoring
system for promotions, regardless of whether many or most of those individuals would otherwise
have attained a score above the cutoff. See supratext accompanying notes 11, 27. But in many
other cases nondeterminative discrimination will literally vanish without a trace because there is
no record of the process leading to the decision, or that process has unfolded entirely inside the
decisionmaker's head. Cf Strauss, supra note 1, at 958 n.72 (suggesting that nondeterminative
discrimination always entails some kind of less favorable treatment, which is detectable as a
difference at least in principle).
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discrimination by imposing liability is significantly greater for conscious bias
because it is far easier for supervisors, and their employer firms, to take effective
precautions against deliberate discrimination than against discrimination that is
hidden even from the decisionmaker himself.

The analysis begins with the persons on the front lines-those directly responsible
for observing and evaluating workers in the first instance. Supervisors who practice
conscious as opposed to unconscious discrimination, like those who inflict
intentional as opposed to "accidental" harms generally, differ in their awareness of
what they are doing and in their level of control over the injuries they inflict. 36
These two parameters are not unrelated. A central element of consciousness is the
ability to observe or evaluate one's own thoughts. 37 The cognitive processes that
produce "intentional" actions can be monitored effectively by the actor through
introspection, which reveals the nature of what he is doing. Harms inflicted
"deliberately" or as the outgrowth of self-conscious motives are also generally
amenable to a much higher degree of actor's control than harms produced by
processes that are not available to introspection. 3 Finally, because there is
generally atight link between act and result for purposeful harms, 39 the choice not
to actfrom a consciously discriminatorymotive can result in an effective decision
to refrain from inflicting the tortious harm. In contrast, where bias is inadvertent, the
actor can always choose to act differently (e.g., by changing the outcomes of his
decisions), but he cannot generally make an effective choice not to act out of bias. 4
In light of this discussion, it should be obvious that imposing strict liability for
deliberate discrimination has at least the potential to produce more effective
deterrence than imposing liability for unconscious discrimination. A conscious
discriminator can respond to incentives, because he has a firm internal benchmark

136. See discussion of intentional and unintentional torts supra Part II.B.
137. See, ag,Wegner & Bargh, supra note 16, at 453-54 (discussing the distinction between
conscious and unconscious processes in terms of awareness and control); Devine, supranote 24,
at 6.
138. Whether motives or reasons for action can be said to "cause" an action or its result is the
subject ofendless philosophical speculation that is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Gudel,supra note 50, at 20; Symposium on Causationin the Law of Torts, 63 CmH.-KENT L. REv.
397 (1987). It suffices for our purposes to take note of the common sense understanding that
reasons in some sense "produce" actions. Moreover, where actions are taken deliberately-for
instance, out ofa self-conscious desire to do harm-the actor has the power to refrain from taking
the action. Therefore, he has the power to avoid doing the harm, and holding him responsible for
that harm is generally seen as unproblematic. See, e.g., Krieger ILsupra note 1, at 1185 (noting
the relationship between the assumption that persons are "aware of the reasons why they are about
to make, or have made, a particular employment decision" and the ability of those persons to
"comply with Title VII's injunction 'not to discriminate").
Nonetheless, the ability to cease doing -what is done "on purpose" may not be present equally
in every case, because some persons may act under a pathological compulsion or exhibit weakness
of the will.Some bigots may know very well that they are discriminating against blacks or women
but may be unable, in some sense, to stop themselves. But leaving those cases of compulsion aside,
the purposefi nature ofconsciously directed action in most cases offers at least some potential for
self-control.
139. See supra note 37.
140.For a discussion of activity level effects, see discussion supra Part ILC.1 and discussion
infra Part ILC.5.a.
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for the presence of offending conduct. He knows when he is discriminating, and
when he is not. And he knows how to take precautions against the harm of
discrimination: he can stop discriminating. Moreover, the ability of supervisors to
stop discriminating "on purpose" through simple self-help keeps process costs low.
Responding to liability does not require the acquisition of specialized technical
knowledge or the implementation of sweeping workplace reforms. For irrational
discrimination, the costs of choosing to be neutral are the loss of whatever psychic
benefits bigots enjoy. For statistical discrimination, there may be additional costs
from loss of information. But there are no other significant obstacles to
implementing precautions. The theory of strict liability predicts that firms will cease
deliberately discriminating if the costs imposed by the liability system outweigh
whatever benefits the firms or their employees enjoy from discriminatory behavior.
4. Enterprise Liability and Monitoring Bias
So far, the discussion has focused on supervisory personnel directly responsible
for evaluating other employees. Those persons have far more control over their
conscious biases then their unconscious ones. But one potential objection to this tidy

story is that it fails to take into account the rule of vicarious enterprise liability for
discrimination in the workplace. 141 Employer firms are routinely held liable for
supervisors' acts of intentional disparate treatment, whether inflicted with the
knowledge and blessing of the firm or not. But an enterprise does not have full

control over its agents' conscious choices, just as a supervisor does not have full
control over his.own subconscious processes. Discrimination as practiced by line
supervisors against company policy is like an accident for the enterprise in that it
is unintentional, inadvertent, and unpredictable from the firm's point of view. The
danger of liability in that setting gives rise to a risk managemerit problem for the
employer regardless of whether the agent is acting unconsciously or with deliberate
intent.
These observations beg the question of why the rule that governs a firm's liability
for an agent's purposeful discrimination should be any different from the one that
governs the liability of an agent for his own unconscious acts (or of a principal for
an agent's unconscious acts). Despite ostensible parallels, there are still sound
reasons for applying a different liability rule to the enterprise depending on whether
the injuries inflicted by its agents are inadvertent or deliberate. The justification is
grounded in differences in the nature of the risks the enterprise must manage and the
methods available for managing them.
By attempting to internalize all costs of an activity to the firm, enterprise liability
creates an incentive for the firm to take efficient precautions against the risk. But
where the risk at issue is of discriminatory harms, the employer-enterprise may have

141. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundariesof VicariousLiabiliy:An EconomicAnalysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988)
[hereinafter Sykes, The Boundariesof VicariousLiability];Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of
VicariousLiability,93 YALELJ. 1231 (1984) [hereinafter Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious
Liability]; J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liabiliy in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 81 VA. L.
Rav. 273, 341 (1995); Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious andPersonalLiabiliyforEmployment
Discrimination,30 GA. L. Rav. 509 (1997).
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to implement its risk-reducing strategy by altering the conduct of its "front-line"
agents. The firm can attempt to promote greater neutrality in decisionmaking by
introducing structural reforms in its personnel system-a result quite difficult to
achieve." Alternatively, the43enterprise can try to create effective incentives for the
agent to take greater care.1
Incentives are of little value if the agent is inherently incapable of responding to
them. The problem with automatic bias is that it is refractory to incentives of any
kind. Even if the agent fears the sanctions the employer threatens to impose, and
even ifhe believes there is a significant probability of detection and punishment, his
ability to monitor or control his own inadvertent bias is quite limited. This makes
it hard, if not impossible, for him to respond precisely and effectively to the
employer's threats. Thus even assuming an enterprise can detect instances of
discrimination and identify offending supervisors with a high degree of accuracy (a
dubious assumption), threatening to punish supervisors will not reliably reduce the
risk of biased evaluations or otherwise neutralize the decisionmaking process where
disparate treatment results from unconscious forms of bias.
In contrast, as discussed in the previous Section, the supervisor who deliberately
discriminates does have the capacity to respond effectively, and at low cost, to
incentives the employer creates to suppress the offending behavior. Then the
efficacy of imposing strict liability on the enterprise will depend on the methods
available to the principal-firm for inducing its employees to refrain from behavior
that exposes the firm to liability. Although the ability to create an effective incentive
system depends on a number of factors, 14 an important
one is the employer's ability
45
to identify and monitor risk-creating behavior.
The previous Section has already discussed the difficulties inherent in trying to
detect and monitor unconscious bias. But deliberate bias can be difficult to oversee
as well. Persons motivated by self-conscious animus often try to hide or camouflage
their motives, and it is often unclear whether an adverse action against an employee
was motivated by discrimination or another factor. Since employers cannot look into
the minds of their agents any better than unconsciously biased agents can look into
their own, firms attempting to monitor deliberate animus, like those trying to detect
unconscious discrimination, will be forced to rely on external cues, including
statistical analysis of outcomes, with all the problems inherent in those methods.
Despite these parallel difficulties, there are nevertheless good reasons, from the
point of view of deterrence, to adopt a liability system that treats unconscious and
conscious bias differently. First, purposeful bias does not always implicate the
problem of monitoring renegade supervisors because it may take the form of
invidious policies or practices maintained at the highest levels. In those instances,

142. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 11-38 and infra text accompanying notes
161-68 of the difficulty of creating personnel structure that is "bias free."
143. See Sykes, The Boundariesof VicariousLiability, supra note 141, at 1237; Verkerke,
supra note 141, at 341-44.
144. See Sykes, The Boundariesof VicariousLiability, supra note 141, at 578-79 (discussing
the challenge ofcreating an effective penalty structure for employees in the teeth of the employee's
limited financial resources, financial exposure, and job investment).
145. See id. (stressing problems of information and monitoring); Sykes, The Economics of
VicariousLiability,supra note 141, at 1231 (same); Verkerke, supra note 141, at 341-43 (same).
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imposing liability on the firm has the potential to deter unlawful practices directly.
Second, unconscious bias is, by definition, a problem that arises from the use of
discretionary and subjective procedures rather than objective methods of workplace
evaluation. The Supreme Court and others have recognized that subjective bias is
'
notoriously difficult to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the fact-finder. 46
That
observation applies regardless of whether the bias is inadvertent or quite deliberate.
But the fact that some cases of deliberate or animus-based bias will be difficult for
employers to monitor or detect-because embedded, perhaps, in subjective
assessments that are difficult to compare-does not mean that all cases will be.
Conscious bias may also manifest itself in decisions that are supposed to be
governed principally by objective criteria. Where those criteria are disregarded or
overridden, bias may be relatively easy to monitor and prove. By definition,
however, unconscious bias of the type considered here will infect subjective
appraisals only. Because a rule against conscious bias will take on some "easy"
cases, whereas the rule against unconscious bias will only take on hard ones, the
former is worth maintaining even if the latter is not.
Third, even if the focus is on subjective decisionnaking, purposeful
discrimination may in general be easier to detect and monitor than unconscious
cognitive bias. Purposeful bias has at least the potential to call attention to itself
through anecdotal evidence such as telltale conversations, idiosyncratic remarks, or
suggestive workplace behavior that confesses the agent's state of mind. Inadvertent
distortions in the decisionmaking process will not generally yield this type of
particularistic or anecdotal evidence because, by definition, the agent wishes to be,
and believes himself to be, "fair."' 4 In addition, purposeful bigotry may well
generate effects that are more blatant, extreme, and internally consistent in their
operation than inadvertent bias. When a supervisor harbors conscious bias based on
race or sex, that factor will often dominate the decisionmaking process.'48 Deliberate
bias may have harsher effects that will make it easier to measure: The cruder the
bias, the fewer the data points needed to demonstrate it and the more likely a firm
can detect, or a plaintiff show, discrimination by comparing a few examples and
eschewing complex statistical analysis. Thus, firms may in general have an easier
time monitoring animus-based conduct. If, for this reason, employees realistically
fear detection more often for deliberate than for inadvertent discrimination, liability
for the former will have a more significant deterrent effect.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the distinction between conscious and
unconscious bias implicates the power of the law to change behavior by expressing

146. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,990 (1988); Strauss, supra note
29, at 1655-56.
147. Even if anecdotal evidence of prejudice is available, it is doubtful that it should be
considered probative: there is no systematic correspondence between "mental contamination,"
prejudiced views, and overt expressions of bias. See supratext accompanying notes 11-17.
148. Mixed motive cases stand as a potential exception: by definition, some nondiscriminatory
factor is also influencing the decisionmaking process. But that factor may be clearly inadequate to
explain the outcome, or the employer may otherwise make the invidious motive clear. See supra
text accompanying notes 57-58 on "mixed motive" cases and the type of "direct" or "anecdotal"
evidence usually required.
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society's disapproval or its conception of right conduct. 149 Laws against
discrimination in the workplace make clear that bigotry is unacceptable. Through
their effect on social norms of workplace conduct and individuals' conceptions of
justice and fairness-which can operate wholly apart from any legal
sanctions-antidiscrimination laws may cause individuals to try to suppress their
own biased impulses or at least not to act on them.150 But this effect will only work
when discrimination is deliberately inflicted. The individual's desire to reform will
issue in a diminution of conscious bias, because the individual can control
discrimination inflicted "on purpose." In contrast, good intentions are of little use
when bias is inadvertent, since such biases cannot be reliably purged from social
judgment by self-regulation alone. There is thus little to be gained in practice by
penalizing unconscious bias for the purpose of sending a message that such bias is
"wrong."
5. Employer Responses to Liability
As explained in the foregoing Section, firms and their agents will find it virtually
impossible selectively to root out unconscious trait-based disparate treatment from
the workplace by changing decisionmakers' behavior. This suggests, at first blush,
that internalizing costs to employers in the hopes of inducing them to take costeffective precautions against biased behavior is likely to be futile because it is
impossible for them to take any effective precautions at all. Unconscious
discrimination would appear to be an "unavoidable accident." The targeted response
of purging all decisions of trait-based bias, however, does not exhaust the range of
possible responses that an employer might make to the threat of liability for
unconscious bias. An assessment of the cost-benefit balance of imposing strict
liability for unconscious disparate treatment is not complete without a consideration
of other steps, apart from removing the taint of bias itself, that employers might take
in response to the threat of liability.
a. Activity Level and Employment Effects
Where effective precautions against a targeted harm cannot be taken because
technologically infeasible or prohibitively expensive, an enterprise may be driven
to respond in other ways to the threat of liability for those harms. One strategy is to
reduce the level of operations generally or to shift away from the vulnerable activity

149. For a recent discussion of the expressive or symbolic value of law, see, e.g., Richard IMcAdams, The Origi, Development andRegulaionofNorms, 96 MIcH. L. REv., 338,398-400
(1997) (arguing that "law also expresses normative principles and symbolizes societal values, and
these moralizing features may affect behavior"'); see generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation
of Social Meaning, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 943 (1995) (discussing the power of law to change
attitudes and behavior apart from the fear of legal penalties).
150. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 149, at 399 (noting that "several theorists have suggested
that the expressive function of law works by affecting norms) (emphasis in original).
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to alternatives.' In the case of strict liability for unconscious disparate treatment,
a firm might search for ways to reduce the number of persons employed (by, for
example, switching from labor to capital-intensive means of production). Or it might
try to employ fewer persons presenting a threat of liability by, for example,
relocating to areas with a predominantly nonminority workforce. These effects have
been noted as possible consequences of employment discrimination laws
generally. 5 ' A full analysis of the potential for effecting such compensatory
adjustments will not be undertaken here, except to note that it is often difficult to
predict whether and to what extent a particular enterprise will respond to liability
for unavoidable accidents by reducing the scope of its activities. But if the response
to liability takes the form of fewer jobs for minority, female, or other workers, that
consequence would not ordinarily be regarded as a socially desirable outgrowth of
strengthening employment discrimination laws, if only because it would tax many
of the same people the laws are designed to help.
Alternatively, if the costs of reducing activity levels are too high or if the activity
is still cost-effective after absorbing liability payments, the enterprise may simply
continue business as usual and may try to "pass through" the costs of liability to
employees, managers, customers, stockholders, or owners, or some combination of
these.' Such pass-throughs might be considered undesirable for two reasons. First,
pure transfers or redistributions of resources are generally thought to impose
deadweight losses because they generate transaction costs without any compensating
risk reduction.'54 Second, an enterprise might try to shift the unavoidable costs of
liability to employees in the form of lower wages or fewer benefits. This would

151. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 277 (speculating about activity level effects from
incentives created in the employment liability context); Verkerke, supra note 141, at 341-44
(same).
152. See e.g, RCHARDA. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs: THE CASE AGAiNST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws 61-69 (1992); John . Donohue IRI, Advocacy Versus Analysis in
AssessingEmploymentDiscrminationLaw, 44 STAN.L. REV.1583,1602-03 (1992) [hereinafter
Donohue,Advocacy VersusAnalysis] (reviewing EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra);John
. Donohue I, FurtherThoughts on Employment DiscriminationLegislation:A Reply to Judge

Posner,136 U. PA. L. REv. 523 (1987) [hereinafter DonohueA Reply toJudgePosner];John
.Donohue III, Is Title VIrEfficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV.1411 (1986) [hereinafter Donohue, Is
Title Vii Efficient?]; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex DiscriminationLaw, 56
U. CHL L.REv. 1311 (1989) [hereinafter Posner, EconomicAnalysis ofSex DiscriminationLaw];
Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VH,136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987)
[hereinafter Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VMI].

153. For a discussion of pass-throughs in the products liability literature, see Alan Schwartz,
ProposalsforProductsLiabilif, Reform: A TheoreticalSynthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 360 (1988)

(assuming, for purposes of analysis, 100% pass-through to consumers through higher prices). But
see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contractand Tort Law, with
SpecialReference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower,41 Mn. L. Rpy. 563

(1982) (suggesting that cost-shifting varies considerably in different liability contexts depending
on the type ofliability, market conditions, market imperfections, information problems, and other
factors).
154. See John J.Donohue I, The Law andEconomics ofTort Law: The ProfoundRevolution,
102 HARv. L. RaV. 1047,1066-67 (1989) (book review) (noting the "typical argument against
wealth transfers-that because they are costly to effect and do not expand the size of the pie, but
only change its distribution, they actually reduce total social welfare").

1182

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 74:1129

mean that all or some workers would effectively end up bearing the costs of the
sums collected by plaintiffs as compensation under the liability system. If minorities
bear the brunt of the pass-throughs, the at-risk group would effectively insure itself.
The fairness or desirability of this result is a complicated question. Apart from
distributional concerns, whether such shifts are efficient will depend on whether the
transfers end up reducing or increasing social utility overall, which in turn depends
on the marginal utility of the intra-personal and interpersonal shifts in resources
represented by the transfers. Since it is almost impossible to predict who will end
up paying in any given case,'55 very little can be said about whether a liability rule
that yields more cost shifting than activity effects will produce a desirable result.
b. Overinvestment in Precautions
The foregoing Section suggests that, to the extent that strict liability may produce
reductions in activity levels, that effect might prove harmful to the very groups that
are the intended beneficiaries of the liability system. This Section discusses-yet
another potential employer response that argues against expressly extending liability
to unconscious forms of bias: the danger that employers will respond to liability by
engaging in inefficiently expensive precautions against the threat of being held
liable.
The argument is based on the prediction that employers will be able to adopt
strategies that reduce the risk of liability for discrimination, but without necessarily
effecting a proportionate reduction in the amount of group-based unconscious bias
in their employment practices. As explained below, the danger of socially inefficient
"overinvesinent" in precautions is produced by the joint operation of two peculiar
features, already discussed, that characterize a system of liability for inadvertent
bias: the intransigence of unconscious bias to any precautionary program, and the
comprehensive control that employers exert over adverse or "injurious" actions
against employees, both discriminatory and benign. As noted above, employment
discrimination is unique in that liability turns on distinguishing actionable from nonactionable causes of decisions adverse to employee interests, all of which are
internal to the workplace. Not only does this feature make causation hard to sort out,
but it enables a particular response to the threat of liability. Specifically, it opens the
way for employers to deflect a finding of liability by manipulating the treatment of
employees to create the illusion that forbidden biases have been purged from its
decisionmaking processes.
Overinvestment in response to liability is a danger in many legal regimes, whether
based on strict liability or negligence. Overinvestment can occur, for example, when
an enterprise is held responsible for harms it does not create or that are not
actionable." 6 Errors leading to liability for nontortious harms can arise from
imperfections in the judicial process, including faulty or exiguous evidence, fact-

155. See Kennedy, supra note 153, at 566.
156. See Poliasky &Shavell, supra note 8, at 873 ("[l]finjurers are made to pay more than for
the harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be taken... and risky but socially beneficial
activities may be undesirably curtailed.").
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finder error, or uncertainties in the legal standard to be applied."" There is yet
another scenario that can produce an inefficient level of "precautionary" investment
in response to a liability threat: when investments allow an enterprise to escape
liability without effecting a proportional reduction in the harm targeted by the
liability system. Such a pattern might arise from imperfections in the administration
of the liability system-as when a judicial fact-finder mistakes the appearance of a
cure for the targeted harm with an actual cure.
In both of these overinvestment situations, the problem comes down to wasted
expenditures: an enterprise invests resources, but harm is not reduced enough to
justify the investment. For liability systems to function properly, the resources a
tortfeasor invests in precautions in response to an expected amount of liability must
actually reduce the harm with which the liability system is concerned, and must do
so without generating significant negative externalities. A party will invest the right
amount only if that investment reduces that party's expected liability in proportion
to a reduction in the social costs of the targeted harm.' 58
But where tortfeasors can take steps to reduce their potential liability costs
without effecting a proportionate reduction in the specific harms for which they are
being charged, there is no reason to believe that the system will be cost-effective.
This point represents an extension of an argument made by Craswell and Calfee in
the negligence context. The authors point out that a particular precautionary
investment will be worthwhile for the enterprise if the marginal reduction in
expected damage payments from the investment exceeds the extra cost of taking the
precautions, wholly apart from any reduction in the expected social costs of harm.I 9
Craswell's and Calfee's insight is not specific to the negligence context. Nor is it

157. On over-investments in precautions due to uncertainty about the legal standard for liability,
see John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliancewith Legal
Standards,70 VA. L. RaV. 965, 981 (1984) (discussing how imprecision in determining the
standard of care can produce overinvestment in precautions in negligence regimes). See also
Krieger I, supra note 1, at 1247 (citing John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Deterrenceand
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 279 (1963), for the proposition that the
unpredictability of legal standards for employment discrimination can produce large variations in
employer compliance). As the ensuing discussion makes clear, discriminatory actions are not
immune from fact-finder errors that can lead to overinvestment.
158. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 8, at 887-89. As David Rosenberg has stated,
"[A] strict liability rule allows a firm to reduce its potential liability only by reducing the probability
ofaccidents." Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 866. Strict liability will induce the proper investment
in precautions because the firm "will cease investing when it can no longer profitably affect the
probability [of liability]."Id.
159. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 157, at 970. The authors argue that if the investment
in precautions causes the risk ofliablityto drop faster than the actual level of social costs generally,'
some portion of the precautionary investment will be wasted. See id.In their case, it is the legal
uncertainty of the standard of due care, and the error that it generates, that creates a disparity
between the actual reduction in the costs of the targeted harm brought about by the defendant's
precautionary investment and the reduction in the amount of expected damages that the defendant
can expect to pay at this level of investment See id. at 974. In our case, it is the fact-finder error
generated by the employer's ability to create an impression that unconscious discrimination has
been eliminated from the decisionmaking process, when in fact it may not have been-or may
have been only to some degree-that generates the potential disparity between expected liability
and social costs. See discussion infra pp. 1186-93.
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peculiar to the type of error discussed by the authors that leads to a disparity in
expected damages and expected harm (which is error in the application of the
standard of due care to the facts). Rather, it comes into play wherever there is the
potential for systematic error in applying any legal standard to the facts at hand and
the tortfeasor can manipulate that error to his benefit.
The tortfeasor is concerned with the amount of liability, not with social costs.
Expected liability is the "signal" that informs the tortfeasor of the social costs he is
generating, and of the amount he must expend to reduce the social costs of that
harm. But if the signal goes awry-because the actor's expected liability drops off
faster than the value of the harm his investments are supposed to prevent-the
actor's expenditure may fail to increase net social welfare. The potential for an
inefficient response is even greater if a defendant's liability-reducing strategies
generate negative externalities or entail massive process costs. 6
If the goal of a liability system is to reduce unconscious trait-based bias in
workplace decisionmaking, the danger of overinvestment in precautions may arise
if this scenario obtains: an enterprise can take measures that will reduce the
likelihood it will be held liable for discrimination, but without making its personnel
system significantly more "neutral" or without effectively reducing the influence of
unconscious bias on its decisionmaking processes. Could this happen? It could
happen if the enterprise could take steps to convince judicial fact-finders that it was
not making unconsciously biased decisions or that it had effectively controlled
unconscious bias even if those steps reduced unconscious bias erratically or not at
all, and even if they generated undesirable social costs. The fact-finder would then
underestimate the amount of actionable discrimination in which the defendant was
actually engaged, and would reduce penalties accordingly. If the penalty reduction
exceeded the cost of the "precautionary" measures, employers would invest in those
measures regardless of any effect on the targeted harm.
Although corporate programs aimed at addressing the problems posed by a
diverse workforce can take a variety of forms, there are two main types of strategies
an enterprise might adopt in response to a threat of liability for unconscious
discrimination. The first is to implement "diversity awareness" programs, which are
usually short educational or training sessions designed to make people more aware
of their prejudices against protected groups and how their biased attitudes can
impede the progress of minorities and women. These training programs have
become quite widespread."' A second strategy is to introduce more far-reaching
160. For example, a party will willingly spend $6,000 to avoid $12,000 in damages costs, even
if that expenditure generates only $3,000 worth ofharm reduction and creates an additional $3,000
in social costs or "negative externalities." In that case, the employer would spend $6,000 to effect
no net change in social welfare (S3,000 in targeted harm reduction offset by $3,000 in external
costs). A $6,000 expenditure for nothing is socially inefficient. Yet an employer will voluntarily
spend $6,000 because it saves $12,000 in liability costs.
161. See, e.g., VALIAN, supra note 2, at 314 ("A major component of many programs aimed
at increasing diversity in the workplace is awareness training, in which people are encouraged to
explore together their nonconscious beliefs about gender, ethnic, and other differences."); Sam
Rynes &Benson Rosen,A FieldSurvey ofFactorsAffecting theAdoption andPerceivedSuccess
of Diversity Training, 48 PERSONNEL PsYcHoL. 247, 247 (1995) (surveying 785 corporate
diversity training programs); Jack Gordon, DifferentFrom What? Diversity as a Performance
Issue, TRAING, May 1995, at 25,25-26 (describing diversity sensitivity training programs). On
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reforms in the personnel system or workplace practices that are designed to increase
the representation of protected groups or to reduce differences in career
outcomes-measures that will be referred to here as "diversity action" programs. 6
Diversity awareness programs might bring about a disjunction between expected
liability and realized social benefit because they have the potential to create the
appearanceof "doing something about the problem" without actually reducing the
targeted harm or without reducing it in proportion to the resources expended. If factfinders are sometimes or often convinced that diversity training programs really
work-that is, that they really decrease the extent to which employers are influenced
by unconscious categories in judging employees-then implementing such programs
might decrease the chance that a company or its supervisors will be judged in
litigation to have discriminated against workers unconsciously.'63 If so, a company's
investment in these programs might be worthwhile from the enterprise's point of
view. But these programs may function as a form of "pseudo-precaution": there is
virtually no credible evidence that diversity education programs reduce the
incidence of unconsciously biased decisionmaking.'" And the programs are not

workplace diversity initiatives generally, including educational awareness training, see Linda S.
Gottfredson, Dilemmas in DevelopingDiversity Programs,in DIVERSITY IN THE WORKPLACE:
HUMAN REsouRcES INmAarVAs 279 (Susan E. Jackson et al. eds., 1992).

162. These programs run the gamut of measures employers adopt with the goal of increasing
the number and success of persons from underrepresented groups. Strategies include
"restructur[ing] jobs and benefits [packages] in order to reduce conflicts between work and
family," directing special career development efforts such as mentoring or networking programs
towards female and minority candidates, creating numerical hiring targets and stepping up
recruiting of employees from protected groups, and tying executives' or managers' evaluations and
compensation to their "success in meeting diversity goals." Gottfredson, supranote 161, at 28485. Onthe practice of tying managers' pay raises and bonuses to their "commitment to diversity"
as away ofmaking supervisors more "accountable" for increasing diversity in the workplace, see
MARYJ.WhmTRLE,WORKFRCEDIVERsITY: CoRPoRATE CHALLENGES, CoRpoRATE RESPoNsEs
30 (1992); Susan E. Jackson, Preview of the Road to Be Traveled, in DrwvPsrry INTHE
WORKPLA E,supra note 161, at 60; see also VALIAN, supra note 2, at 319-21 (describing a multi-

pronged program at Johns Hopkins Medical School for increasing the number of successful female
faculty members). For additional discussion of the Johns Hopkins program, see infra Part BI
163. This disjunction effectively depends on the ability to create the illusion of reducing the
targeted hann--unconscious bias-without actually doing so. It therefore depends on the judicial
fact-finder's inability to distinguish between "pseudo-precautions" and genuine precautions in
some cases. Although companies might perceive diversity programs as helping to reduce liability
exposure, the author is aware of no systematic study that demonstrates that companies with
diversity programs are less often held liable for discrimination or are otherwise protected from large
payouts for discrimination against workers. This issue would be a fruitful area for empirical
investigation.

164. There is a dizzying amount of literature on diversity or "awareness" training, but few
rigorous attempts to document its effects. In a recent comprehensive survey of the theory and
practice ofpromoting diversity in the workplace, the author reports that "[p]opular business books
on the topic have tended to be consultant testimonials and 'how-to-do-it' cookbooks." FkEDERicK
R. LYNc , THm DivERsrry MAcHm: Tim DRIVE TO CHANGE THE'"rWHE MALE WORKPLACE"
14 (1997); see also id. at 7 (There simply is "no systematic proof that diversity management
programs decrease ethnic and gender tensions while increasing profits, productivity, and
creativity.'). Another recent review observes "that the metrics most often cited as real evidence of
the success or failure of corporate 'diversity' programs are exactly the ones used to gauge the
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without cost. If there is no assurance of producing the result that is the objective of
the liability system, the programs could as well produce net losses as gains.
Diversity programs in the form of educational seminars and ethnic sensitivity
training are frequently directed at encouraging supervisors.and personnel managers
to question the validity of their judgments and to suspect their own motives.'65 But,
as already explained, individual employees do not know how to alter or neutralize
the influence of cognitive stereotypes, and enterprises do not know how to redesign
personnel systems to minimize the danger that supervisors will act on subjective
bias. In light of these insights, at least one psychologist has suggested that not only
are educational programs aimed at "teaching" relevant actors to make less biased
judgments unlikely to succeed, but they are as likely to exacerbate the problem of
unconscious stereotyping as to alleviate it.'"
As noted, employers also have the option of adopting so-called diversity action
programs aimed at altering the way employees are selected or judged or the way the
workplace is organized. The potential of diversity action programs to reduce the
employer's risk of being held liable for unconscious disparate treatment is a function
of a unique feature of the relationship between discriminatory, actionable workplace
harms, and employers' adverse actions against employees generally. As already
noted, the universe of "injuries" employees might suffer as employees, in the form
of decisions that detract from status or pay, is entirely internal to the workplace
itself. In contrast with other types of workplace injuries, adverse actions against
employees from any cause, whether discriminatory or not, are completely within the
employer's control. The employer can choose, for any reason whatsoever or for no
reason at all, to fire, hire, promote, demote, or otherwise offer or withdraw a
desirable incident or benefit of employment. He can manipulate the background
incidence of harm predictably and at will. The employer may not be able to control
unconscious bias-in-the-process, but he can control the baseline incidence of
adverse decisions against persons in disfavored groups to which it is compared. In
contrast, an employer cannot fully control whether, for example, an employee
contracts cancer. He can potentially control cancer risks generated from within the

progress ofaffrmative action: How many minorities and women have been hired, how many have
been promoted, and to what ranks in the hierarchy?" Gordon, supra note 161, at 29; see also id.
at 28 (suggesting that diversity training, by encouraging the repetition of common stereotypes
about groups, does not reduce prejudice and may "reinforce prejudiced attitudes"); Rynes &
Rosen, supranote 161, at 247, 266 (evaluating programs in terms of employees' perceptions of
"training success" but failing to include any objective or standardized measure of success); id. at
264 (noting the paucity of "long-term evaluations" of the effects of diversity awareness, and
evidence of "modest success rates for diversity management efforts in general"); VALiAN, supra
note 2, at 314-15 ("The effectiveness of [diversity training] programs is unknown because there
are no established methods of evaluation.').
165. One commentator states that the general aim of the programs is to "encourage people to
be conscious of and responsive to a wide range of people who are different" ANTHONY PATRICK
CARNEVALE & SUSAN CAROL STONE, THE AMERICAN MosAIc: AN IN-DEPTH REPORT ON THE
FuruR oFDrvnsrrYATWORK92-93 (1995), see also id. at 105-07; WmTERLE, supra note 162,

at 22-23.
166. See VALiAN, supra note 2, at 315 (stating the view that "[i]n the case of gender,...
awareness training may be counterproductive" because it makes gender schemas more salient
without any evidence that this leads to a reduction in actual decisionmaking bias).
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workplace, but has little control over the background level of disease to which his
employees' cancer rate will be compared.
Diversity action programs can take myriad forms, running the gamut from outright
"affirmative action" or "quotas," to giving weight to race or sex as a "plus factor,"
to a fundamental transformation of corporate organization, customs, or personnel
practices.'67 Many such programs will, as a general matter, have the effect of
reducing the number of unfavorable actions taken against employees in some groups
relative to others. In effect, these programs will manipulate the denominator in the
liability equation-that is, the number of adverse events overall. But not all such
programs will necessarily affect the magnitude of the numerato.r-that is, the
decisions that are affected in some way by unconscious bias in the process. For
example, a program might boost the prospects of minority or female workers who
were never targets of discrimination in the first place-thus reducing the total
number of unfavorable decisions taken against members of protected groups-while
bypassing individuals who had been true victims of unconscious bias within the
enterprise. On this scenario, the employers' response will do nothing to reduce
unconscious discrimination within the firm at all.
To be sure, the diversity action programs described here, including outright
affirmative action, may end up preventing adverse unconscious bias from
influencing some decisions. For example, an employer might permit some "best"
minorities or women in the pool, who would otherwise be undervalued because of
unconscious disparate treatment, to jump ahead in the queue in a way that advances
them nearer to the position they would have occupied without bias. In the most
extreme case, an employer can override any possible discrimination against
minorities and women simply by refraining from taking any adverse steps against
anyone belonging to these groups. Such measures do not operate by purging bias
from the process of judgment itself; rather, they are better described as canceling
any effects of unconscious group-based biases by disturbing the link between
potentially tainted processes of judgment and outcomes.
But this strategy will necessarily entail the introduction of deliberately imposed
group-conscious compensatory biases into the decision-making process. This type
of response is problematic for two reasons. First, although the employer's
preferential treatment might advance persons precisely to the position they would
have occupied absent unconscious bias, it is unlikely that this will happen. As
already argued, the inability of supervisors, or their employers, to calibrate attempts
to compensate for unconscious biases means there is no reason to believe that the
targeted harms will be precisely canceled. Second, the closer an employer's reaction
gets to outright affirmative action, the stronger the argument that it constitutes a
fresh violation of the antidiscrimination laws and thus a new source of potential

167. There will inevitably be some degree of controversy over which programs are fairly
denominated "affirmative action" or whether that designation is unduly restrictive (and
inflammatory). Clearly the programs vary in the degree to which they are overtly and selfconsciously race or sex based, with some measures designed only indirectly to attract and retain
a more diverse workforce as part of a broader set of changes aimed at increasing the productivity
and satisfaction of all workers. See, e.g., Gottfredson, supranote 161, at 284.
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liability. 6 ' Antidiscrimination laws outlaw not just discrimination against certain
disfavored groups, but rather differential treatment of any kind "because of'
protected traits. Thus, an employer's attempt to avoid liability by treating some
groups more favorably than others would appear to count as a "harm" within the
liability system established by the literal terms of Title VII and like provisions. 69
The important point for our purposes is that although compensatory diversity
action measures could possibly issue in real "harm reduction" by overriding or
reversing adverse workplace decisions against some workers whose evaluations
would otherwise be negatively affected by bias, there is no necessary connection
between the employer's response and the level of bias, positive or negative, that is
eliminated or remains in the workplace. There is thus no systematic relationship
between expenditures on precautions against liability and the costs saved through
effective harm reduction, where the harm at issue is precisely race or sex-based
unconscious discrimination. Given the ease of "substituting" away from the goal of
decisional neutrality and the difficulty of achieving that objective, it is less likely
that each decisionmaking agent will respond to a diversity initiative by engaging in
more neutral processes ofjudgment than that each will end up implementing his or
her own private affirmative action program by in effect using race or sex as a "plus
factor" in an attempt to achieve a seemingly more even-handed result. 70
If these arguments are accepted, the issue of whether inducing these types of
precautions will increase net social welfare requires addressing these questions: Is
the widespread adoption of diversity action programs likely to represent a costeffective response to the threat of liability for unconscious disparate treatment? And,
is such a liability system likely to be the cheapest or best method for effecting the
widespread adoption of these types of programs in the workplace?
We have already seen that there is no evidence that the type's of workplace
diversity action programs that might be adopted under threat of liability for
unconscious discrimination will produce social benefits in the form of harm
reduction that accurately reflect the employer's decline in expected liability costs.
A straightforward economic analysis, grounded in liability theory, predicts that the

168. Although some would defend workplace preferential treatment as a necessary remedial
counterweight to workplace bias, scholars calling for a more vigorous attack on unconscious bias
in the workplace and elsewhere do not generally choose to justify greater activism by predicting
more widespread adoption of affirmative action programs. Rather, the objective is a system that
is "more fair" or "more neutral" because race or sex will make less of a difference, not more. The
point is that such a system is extremely difficult to achieve without introducing elements that, in
themselves, deviate from neutrality.
169. This point leaves to one side the vexed question of whether and what kind of groupconscious measures can be adopted pursuant to a judicially imposed remedy for violations of
antidiscrimination laws. Rather, the question is whether prophylactic trait-conscious practices on
the part of employers can be regarded as increasing or decreasing the "harm" targeted by laws
against discrimination in the workplace.
170. It is tempting to think that if liability spurs more searching, individualized, and careful
assessments of workers, or leads to the collection of more and different kinds of information, it
cannot help but have a salutary effect on the decisionmaking process. But, as already discussed,
there is little support for the view that this type of effort makes for a "better" decision or for one
that is consistently less influenced by trait-based biases. See supranotes 14-29 and infra notes 18590 (discussing the effects of more information and "clinical" versus "actuarial" decisionmaking).
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amount that firms expend will exceed the social savings generated by a reduction in
the particular targeted harm. That is because, as argued above, there will be no
necessary or proportional relationship between what employers are willing to spend
on "precautions" against liability, and any reduction in the harm (unconscious bias)
targeted by the liability system. Yet once that correspondence is disturbed, efficient
cost avoidance cannot be guaranteed.
This point is illustrated by considering some especially popular and seemingly
benign programs that employers could adopt as part of their "diversity action"
programs to improve minority prospects: outreach, recruitment, training, and
education directed at locating a promising pool of minority or female employees
combined with extra pre-job or on-the-job training. Although costly, these measures
could potentially have salutary social effects or even be socially beneficial overall.
Once again, it is difficult to justify extending Title VII-like liability to unconscious
disparate treatment on the ground that it will spur the adoption of outreach and
training programs. First, there is reason to believe that employers will end up
disfavoring these particular strategies, since they are as likely to enhance exposure
to liability as to reduce it."" As for trying to improve the performance of existing
employees, there is little reason to think that adopting these measures in the face of
a liability threat would issue in a socially optimal result. More training for women
and minorities will not necessarily issue in a direct reduction in the very harms (of
unconscious bias) targeted by the liability system that is driving those measures.
Once again, a disparity could easily develop between the amounts expended by
employers on workplace reforms and special training in the hopes of reducing their
own expected liability and the social benefits of those expenditures, because
investments in "precautions" will be geared to estimates of expected liability that
are unrelated to actual harm reduction. Under those circumstances, the liability
system cannot guarantee the cost-effectiveness of measures taken in response to it.
Finally, the heavy transaction costs of a system that depends on individualized
litigation makes it a poor vehicle for encouraging better training for minorities. That
goal could better be accomplished by creating programs that advance the objective
more directly.
This discussion does not rule out the possibility that diversity programs could,
either individually or in the aggregate, generate positive social benefits net of social
costs, even taking into account the costs of running a liability system. If that were
so, however, that fact would be a lucky accident. It would not be a feature that
necessarily followed from the design of the liability system itself. On the other hand,

171. Because hiring is not a rich source of potential liability for workplace discrimination, and
because it is the one stage of the employment process in which employers are most likely to find
it cost-effective to rely to some extent on objective criteria, employers are unlikely to elect to
respond to liability by expending great efforts in recruiting more minority employees. Indeed, such
increases are to be avoided because they would potentially expose the employer to enhanced
liability for adverse decisions against employees once hired. See John J. Donohue I & Peter
Siegelman, The ChangingNatureofEmployment DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REv.
983, 984 (1991); see also Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why
DisparateImpactLiabilityDoesNotInduceHiringQuotas,74 TEx. L. REv. 1487,1489 (1996)
(explaining how the threat of disparate treatment and disparate impact liability "blunts the positive
incentives to hire minorities that Title VII was originally supposed to create").
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the aleatory quality of that result suggests that the opposite could as well be true:
overall social costs could outweigh gains. Determining which of these situations in
fact obtains-and whether the proposed liability system would ultimately be
worthwhile-requires nothing less than a comprehensiv6 evaluation of the costs and
benefits of the full range of workplace diversity programs generally, which cannot
be undertaken here. The balance of those effects, however, will quite likely depart
significantly from the situation that would prevail if the goals of the liability
system-ideal race and sex neutrality-were realized.' 72 Even apart from process
costs, diversity programs potentially carry a number of social costs that would not
be incurred in a truly color-blind system, such'as decreased productivity from
possible worker-job mismatch, losses to workers displaced by others, detrimental
incentive effects, and social resentment and strife.' 73 To be sure, even overt groupconscious measures could conceivably have some social benefits, which cannot be
ignored in assessing the cost-benefit balance. 74 But the point is that if these

172. Depending on design and implementation, different workplace diversity and affirmative
action plans will produce dramatically different outcomes for individuals within a targeted group.
For example, an employer's decision to respond to a racially lopsided workforce by taking the best
candidates from racially segregated lists will produce a different mix of outcomes than eliminating
neutral criteria with disparate racial impact. See Shelly J. Lundberg, The Enforcement ofEqual
Opportunit Laws Under Imperfect Information:Afflirmative Action andAlternatives, 106 Q.J.

ECON. 309,323 (1991). And neither ofthese scenarios will necessarily match the pattern produced
by using race-blind criteria.
173. For a discussion of the perverse incentive effects of affirmative action, see Stephen Coate
& Glenn Louty,AnidiscriminationEnforcementand the Problem ofPatronization,AM. ECON.

Rav., May 1993, at 92, 95-97 (arguing that affirmative action tempts beneficiaries to reduce their
level of effort and preparation). On some of the potential costs of other forms of diversity action
programs, see generally Gottfredson, supra note 161, at 288-89.
Would diversity programs that include some race- or sex-conscious affirmative measures
produce a more productive workforce than a move towards universal neutrality in selection
criteria? The answer is complicated by the possibility that a move from the current baseline to
neutrality might not lead to better worker-job matches and more accurate productivity-related
decisionmaking overall. Neutrality might be "worse" than an unconsciously biased baseline if most
unconscious bias in the workplace is rational-that is, if it reflects accurate (and for the employer
efficient) generalizations about group attributes. Alternatively, there is at least some basis for
arguing that neutrality would still represent a positive move overall: negative externalities from
statistical discrimination might make its elimination socially beneficial. See supra text
accompanying notes 26-33 and infratext accompanying notes 251-58 (discussing rational versus

irrational bias and negative externalities from statistical bias). Regardless of whether a particular
form of inadvertent bias is efficient or inefficient, the point is that attempts to correct it could as
well prove more costly than less, or make things worse rather than better.
174. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 1296-1308 (arguing that affirmative action programs
enhance productivity); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society:
Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &

L. 49, 59-60 (1998) (discussing the "contact hypothesis" which suggests that
interactions among members of diverse groups in the workplace or elsewhere will facilitate
reductions in prejudicial attitudes and might enhance cooperation); Lisa E. Cohen et al., And Then
EMPLOYMENT

There WereMore? The Effect of OrganizationalSex Composition on the HiringandPromotion

ofManagers,63 AM. Soc. Rav. 711,719-24 (1998) (reporting data suggesting that women are
more likely to be hired and promoted when an ample number of women hold jobs above and below
the relevant promotional levels). See generally NoRMAN MILLER & MARILYNN B. BREWE,
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programs are implemented in response to expected liability that is not calibrated to
reflect the balance of social benefits from the tortfeasor's response, there is no
assurance whatever that the liability system will produce a socially optimal or even
net positive result, and some reason to believe it will not.
When the process costs of running the proposed liability system are added to the
mix, the picture potentially changes for the worse: Even if the widespread adoption
of diversity action programs in the workplace would prove socially beneficial in the
end, the key question is whether a costly, time-consuming, and resource-intensive
liability scheme is the best way to spur the adoption of such programs. An
individualized liability system directed at an intransigent and elusive social
phenomenon is unlikely to be the most desirable way to obtain this outcome,
because the same result can probably be achieved, with far less elaborate or
cumbersome machinery, by direct regulation or by other more straightforward
means.

175

In sum, because unconscious bias is particularly resistant to any workable
precautionary strategy or technological fix, employers will consistently find it both
cheaper and easier to substitute away to measures other than "genuine"
precautions-that is, arrangements not reliably known to produce a more neutral and
fairer workplace. But some of these compensatory steps-such as diversity
education programs-might carry significant social costs without any evidence of
proportionate benefits in the form of reductions in harm. Others-such as diversity
action or affirmative action programs-might reduce the effects of actionable bias
for some workers, but will do so erratically and at a social cost that could well
outweigh the investment in program costs and processing. It may be that certain
programs designed to increase diversity in the workplace do in fact result in the
abatement of the kinds of cognitive biases that give rise to distorted decisionmaking,
and that programs that contain some race or sex-conscious element may ultimately
have the effect of making those categories less important to decisionmaking. There
is simply no way of knowing, at this point, whether that will occur.
c. Objective Assessments
The type ofunconscious disparate treatment described in this Article is a problem
that infects appraisal systems that rely on subjective, discretionary judgments. But
employers have the option of reducing reliance on those judgments by substituting
more objective methods. There are several potential pitfalls to this strategy that limit
its usefulness and make it potentially costly for society as a whole. First, eliminating
all subjectivity from personnel assessment would not only prove quite difficult,but
would deprive employers of valuable information and vital flexibility that is
considered essential to the effective management of every workplace. This point
applies especially to evaluating workers' performance on the job. If claims of

GRouPs IN CoNTA.T: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION

(1984) (discussing the potential

prejudice-reducing effects of between-group interactions).
175. See infra Part ILD (stating a parallel argument on how the assignment of compensation
for unconscious bias can be expected to resemble patterns seen in affirmative action programs).
For additional discussion ofthe desirability ofimposing liability for unconscious bias as a spur to
the adoption ofworkplac diversity programs, see infra Part Il
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unconscious bias continue to reflect current patterns of litigation, most will involve
challenges to on-the-job assessments of existing employees or ex-employees rather
than to the selection of new hires. But devices like tests or quantitative measures of
employee performance, although not without their uses, are generally regarded as
inadequate to capture the full range of information considered relevant to evaluating
76
active workers.
Second, employers will be reluctant to respond to the threat of liability by shifting
to objective methods of evaluating workers because those practices carry their own
threat of liability. Such methods will often have a disparate impact by race or sex,
which can-give rise to lawsuits under the disparate impact theory in Title VII. To
escape liability, the employer must take on the notoriously difficult, uncertain, and
expensive task of "validating" the selection method by proving that it is related to
productivity.'" This will discourage employers from switching to objective methods,
even if they also risk liability by failing to take that option.
d. Evolution
Perhaps the most important objection to the conclusion that strict liability will not
efficiently deter unconscious bias proceeds from an alternative account of how
unconscious bias might abate under a threat of liability. The argument that neither
well-meaning supervisors, nor well-intentioned employers, nor cognitive science,
nor industrial psychology, has supplied, nor is likely to supply, a reliable program
for the elimination of subjective group-based bias assumes that this type of program
is necessary to that end. But that assumption ignores the possibility that change
might come about through a process that resembles organic evolution. First, liability
could operate as a selective tax on firms that engage in unconscious discrimination
by making them pay more than 6thers that do not maintain a flawed personnel
system. That effect would operate even though no one knew how to design an
unbiased system through targeted manipulation. 78 Rather, it would take advantage
of chance variations in the degree to which different firms engaged in the offending
behavior. The most biased firms would be placed at a competitive disadvantage by
being charged with the costs of their discriminatory harms.
An alternative scenario posits that firms are more or less uniform in their degree
of unconscious bias to begin with, but that practices within firms will differentiate
as firms experiment with a range of new personnel methods in response to the threat
of liability. Once those variations arise, the winnowing effect of liability would come
into play to ensure that the firms that had by chance adopted the least bias-infected

176. See discussion supra Part 1. & note 96; see also FAIRNEss IN EMPLOYMENT
supra note 130 (discussing employment testing); Kelman, supra note 30 (same).

TESTING,

177. See Kelman, supra note 30, at 1159. See generally FARNmss INEMPLOYMENT TESTING,

supra note 130.
178. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law andNorms, 78 B.U. L. RIv. 813, 840
(1998) ("Evolutionary theory does not require conscious calculation by individuals about which
path is superior. Rather, it suggests simply that those who set out on a path that turns out to be
superior will be more successful than those who select, for whatever reason, a different path.");
see also RicHARD DAWKINS, TEm BLIND WATCHMAKERpassim (1986); DANIEL C. DBNNETr,
DARwIN's DANGEROUS IDEApassim (1995).
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methods survived while others were driven out of business. Once again, just as
organisms can evolve without possessing knowledge of how to remake themselves
in ways better "adapted" to their environment, this account suggests how personnel
systems can move towards neutrality under the threat of liability without anyone
possessing knowledge of how to purge bias from the system.
Although arresting, this story is fundamentally flawed because it depends on a
number of unproven or questionable assumptions. First, it assumes clear and sharp
differences in the degree to which firms' personnel practices are infected with
unconscious racial or sexual bias. But such pronounced variations among firms will
not necessarily arise. Although there is evidence of individual variation in
susceptibility to unconscious stereotyping, the sources of those differences are
mysterious. 7 9 There is no reason to believe that some firms will regularly attract
more bias-prone supervisors than others. Moreover, the degree of variation among
individuals in the tendency to categorize unconsciously may not be large enough to
drive selection among firms. Because bias in evaluations may reflect habits of
thinking that are quite deeply rooted and widespread in the population at the current
stage of social development, there may be rather minimal variations in inadvertent
bias even across different workplace organizations and personnel systems.
Second, even if employers can be expected to change their ways in response to
liability, the evolutionary approach potentially founders on the assumption that
employers will move towards greater neutrality in employee evaluation. But, as
already discussed, the peculiar structure of liability for discrimination may enable
employers to reduce liability exposure by means other than adopting unbiased
personnel methods. If diversity action programs or other responses promise a
cheaper and more profound reduction in exposure to liability than "genuine"
precautions against bias, the employer will take the path of substituting away from
real risk reduction.
Third, differences between firms may be small and undetectable because, as
already discussed, the "signal" to "noise" ratio may be very low.' Instead of
everyone being biased, and to the same degree, perhaps only a few supervisors or
decisionmakers are biased, or their biases operate only some of the time, or they

179. See Bargh, supra note 11, at 376; see also supra note 133 (discussing the influence of
environment on stereotyping).
180. This observation provides one possible answer to the question of why evolution towards
neutrality does not occur spontaneously without the need for the selective pressure of legal liability.
Even ifunconscious bias is costly to the firm, see discussion infra Part MC.6, the effects of its
operation on a firm's competitive position relative to others may be too inconsequential to make
a practical difference. Alternatively, as noted in the discussion above, perhaps no firm can gain a
significant edge by varying its procedures because the extent to which unconscious bias infects the
range of feasible personnel practices across firms is too similar. But another explanation is that
spontaneous evolution will work only if unconscious bias is irrational. See supra note 178. By
definition, bias based on rational group generalizations will not drive firms out of business or
render them less cost effective, so spontaneous competitive forces will not insure evolution away
from statistical discrimination. The ratio of irrational to rational unconscious bias is unknown,
although there is some evidence that a good deal of unconscious stereotyping is not wholly
inaccurate. See McCauley et al., StereotypeAccuracy, supra note 23, at 297-99; Jussim, supra
note 24, at 60.
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influence most decisions little or not at all. 8" The operation of the evolutionary
model depends on unconscious bias "making a difference" to a significant number
of outcomes, which can then be used as a basis for selecting among employers.
Although the frequency with which unconscious stereotyping is determinative of
decisions adverse to members of protected groups is simply not known, it may be
fairly low. This would provide a weak basis for any selection effect.
The final and most important objection to the evolutionary story is that a liability
system targeted at unconscious disparate treatment cannot operate without a
considerable amount of error. As discussed, the evidentiary and fact-finding
limitations inherent in detecting unconscious bias mean that the system will almost
certainly fall short in its ability accurately to identify and "tax" firms that have
committed the offending conduct. Moreover, as Linda Krieger observes, judicial
decisionmakers are vulnerable to the very same group or expectancy based biases
in considering the evidence of workplace discrimination as the workplace
decisionmakers themselves." In this sense, the model of organic evolution breaks
down. Evolution in biological systems is self-executing. No agent need identify the
"best adapted" organisms, because environmental constraints ensure that the fittest
automatically survive. But there is no guarantee of an analogous spontaneous
mechanism for identifying and putting pressure on the least biased firms. Those
firms are not necessarily the "best adapted" for survival.'3 The law must act to
place a financial burden on the firms that engage in the undesirable practices. This
requires that the legal system reliably distinguish between neutral firms and those
that discriminate unconsciously. Driving discriminatory firms out of business
requires the liability system to make more precise distinctions than can realistically
be expected.' 4
e. Spurring Technological Innovation
The foregoing analysis exposes the weakness of a key potential rationale for
holding employers strictly liable for unconscious disparate treatment: to create an
incentive for employers to investigate new approaches to reducing unconscious bias
8 5
in the workplace."
For several reasons it is unrealistic to expect employers and
industrial psychologists to learn enough, even over the very long term, to develop
reasonably reliable and effective strategies to combat inadvertent workplace bias.
First, despite steady advances, knowledge of human psychology in general, and of
the operation of human judgment in particular, is in an extremely primitive state. As
already stated, an understanding of factors that are capable of moving human
judgment towards greater or lesser neutrality--or greater or lesser accuracy-can

181. See discussion supra Parts I.C and ]MC.1.
182. See discussion supra note 122.
183. See supra note 180.
184. See supra Part 1.C.2 and infra Part II.D.2.b (discussing evidentiary limitations).
185. Ifsignificant risk reduction is likely to require technical innovation, strict liability is a better
rule than negligence because it is difficult for courts to take speculative costs of nonobvious
scientific research into account in applying a negligence standard. See supraPart I.B (comparing
strict liability to negligence).
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be gained only through sophisticated, controlled, scientific studies."8 6 Constructing
such studies, and gaining usable information from them, requires identifying the
benchmark for accurate or neutral judgment-that is, resolving the question of "how
individuals can come to make unbiased judgments" and "how judgments and
behavior towards others should occur in the ideal world."" 7 Alternatively, it
requires comparisons under perfectly controlled conditions-that is, where the
persons or situations to be evaluated differ only in respect of group membership or
some other variable of interest. But the principal difficulty faced by psychologists
studying human cognition is that the variables that influence human judgment are
so complex, numerous, hard to control, and poorly understood, that a degree of
scientific knowledge sufficient to yield an effective program of control and
manipulation is not even on the horizon. In contrast, the technical challenges posed
by other common types of workplace hazards or dangerous activities appear simple.
Thus, the prospect of devising an effective technical "fix" for the problem of
unconscious workplace discrimination is considerably more remote than for many
other hazards.' Once again, there is nothing to stop employers and firms from

186. See discussion supraPart ILC.1-2; Wilson & Brekke, supra note 11, at 121-22; Grove &
Meehl, supra note 116, at 316 (comparing "accuracy" of subjective judgments based on the
availability ofuntainted criteria or benchmarks); see also Jussim, supra note 24, at 68 ("Identifying
accuracy and inaccuracy hinges on obtaining some sort of scientific evidence") (citation omitted);
Diane Kobrynowiz & Monica Biernat, ConsideringCorrectness,Contrast and Categorization
inStereofoingPhenomena,in 11 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNmON, supra note 15, at 109, 111

("[D]etenmiiing the accuracy of a stereotype is... complicated. An appropriate criterion must be
selected and a valid measurement tool must be created. This task may not be impossible, but it is
certainly challenging.'); Kruglanski, supra note 105, at 396 (noting that "criteria for accurate
judgments are not invariably self-evident" and "[o]ften, they need to be justified by complex
argument or indirect evidence;' and defining three possible measures of accuracy, including (1)
correspondence between ajudgment and independent criterion, (2) the existence of a consensus
or interpersonal agreement between judges, or (3) the usefulness of ajudgment for a functional
purpose, keeping in mind costs and benefits of alternatives). The difficulties of creating a
benchmark for an ideal process of judgment is complicated by the fact that accuracy and
"neutrality" (the absence of influence by group-based generalizations) do not necessarily go
together The theories ofstatistical discrimination and stereotype accuracy suggest that making use
of group-based generalizations may,when information is limited, sometimes enhance the accuracy
or predictive power ofjudgments. See discussion supraPart LD.
187. Kobrynowicz &Biernatsupra note 186, at 119,122; see also Trope & Liberman, supra
note 87, at 265 (noting the difficulty of controlling for individual variations in judgment and
observing that "different people may reach different conclusions depending on their motivations,
on how important it is to them to avoid errors of commission and omission").
188. Risk reduction technologies for otherworkplace harms are usually developed in areas-like
chemistry or epidemiology-in which sophisticated understandings are already in place.
Techniques tailored to specific workplace problems often require fairly routine innovations or
extensions of what is already known. Although the limits of science and ethical practice do
generate some degree ofuncertainty in these areas as well, see, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing
Ignorancein the Manufactureof Toxic Products,82 CORNEL L. REv.773, 778 (1997) (noting
uncertainties inherent in attempts to assess the influence of occupational hazards and other toxic
sources dueto "various ethical, informational, and technological constraints"), strict liability may
nevertheless issue in the development of precautionary measures that are both effective and
affordable, see Glen 0. Robinson &Kenneth S.Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA.
L. REV.1481, 1486 (1992); Robinson, supranote 129, at 794.
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innovating and experimenting in response to the threat of liability. But without
proper scientific measures of the success of their innovations, they will be operating
"blind." It will be impossible to know whether they have succeeded or not.
Finally, there are independent reasons to believe that reforms implemented
primarily at the level of the individual workplace will not prove very effective.
Although attitudes towards disfavored social groups have been evolving over time,
these changes appear to track broad social trends and shifts in public and private
discourse, images, and experience.""9 This suggests that stereotypical patterns of
thought will be eroded, if at all, not through measures effected at the level of the
individual workplace, but rather through a gradual sea change on multiple cultural
fronts. Because broad social trends are largely out of employers' control, the use of
an expensive liability system to create incentives for employers to innovate may
represent a misplaced effort to induce change at the wrong level.
6. Discrimination as Unavoidable Accident
The discussion so far suggests that personnel processes in the workplace cannot
be expected to progress towards greater neutrality under the pressure of a liability
system targeted at unconscious. group-based biases. In other words, the
discriminatory "accidents" represented by contaminated assessments of employees
in the workplace may be unavoidable, in the sense that there are no known effective
precautions that can be taken against them.
This characterization suggests that proposed explanations for the supposed
persistence of discrimination 90 in the workplace have missed an important aspect
of the problem. To the extent that discrimination is "irrational," it leads to the
disregard of factors pertinent to productivity in favor of arbitrary traits like race and
sex. This can be expected to produce undesirable errors, or mismatches, in the
selection and management of personnel. If so, firms would appear to have an
incentive to eliminate discrimination, because discrimination adds to the cost of
doing business and renders the firm less competitive. 9' Yet it appears that

189. For evidence of long-term shifts in prejudicial attitudes, see Hamilton & Sherman, supra
note 15, at 49. The authors discuss the so-called 'Princeton trilogy" in which a stereotype
assessment test was administered to the general populace three times from 1933 to 1969. See id.
Although test subjects' endorsement of some generalizations for some groups remained fairly
constant overtime, opinions regarding other groups-such as women-changed significantly. See
id.; see also Krieger I, supra note 1, at 1246 (noting that employers' ability to change
stereotypical reactions of supervisors and employees is limited because employers cannot control
"the content of media and other cultural depictions ofwomen and minority group members").
190. Whether there continues to be significant discrimination in the labor market is a matter of
some controversy. See supra pp. 1131-38. See generally Symposium, Discriminationin Product
CreditandLaborMarkets,J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 23 (discussing economic evidence
for market discrimination against minorities and women and attributing most observed disparities
to "premarket" factors).
191. Orthodox economic theory would predict that markets will be "hard on discrimination."
Sunstein, Why Markets, supra note 31, at 22 ("An employer who finds himself refusing to hire
qualified blacks and women will, in the long run, lose out to those who are willing to draw from
a broader labor pool .... [B]igots are weak competitors.").
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discrimination persists: employers continue in their biased ways. Markets have not
eliminated discrimination.
Although commentators have tried to explain this supposed persistence in various
ways,1 92 one unifying theme emerges: If discrimination remains a feature of the
economy, it follows that discriminators are deriving some positive benefit or utility
from the practice of discrimination. These positive benefits explain why the
discriminator will not necessarily choose to cease discriminating even if the
"process costs" of doing so are negligible. A number of benefits from discrimination
have been proposed. 93 Statistical discrimination is one example of a practice that
supposedly profits the discriminator-although its effects on society as a whole are

192. Explanations generally fall into two types: discrimination represents the efficient working
of the market Or it is an inefficient result of market failure from negative externalities generated
by practices that benefit employers at workers' or society's expense. See, e.g., David Chamy & (.
Mitu Gulati, Efficiency Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination:A Theory of Employment
DiscriminationLaw for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV.C.-C.L. L. REv. 57 passim (1998)

(describing an "efficiency wage" model that is tilted against minority employees and discourages
optimal work and training patterns); Donohue,Advocacy Versus Analysis, supra note 152, at

1587-91 (summarizing the theory that discriminators, like polluters, do not always internalize all
costs oftheir activities); Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, Job Discrimination,Market Forces,and
the Invisibility Hypothesis, 102 Q. I. EcoN. 453, 454-56 (1987) (summarizing theories of

information deficits that explain why discrimination against minorities and women persists); Selmi,
supra note 1, at 1277-96 (reviewing theories of discrimination); Strauss, supra note 29, at 162123 (reviewing various economic explanations for the persistence of discrimination); David B.
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, WhyAre There So Few BlackLawyers in CorporateLaw Firms?An
InstfutionalAnayis,84 CAL. L. REv. 493, 514-42 (1996) (explaining discrimination within the

legal profession as the product of structuring the workplace to discourage shirking and to minimize
monitoring costs).
193. Richard Epstein suggests that discrimination generates positive utility by resulting in better
employee-job matching, facilitating the selection and management of a more productive workforce,
or satisfying some customer, worker, or owner preferences. EPSTEIN, supra note 152, at 28-78.
Gary Becker, among others, posits a "taste for discrimination," whereby employers, customers, or
co-workers enjoy positive psychic utility (or avoid negative utility) by minimizing contact with
persons from minority groups. GARY S. BECKER, THE EcONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION passim (2d
ed. 1971); see alsoPosner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title V, supranote 152, at 513

("For Becker, discrimination by whites against blacks is the result of an aversion that whites have
to associating with blacks. This aversion makes it more costly for whites to transact with blacks
than with otherwhites."). Becker predicts that, in a perfectly competitive market, employers with
a "taste for discrimination" will be driven out of business, but firms that discriminate to satisfy
customers' or coworkers' preferences will survive either as segregated firms or as integrated firms
with wage discrimination. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 1633-39 (describing Becker's theory).
Finally, Richard McAdams, criticizing the empirical failures of Gary Becker's "associational
preference model," suggests that discrimination is best explained as a social practice that produces
valuable forms of group status. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperationand Conflict: The Economics
of Group StatusProductionandRaceDiscrimination,108 HIv.L. REv. 1005,1033-62 (1995).
Although maintaining a status-generating system of discriminatory practices requires effort,
discrimination persists because the benefits of status production outweigh the costs of maintaining
the system. See id. at 1063.
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a matter of dispute. 194 Indeed, the theory of rational discrimination may help explain
the persistence of some forms of unconscious group-based bias."" But that need not
be the whole explanation.
The acceptance of a significant role for unconscious bias permits abandoning the
assumption that persistent discrimination must bring discrete benefits to the
perpetrators, either as individuals seeking psychic satisfaction, 96 or as players in an
enterprise committed to matching employees to jobs,'97 or as members of a group
.trying to elevate or maintain group status.' If disparate treatment is best understood
as an inadvertent byproduct of long-ingrained habits of human thought, then
discrimination need bring no immediate psychic or economic benefits at all and
those benefits are not needed to explain its persistence. Rather, the main obstacle
to a discrimination-free workplace may simply be the difficulty of altering the
mind's tendency to employ stereotypes and mental categories in social judgment.
A useful analogy can be drawn to an enterprise that suffers costly accidents (for
example, injuries from plant machinery). The enterprise would ideally like to
eliminate all such accidents. Those events bring no benefits in and of themselves,
and their occurrence is pure cost or "downside" for the enterprise and its workers.
But the firm may lack the know-how to design a safer workplace and developing that
expertise may be out of reach. The point is that the accidents bring no benefits to the
firm. The enterprise would gladly eliminate them if it could do so in a way that was
consistent with its core business activities.

194. Even those who appear to believe that discriminatory practices are driven by positive
benefits for the discriminator suggest that discrimination can generate negative externalities that
decrease social welfare overall. See supra note 193; see also Donohue, Advocacy VersusAnasis,
supra note 152, at 1588 (stressing that not all costs of discrimination are internalized and that
"discrimination in labor markets imposes external costs that are quite analogous to the costs of
pollution"); Donohue, Is Title VHEfficient?, supra note 152, at 1431 (arguing that externalities
from workplace discrimination outweigh benefits), Strauss, supra note 29, at 1640 (suggesting that
discrimination is inefficient overall because it generates negative externalities by discouraging the
development of human capital). But cf EpsTEIN,supra note 152 (arguing that benefits outweigh
costs); Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, AntidiscriminationEnforcement and the Problem of
Patronization,AM. EcoN. REv., May 1993, at 92, 92 (acknowledging the thesis that "one
consequence of employment discrimination is that it harms the incentives for workers to acquire
skills" because "their anticipated returns from investing in job-relevant skills are reduced," but
asserting that setting lower standards through affirmative action may backfire by persuading
workers they can "get desired jobs without making costly investments in skills"). The catalogue
of potential social costs of "rational" discrimination includes direct losses to victims; the
"discouragement" of victims leading to the underdevelopment of human capital, poor effort, or
shirking; and transgenerational effects from-unemployment and underemployment, including child
poverty and deprivation, social isolation, anti-social behaviors, demoralization, and alienation from
the culture at large. For more discussion of the assumptions underlying the identification of
negative externalities of discrimination and the "discouragement effect," see infra Part ILC.7.
195. See, e.g., Ottati & Lee, supra note 104, at 29, 41 (exploring evidence that some
stereotyping in social interaction is grounded in accurate generalizations and thus is functional or
"rational"); infra Part l.D.
196. See BECKER, supra note 193.
197. See EPSTEIN, supra note 152.
198. See McAdams, supra note 193, at 1086.
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7. Discrimination as Avoidable Accident: The Role of
Victims
The discussion so far has assumed that potential victims have no role to play in
creating the risk of inadvertent discriminatory harms. It also implicitly takes for
granted that the cheapest cost avoider for those harms must be the employer. This
Section takes on both these assumptions. Victims of discrimination may well be in
the position to exert some control over the risk that they will become the targets of
unconscious bias in the workplace. Indeed, employees might be able to control that
risk more efficiently than employers.
The possibility that employers and workers share control over the risk of
inadvertent discrimination has important implications for the operation of a strict
liability system. In general, strict liability without contributory negligence will not
provide the optimal rule where the victim can affect the risk of an actionable
harm. 99 If victims are insured through compensation for bias-induced harms, they
will have less incentive to take effective precautions against those harms, even if
they have the means to do so.2"'
How do these observations affect the issue of who should bear the costs of
unconscious disparate treatment? The answer is complicated by the need to consider
both the victim's potential role in triggering an adverse event for which he would
be entitled to recover-that is, his role in eliciting discrimination-and his role in
increasing the risk of unfavorable workplace treatment generally. With respect to
the latter, the availability of "insurance" against some workplace setbacks (those
due to discrimination) might reduce the employee's incentive to avoid behaviors that
enhance the risk of unfavorable actions (like discipline and termination) generally.
To be sure, that possibility depends on adopting the assumption that it is quite
difficult to distinguish tortious from nontortious workplace harms-an assumption
for which this Article argues.2"' Nevertheless, the magnitude and direction of the
inevitable errors are very hard to predict. Unless judicial determinations of liability
are chronically tilted towards false positives, or employees are overly optimistic
about their prospects of winning discrimination suits, insuring employees against
unconscious bias should not create significant moral hazard for misbehavior of a
202
general kind.

199. See LANDEs&PosNE supranote 62, at39-40; SHAVEaL, supra note 36, at 26-32; Steven
Shavell, StrictLiability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
200. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, ProductsLiability as an InsuranceMarket, 14 . LEGAL
STUD. 645,653 (1985) ("Individuals with insurance against certain types of losses are more likely
to engage in risky conduct than those who do not have that insurance.") (citing Steven Shavell, On
MoralHazardand Insurance,93 Q. J. ECoN. 541,541 (1979)).
201. See supraPart ILC.2.
202. The behavioral effects of the availability of a cause of action for discrimination would
depend partly on the employee's probability of benefitting from an erroneous judicial finding of
compensable discrimination balanced against the expected loss from the court ruling against the
employee. Potential victims may perceive these probabilities incorrectly, however. If claimants are
overly optimistic about the potential for prevailing in a bias suit, that would enhance the moral
hazard in the system. In theory, this effect will apply regardless of whether the claim is for
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It is also possible that factors within an employee's control could influence the
specific risk at issue: that the employee will become the target of unconscious bias.
Although the suggestion that the degree to which group-based biases influence
judgments about particular individuals might depend on the victims' own attributes
or behavior will inevitably strike some as repugnant "victim-blaming," 3 that
prospect must nevertheless be taken seriously in the context of this analysis. All
available evidence suggests that trait-based "mental contamination" of social
interactions is a highly variable and nuanced phenomenon that is responsive to
contextual cues. The degree to which unconscious bias figures in a decision at all
may vary widely with the characteristics of the person being assessed and the type
of information that person makes available about himself. This suggests that
elements that vary from person to person and are at least partly within that person's
control-such as background, education, appearance, grooming, demeanor,
manners, speech patterns, work habits, personal conduct, and personality
type-could well determine whether and to what extent an individual elicits an
unconsciously biased response. Moreover, this variation and sensitivity to context
is almost surely more pronounced when discrimination is subtle or inadvertent than
when it is crude, deliberate, or grounded in overt bigotry.20 4 The exact circumstances

that give rise to these variations, and precisely how they operate, are empirical
questions that cannot be definitively answered in the current state of understanding.
There is some cautious support for the possibility that reliance on race or sex-based
presumptions will decline as the type or quality of credentials improves. 2 5 But any

conscious or unconscious discrimination. In practice, it depends on the potential for false positives,
or for self-delusion, generated by each type of claim.
203. See, e.g., KEmA &LESTER, supra note 30, at 218 (describing the widespread tendency
of left multiculturalism to "avoid- any hint of 'blaming the victim,"' which is described as the
view that "we can best understand the victim's problems by looking at her traits, rather than the
traits of those who evaluate her or 'treat' her in a particular way") (emphasis in original).
204. See, ag., Krieger , supra note 1,at 1310-13 (discussing the assumption in current law that
manifestations of overt or intentional group-based animus are fairly consistent from victim to
victim, whereas the evidence suggests that unconscious bias is more variable and contextdependent). To be sure, practitioners of overt racial or sexual bias may sometimes pick and choose
their victims based on aspects ofthe victim's characteristics or behavior. Courts recognize that a
particular employer's failure to discriminate against all members of a minority group in the
workplace does not rule out sporadic animus directed against particular members of the group. But
our intuition is that actors motivated by purposeful racial or sex-based animus will usually make
no such distinctions. See, e.g., id. at 1310 ("If a person discriminates against members of a
particular gender, racial, or ethnic group, we expect him to do so consistently. We assume a
particular decision maker is unlikely to have a 'taste for discrimination' one day and not the next")
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
205. There is speculation that outgroup employees who conform most closely to behavioral and
lifestyle paradigms ofthe dominant group are less likely to be the targets of bias. See, e.g., Barbara
J.Flagg,Fashioninga Title Vfi Rem edyfor Transparent*y White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104
YALEJL. 2009,2009-15 (1995) (discussing the appeal of "whiteness" and "acting white"); Kevin
Lang, A Language Theory ofDiscrimination,101 Q. J. EcoN. 363 passim (1986) (discussing

reactions to unfamiliar cadence and manner of speech); Mar . Matsuda, Voices ofAmerica:
Accent Antidiscrimination Lam and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.

1329 passim (1991) (analyzing the role of speech in discrimination). The quality of credentials
might also influence the extent to which employers unknowingly fall back on stereotypical
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such "sliding scale" effect will depend not on anything an employer can do, but on
the possibility of a "moving target"-that is, on the employee's willingness and
ability to vary his own profile of qualifications and behavior. If an evaluator's
susceptibility to mental contamination is indeed sensitive to victim characteristics,
this suggests that employees might be able to fend off unconscious bias by
manipulating aspects of their presentation or behavior on the job, or by acquiring
better credentials, education, or experience. To be sure, such exertions may not
completely eliminate all group-based bias, and group members may still be
unconsciously undervalued. But if victims can reduce the degree of undervaluation
by changing their behavior or acquiring different attributes-and if employees are
the ones who can most effectively bring about that result-it could well make sense
to let the costs of unconscious bias remain where they fall.
One objection to this notion, however, is that the power to choose how to present
oneself to the world is not the same as knowing how to alter one's presentation for
the purpose of minimizing bias. Indeed, the victim would appear to be as much in
the dark as the employer on this score. Although it is possible that
counterstereotypic qualities tend to deflect bias, this view amounts to little more
than speculation based on very limited evidence. The fact remains that employees
no more understand how deliberately to manipulate employers' unconscious thought
processes than employers know how to control their own biased thinking:
But this lack of know-how does not necessarily eliminate all moral hazard for
victims. Although victims and employers would appear to be equally incapable of
consciously planning a constructive response to the incentives created by bearing
the costs of unconscious bias, that symmetry is illusory. Consider the way in which
an employee might go about trying to avoid becoming the target of unconscious
discrimination. The employee will have no choice but to proceed by trial and error,
since he doesn't know for sure which moves will work. But the employees' efforts
will not be totally random: he will almost certainly proceed by trying to figure out
how to obtain a generally favorable response from his workplace superiors. The
employee will use feedback as a guide, amplifying the approaches that seem to
please and abandoning those that do not. This looks like the flip side of the
employer's most likely response, discussed above, to a liability rule that shifts the

generalizations. A black man with an honors engineering degree from Harvard, for example, might
avoid triggering presumptions that would attach for someone with a degree in sociology from a
lesser known institution.
The studies that seek to examine whether the influence of unconscious stereotypes varies with
whether victims exemplify or defy.common stereotypes provide some guarded support for the view
that inadvertent biases are less dominant under "counterstereotypie' conditions. See, e.g., Charles
Stangor et al., An Inhibited Model of Stereotype Inhibition, in 11 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL
COGNITION, supra note 15, at 193, 202-03 (describing, for example, how Hispanic targets
observed in front of a library are described using fewer stereotypic terms than Hispanic targets
observed near a bullet-riddled window); supra Part II.C.1 (discussing counterstereotypic
information). However, there is a remarkable paucity of well-controlled studies that try to test this
hypothesis for workplace-based appraisals.
The situation for gender bias may be similarly complex. The question of how women can best
dodge sex-based stereotyping by workplace superiors is the subject of endless private worry as well
as public speculation. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,251 (1998) (noting the
double bind of acting too feminine or too masculine).
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costs of unconscious bias onto the firm: Employers, like protected employees, will
respond by attempting to bring about more favorable outcomes for the persons
covered by the liability rule. But there is an important difference: employers can
afford to be cynical, but employees cannot. As already noted, the employer has
complete and dictatorial control over the full range of adverse employee outcomes,
whether discriminatory or not. But employees have no parallel authority. Thus,
although both employers and employees, if made to bear the costs of unconscious
bias, can be expected to try to minimize the number of unfavorable employment
decisions that, respectively, they make or suffer, employees are much more limited
in their means of accomplishing this result. Employers have the option of treating
employees well whether or not they are good employees. But for employees, the
most effective way to avoid becoming a'target of unconscious discrimination is
probably also the most effective way of ducking unfavorable treatment in general:
by striving to become a model worker.
Any effort along those lines, however, is likely increase the worker's productivity;
and if the effort does not prove too costly, it will generate a corresponding increase
in net social welfare." 6 To be sure, it will be impossible to know for sure whether
a particular employees' efforts are diminishing the influence of categorical race or
sex-based bias. Nor can it be said with certainty that behavior that elicits a more
favorable employer response is necessarily more productive or beneficial.
Employers sometimes favor workers for bad reasons, or for reasons only loosely
related to actual performance on the job. Assessments of workers, even when free
from actionable bias, are subject to errors and a range of unexplained variations." 7
But the discussion in this Section rests on the assumption that this pattern will not
dominate: Absent discriminatory biases or perverse incentives to sacrifice
productivity for other payoffs (such as reducing the risk of liability), it is not
implausible to assume in a competitive marketplace that employees who do well in
the workplace-that is, employees who manage to minimize the adverse decisions
taken against them-will be among the most productive.
As we have seen, forcing employers to bear the costs of unconscious bias may
result in potentially costly measures, such as diversity training, diversity action
programs, or affr-mative action, that are designed to reduce the risk of liability but
may do very little to cure the precise problem of bias targeted by the liability system.
Moreover, although it is sometimes claimed that these types of workplace reforms
increase worker satisfaction and productivity," 8 there is very little solid evidence of
this effect.2" 9 In contrast, an employee who responds to the prospect of bearing the
risk of loss from unconscious bias by looking for ways to minimize his own
victimization will look for ways to be a better employee. This search is likely to
have a productivity-enhancing effect. If so, then imposing strict liability for
unconscious disparate treatment on employers could well be ill-advised to the extent

206.On the balance of costs"and benefits, see infra pp. 1205-06.
207. See discussion infra Part I[.D.2.b on irrational "noise" or arbitrariness in labor markets.
208. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 1255; Estund, supra note 174, at 54-58.
209. See, e.g., Gottfredson, supra note 161, at 300; VALIAN supranote 2, at 314-15; Rynes &
Rosen, supra note 161, at 247.
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that it shifts losses from the party whose response is more likely to increase social
welfare to the party less likely to do so.21
One potential problem with the analysis so far is that it gives short shrift to the
cost side of the equation. Whether leaving employees to bear the costs of
unconscious bias is efficient-that is, net socially beneficial-is a function not just
of whether the employee will be led to increase his productivity, but what it costs
him to do so. Some commentators have argued that group-based discrimination may
"
induce socially wasteful overinvestments in education or training.21
' Alternatively,
employees might incur grievous personal costs from efforts to minimize bias,
including the sacrifice of individuality, identity, or choice.212 Finally, the notion that
employees will in fact respond "constructively" to unregulated discrimination could
be criticized as unrealistic. An oft-repeated assertion in the discrimination literature
is that group-based bias will lead to discouragement: members of the targeted group
will underinvest in human capital and will underperform on the job because the
expected payoff from these inputs will be less than for others.213 Finally, the decision
to take the victim's role into account in selecting a liability rule depends to some
extent on justice-based and equitable considerations that transcend the terms of a

210. One objection to this conclusion is that the magnitude of the moral hazard from shifting
the costs of unconscious bias away from victims to employers may be fairly small. It can be argued

tat employees have substantial standing incentives to please their employers, which will swamp
any incremental effects of making them bear the costs of unconscious bias. There is no easy way
to answer this objection, because not enough is known about the relative influence of legal
protections and extra-legal factors on employee effort and performance. The possibility that the
liability rule for bias will have some significant effect, however, cannot be dismissed out of hand.
An employee's belief that subconscious bias is potentially an important factor in the workplace and
can be manipulated could significantly influence that employee's pre-market and workplace
choices.
211. See A. MICHAEL SPENcE, MARKET SIGNALiNG: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRnNG AND
RELATED ScREENING PROCEsSES passim (1974); A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling,87
Q. . EcoN. 355, 368-74 (1973). See also Chamy & Gulati, supra note 192, at 78-83, for the
argument that victims caught up in discriminatory systems will invest in educational signals that
improve the victims' prospects in the workplace but fail to increase productivity in a cost-effective

manner.
212. The strategies could range from simple adjustments in attitude, dress, and demeanor, to
more problematic shifts in speech patterns or lifestyle choices that are central to cultural identity,
solidarity, or individual personality.
213. See supra note 194 for a discussion of the "discouragement" effect. This idea often
surfaces in discussions of statistical discrimination, and is used to defend the conclusion that
although rational bias may be efficient for the employer it induces negative externalities that are
inefficient for society as a whole. See supra notes 192 and 194 for a discussion of externalities.
For examples ofthis view, see Arrow, supra note 29, at 96 ("If the employer is going to judge by
race, then there is no reward for [greater] investments. They will not be acquired, and then the
statistical judgments will be confirmed.'); Darity & Mason, supranote 127, at 84; Williams &
Sander, supra note 130, at 2035 (suggesting that race-based statistical discrimination is selfreinforcing because the discouragement and resentment that results from being judged by group
norms causes targets to underperform). See also Strauss, supra note 29, at 1639-43; Sunstein,
Why Markets, supra note 31, at 29-31. For an economic model of statistical discrimination that
describes reduced payoffs for workers, see Edmund S. Phelps, The StatisticalTheory ofRacism
andSexism, 62 AM. EcON. REV. 659 (1972).
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cost-benefit analysis so narrowly conceived. We may be uneasy about placing the
onus for finding strategies to reduce unconscious bias on potential victims when they
do not "deserve" to be the targets of risk in the first place. We may ultimately judge
the employer preferences that employees must satisfy in their quest to minimize bias
as unreasonable, culturally arbitrary, and only tenuously related to any legitimate
"business purpose."
Considerations ofjustice and employer hegemony, although important, are beyond
the scope of this Article. Leaving aside these difficult issues, however, one answer
to the concern that victims wil make overly costly sacrifices or investments is that
victims generally will not pursue particular options designed to reduce their own
risks of victimization unless it is worth their while: those measures must promise to
generate net benefits to the victims themselves. Since victims will bear most of the
costs of trying to forestall their own victimization and will also reap the lion's share
of rewards from success, they are probably a good judge of whether a particular
response is socially beneficial overall. In other words, the employee's internalization
of most significant costs and benefits of any change in strategy should operate as a
hedge against wasteful overinvestment in most cases. Although expecting employees
to bear the costs of making changes in response to the prospect of being victimized
by unconscious bias may not be fair, it is unlikely to be inefficient.
As for the contention that victims may not internalize all costs of investments in
response to discrimination (most notably some "signaling" costs), 214 that view
depends on the assumption that investments in signaling systems may not always be
socially efficient. The signals used to sort workers (such as education) do not
necessarily enhance productivity. Rather, they may simply reveal pre-existing
differences in talent or ability. But there is no a priori reason, at least from an
economic point of view, to distinguish the costs of matching and sorting employees
from other factors bearing on their contribution to the net profitability of an
enterprise.2 " Although signaling practices may occasionally generate wasteful
equilibria, the employer's preference for employees who possess relatively
reliable signals of quality or ability will more often reflect real net benefit to the
enterprise and to society as a whole.
Finally, the prediction that discrimination that effectively discounts the inputs of
members of some groups will invariably lead to "discouragement," reduced effort,
and less investment in human capital is almost surely wrong. More likely the true
picture is far more mixed, with different people responding in different ways.
Discrimination can be viewed as a form of adversity, in the sense that it can reduce
payoffs to individuals for a fixed amount of effort. But victims of adversity are
always faced with a range of options. Specifically, they can decide whether to exert
greater or more costly efforts in the face of reduced payoffs or to decrease effort.
Whether the selection of one or the other strategy is "rational," either from the
victim's point of view or in some broader sense, does not admit of a categorical

214. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 211; Chamy & Gulati, supra note 192, at 57.
215. See KELmAN& LESrER, supra note 30; Kelman, supra note 30, at 1203-04 (distinguishing
between "gross" productivity, which reflects work output and quality only, and net productivity,
which represents an employee's work output minus all expenses related to hiring, managing, and

supporting the worker).
216. See, e.g., SPBNCE, supra note 211.
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answer. Whether it is "rational" for the victim himself depends on characteristics
peculiar to each individual, including the relative dominance in each person's
preference structure ofwhat labor economists would term the substitution effect and
income effect from unfavorable changes in that person's economic.prospects.
The substitution effect is the product of the "price" or opportunity cost of leisure.
As the payoff to work decreases (as with discrimination), leisure costs less in
forgone earnings, which causes work effort to decline. The income effect, on the
other hand, is the product of the decrease in the demand for a good (for example,
money) as income rises, or an increase in demand as income falls. The income effect
will lead a person who is poorer because of discrimination to work harder to restore
the level of income he otherwise would enjoy.217 In the case of discrimination, these
effects work in opposite directions, and whether a person will respond to
discrimination by working harder or "smarter," or working less hard, depends on the
relative dominance of the effects for that person.
The mix of these two effects is not constant for everyone: it varies with the taste
for leisure over material gain, the consumption value or moral value of work, and
other factors relating to discount rate, long term and second-order goals, group
identification, work-ethic, self-concept, personality, cultural values, and normative
expectations. The complexity ofthese factors means that not everyone will deal with
the prospect of discrimination by becoming discouraged, studying less, or working
less hard. Some may have the opposite response. It could be argued that groups in
which most persons respond to discrimination with more effort rather than less will
be more successful in the long run. Indeed, if unconscious bias turns out to vary
regularly with factors victims can manipulate, individuals who counter
discrimination with redoubled effort or investment may well place themselves at a
distinct advantage relative to those who do not. In light of these observations, it
should be clear that victims of unconscious bias are not doomed to a downward
spiral of employment-related losses if unconscious discrimination goes
uncompensated. Rather, there may be much that potential victims can do to lighten
the burden placed on them by this unfortunate phenomenon.
Even if victims are not completely helpless against unconscious bias, however,
benefits will not be forthcoming if most people simply refuse to make a positive
response. Advocates of leaving the costs of unconscious bias where they fall must
confront the possibility that most persons who believe themselves victims will react
as the dominant theory predicts: Some will become discouraged and decrease their
amount and quality of effort, while others will conclude that the cost of adjusting
behavior or increasing investment is simply too great and overwhelms any potential
gain. If the system must accept people and their preferences as they fird them, this
is a potent objection. Nonetheless, not only is there no reason to believe that the
balance of income and substitution effects are uniform across persons, there is also
no reason to believe that they are immutably fixed. The preferences that determine
how individuals deal with discrimination almost surely can be altered by reason and

217. See, e.g., DANIEL S. H.AMERMESH & ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WoRK AND PAY

34 (3d ed. 1984). For an instructive application of the concepts of income and substitution effects
to the analysis of how individuals will respond to legal protections for the learning disabled, see
KELMAN & LEsTER, supranote 30, at 188-94.
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persuasion as well as by shifts in norms, attitudes, expectations, and cultural values.
Persons who at first accept discouragement as an "appropriate" or rational response
to discrimination might come to see this as counterproductive or self-defeating.
Others who initially regard certain behaviors as central to cultural identity or
individuality may yet come to see compromise as ultimately less costly or more
worthwhile than maintaining a personal status quo.
Even if these arguments are accepted, it may nevertheless strike many as perverse
to structure a legal regime to "reward" victims who can manage a constructive
response to adversity rather to tax the employers who are creating the adversity. But
that stance assumes both that employers can be taxed accurately and effectively and
that shifting costs through the legal system to reduce unconscious bias will actually
work. Although trying to hold victims harmless may make occasional victims better
off, the overall effect could well be to increase net social costs by discouraging the
cheapest cost avoiders (that is, victims) from making the most socially constructive
response to loss. Leaving the costs where they fall may represent the best we can do
in an imperfect world.
D. Compensationand InsuranceAgainst Unconscious
Disparate Treatment
As argued above, employers do not know how to purge the influence of
unconscious stereotypes from workplace assessments. Although employers might
respond to the threat of liability for unconscious bias by implementing diversity
action programs that end up reducing the number of adverse decisions against
protected individuals-and which therefore may cancel the effects of some
indeterminate amount of unconscious bias-the relationship between exposure to
liability and reduction in the targeted harm will be irregular and unpredictable.
Since imposing strict liability on employers for unconscious forms of bias cannot be
expected to produce targeted deterrence, it cannot be relied upon to produce
efficient cost avoidance. Indeed, it might detract from efficient risk reduction by
shifting costs away from employees to employers.
But efficient harm reduction is only one possible objective of a liability system.
A system might also seek to compensate victims for losses and to insure potential
victims efficiently against harm. The prospect of generating considerable transaction
costs without effective or efficient risk reduction must then be weighed against the
liability system's potential to advance the goals of effective compensation or
efficient insurance.
With respect to compensating victims, efficiency is not the only concern.
Considerations of justice loom large. Among the principal goals of compensation
systems has always been to return individuals to the position they would have
occupied absent the wrongful conduct. Where unlawful reliance on race or sex
results in concrete losses to the victim-that is, where the effect of bias in the
workplace is "determinative"-there are strong arguments, grounded in principles
of corrective or compensatory justice, for making victims of unconscious disparate
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treatment whole for any resulting losses. 1 Although some theories of compensatory
justice might attach importance to distinctions based on the state of mind of the
person being held liable,2 ' it will be assumed for purposes of this discussion that
unconscious bias can be made up efficiently, justice
if losses to victims caused by
220
dictates that they should be.

218. This Article is primarily about the social costs and distributional effects of imposing tortious
liability for unconscious discrimination. Issues of compensatory justice are largely beyond its scope.
Thus the discussion indulges a presumption that transfers from the "injurer"--here taken to be the
employer-to the "victim" of discrimination-the employee-are appropriate for the purpose of
making up the losses suffered by the victim. Compare Stephen R. Perry, The MoralFoundations
ofTortLaw, 77 IOwA L.REV. 449,465 (1992) (noting that the Coasian view oftransactions calls
into question the identification of victims or perpetrators of a harmful interaction, since the
participation of both is required to bring about the harm), with Richard A. EpsteinA Theory of
Strict Liabili, 2 3. LEGAL STUD. 151, 164-89 (1973) (asserting a non-reciprocal theory of
causation of harm).
219. Conventional accident analysis makes no initial categorical distinction between losses
inflicted "on purpose" and those incurred through carelessness or inadvertency, although the
defendant's state of mind will have some bearing on the real-world cost-benefit calculus. In
contrast, whether compensation for inadvertent harms would either be mandated by, or consistent
with, principles ofjustice is a highly debated question. It is unclear whether, and which, justicebased theories would endorse compensating victims of discrimination regardless of whether the
harm is inflicted intentionally or negligently, or the harm is unforeseeable, or the perpetrator could
not have "taken greater care." See Perry, supra note 64 (surveying views in the compensatory
justice literature on the relationship between causation, foreseeability, state of mind, and
justifications for compensation); see also Jules L. Coleman, The Morality ofStrict TortLiability,
18 WM. &MARY L. REV.259,275-86 (1976) (expressing concern about the moral implications
of tort theories that assign the costs of accidents to parties who are not in some sense
"blameworthy" or "at faulV', Mahzarin K.Banaji &Anthony G.Greenwald, ImplicitStereotyping
andPrejudice,in7 THE PSYCHOLOGY OFPREUDICE: THE ONTAIO SYMPOSIUM, supranote 24,
at 55, 70-71 (questioning the moral implications of holding persons responsible for automatic
unconscious biases that are outside individual control and arguing for "removing responsibility
from individual perpetrators of social crimes of stereotyping and prejudice"); Bargh, supra note
11, at 364 (suggesting that "[i]f people cannot help stereotyping, then they cannot be held
personally responsible for their actions, and so cannot be sanctioned for any prejudicial actions').
220. The case for compensating victims for inadvertent bias in the workplace is enhanced if the
failure to make victims whole for losses resulting from workplace discrimination can be expected
to have significant secondary or spillover effects that compound the victim's injury. Once again,
it is difficult to assess the importance of any such factors for unconscious bias because it is hard
to get a sense of how much social judgment is affected in the real world. This Article suggests that
inadvertent stereotyping is probably only of sporadic or minor importance in many settings. But,
if unconscious bias is a significant phenomenon-4hat is, it often makes a difference and group
members can only do so much to minimize bias-then it may have important collective or
secondary effects. In addition to depressing target groups' income, employment prospects, rates
of employment, and status in the workplace, these patterns can result in a cascade of selfreinforcing consequences, including poor health, educational underachievement alienation, castelike stigma, and rejection of dominant norms and cultural expectations. These can in turn fuel
undesirable neighborhood, community, and transgenerational effects, which in turn can depress
minorities' prospects for successful employment See, e.g., Moss &TILLY, supra note 131, at 30
(discussing "additional round effe'ts" ofhigh rates of black male unemployment); WILLAM JULIUs
WL.ON, WaN WORK DkAPEARs (1996) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, The AnticastePrincipal,92
MICH. L. REv. 2410 passim (1994). Not only do conventional remedies for employment
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The goal of compensation, however, requires that compensatory transfers be
appropriately targeted. Compensation should be paid to actual victims. To the extent
that the system falls short of this ideal-that is, to the extent that the assignment of
compensation is inaccurate-the goal of corrective justice for individuals is vitiated.
In light of this observation, the ensuing discussion addresses the following
questions: How does making employers strictly liable for unconscious disparate
treatment fare in advancing the goals of efficient insurance and fair, efficient, and
accurately targeted compensation for victims?
1. Insurance Against Unconscious Bias: Tangible and
Intangible Losses
Compensation for tangible or monetary losses from unconscious discrimination
would ordinarily be expected to provide an efficient form of insurance. Assuming
some risk aversion on the part of victims, an insurance system that makes up
tangible accidental losses should increase victims' total well-being overall.22'
Viewing compensation for discriminatory harms from the point of view of insurance
theory also sheds light on the question of whether compensation should be awarded
for (conscious or unconscious) "nondeterminative" bias-that is, bias-in-the-process

discrimination (including front pay, back pay, and equitable reinstatement) typically disregard many
ofthese consequential costs, but these remedies will not necessarily head off all secondary effects.
Also, the emotional or dignitary harms from discrimination might linger regardless of
compensation for material losses. Indeed, those ill effects might not be wholly eliminated even by
adding compensation for the intangible harms themselves. See infra text accompanying notes 22224 for a discussion of compensation for nonpecuniary losses from discrimination. Although the
ideal would be to eliminate the bias that warrants compensation, generous compensation could at
least mitigate these effects and would be worth achieving if otherwise feasible.
221. Insurance generally is thought to be "efficient' if the victim would choose to insure himself
against the harm. If victims are risk averse, they will gain by transferring money from the
preaccident to the postaccident state until the marginal utility of money in both states is equalized.
This occurs when monetary losses are fully compensated. Persons who suffer monetary losses
from accidents (either because oflost income or enhanced expenses) have a higher marginal utility
of money, and will experience a gain in utility from a transfer of money from the wealthier
(preaccident) to the less wealthy (postaccident) state. Victims can thus be expected to purchase full
insurance for tangible losses because they will choose to transfer money until monetary losses are
fully made up. The insurance itsel by abating risk, adds an extra component of positive utility over
and above the equalization of wealth. See, e.g., PAUL H. RunIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRAcT 2940 (1993); Patricia l Danzon, TortReform and the Role ofGovernment in PrivateMarkets, 13
J. LEGAL STuD. 517, 520-24 (1984); Ellen Smith Pryor, The TortLaw Debate,Efficiency, and
the Kingdom ofthe 11. A Critiqueof the InsuranceTheory ofCompensation,79 VA. L. REV. 91,
99-104 (1993); Schwartz, supra note 153, at 362-67.

The insurance story for tangible harms from discrimination is not without complication,
however. The types of harm inflicted may sometimes give rise to severe valuation problems (e.g.,
as in trying to assess the monetary loss that corresponds to the employee's forgone future
opportunities). Antidiscrimination liability systems also necessarily lump together into the same
"insurance pool" potential victims with very different degrees of risk aversion toward the prospect
of suffering losses from workplace bias, which can potentially produce inefficiencies. See, e.g., Jon
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-PartyInsuranceExternality:An Economic Justification
for EnterpriseLiability, 76 CoRNSLLL. Rnv. 129, 139-41 (1990).
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that produces no measurable loss in concrete job benefits or monetary
compensation.222 That question is potentially quite important to the legal treatment
ofunconscious discrimination, since, as already discussed, inadvertent stereotyping
may not make a difference to many decisional outcomes. In the absence of a tangible
loss, a system that awarded compensation under these circumstances could be
regarded as creating insurance for emotional, dignitary, or nonpecuniary
harms--that is, for some form of "pain and suffering." There is a large, though not
unchallenged, body of work that counsels against granting compensation for these
types of harms, based on the prediction that compensation is not likely to improve
the well-being of victims overall. The benchmark for when insurance is efficient is
whether a victim would choose to purchase insurance against a loss. Economists
reason that a person would not rationally choose to purchase insurance against
intangible emotional harms because, once tangible losses have been made up, money
is worth less to a person after the harm has been inflicted than it is in the uninjured
state.2" Should employees be compensated for nondeterminative discrimination?
The orthodox theory predicts that victims of discrimination will not insure
themselves against this nonpecuniary form of harm, and therefore a liability system
that builds in this insurance component by awarding compensation for "bias-in-theprocess" is unlikely to be efficient. In reality, however, the question of whether
compensating discrimination that issues in no monetizable harm would enhance
social welfare cannot be answered definitively in theory. The relative marginal
utility of money in any postaccident state is ultimately an empirical question, and the
answer may vary from case to case.22 Further confounding the issue is the
observation that minority group members will not necessarily function in real life

222. Some scholars have suggested that victims should be compensated for being exposed to
biased processes or procedures, regardless ofoutcomes or tangible harms. See Mark S. Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in Mixed Motive Title VII Actions: A Social Policy Perspective, 82
COLUM. L. Rpv. 292, 316-26 (1982); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotionof
Women to PositionsofPower,41 HASTINGS L.J.471,526, 528-34 (1990); Stonefield, supra note
27, at 134-75; Weber, supra note 9, at 515-24. See generallyLidge, supranote 27 (arguing that
nondeterminative discrimination should be compensated). An analogy could be drawn between this
argument and the suggestion that persons are entitled to compensation for "exposure to risk"
regardlegs of whether any injury ever materializes. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights
AgainstRisks, 86 CoLuM. L. REv.495 passim (1986); see also David McCarthy, Liability and
Risk 25 PEn. &PuB.AF. 238,247-53,259-62 (1995); David McCarthy, Rights,Explanations,
and Risks, 107 ETHIcs 205 passim (1997); Robinson, supra note 129 passim; Kenneth W.
Simons, CorrectiveJustice andLiabilityforRisk-Creation:A Comment, 38 UCLAL. RIV. 113,
114-18 (1990). For further discussion of "compensation for risk," see infra text accompanying
notes 235-36.
223. See Chamallas, supra note 1, at 505 n.164; see also RuBIN, supra note 221, at 29-40;
Mark Geistfeld, ShouldEnterpriseLiabilityReplace the Rule ofStrictLiabilityforAbnormally
DangerousActivities?,45 UCLAL. RFv. 611,630 (1998); Pryor, supra note 221, at 101-04.
224. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 T.X L. REV. 1567, 1573-77 (1997); Pryor, supra note 221, at 125-36;
Margaret Jane Radin, CompensationandCommensurability,43 DuKE L.J. 56, 69-83 (1993); see
also Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs ofAccidents: Pain-andSufferingDamagesin TortLaw, 108 HARv.L.RRV. 1787,1812-45,1857-95 (1995) (suggesting
that the absence of a market for insurance against nonpecuniary harms is not dispositive ofthe
question whether consumers would want such insurance or whether it would be efficient).
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as their own insurers against workplace discrimination. Employers may spread the
costs of liability for discrimination among a variety of economic actors, including
but not limited to victims. 22 5 In that case, the observation that money or other
resources may have relatively low marginal utility in the postaccident state raises a
question that goes to the wisdom of any redistributional move: "relative to what?"
The issue boils down to whether compensation will result in transfers from persons
with lower marginal utility to persons with higher marginal utility for the transferred
resources. It is impossible to answer that question in the abstract.
Insurance theory thus offers little help in resolving the debate between advocates
of compensation for discrimination that falls short of producing tangible harm and
discrimination that causes concrete losses. 26 Even if compensation is restricted to
tangible losses, however, serious questions of fairness are raised by viewing liability
for group-based discrimination in general, and unconscious bias in particular, as an
insurance system. If,
as suggested above, all employees end up bearing the costs of
the compensation system, it is unclear whether this allocation can be justified. On
the one hand, such a system will transfer resources from individuals who are
exposed to minimal risk-non-minority or male workers-to members of protected
groups who are at far greater risk. But individuals who are known ahead of time to
bear no risk are not properly included within a "risk pool" charged with selfinsurance. That is subsidy, not insurance, and as such enhances the possibility of an
inefficient transfer.227 (This effect would be softened, however, if employers shift a
disproportionate amount of the costs of compensation to employees who are most
likely to collect compensation.) On the other hand, it can also be argued that no

225. The determination of whether insurance for discriminatory harms is "efficient" depends
upon the answer to the real-life queAtion of who will ultimately end up paying the compensation
awarded against employers found liable for discrimination. Insurance theory is useful in focusing
attention on this issue. The economic analysis of products liability, for example, assumes that
consumers will end up paying forthe third party insurance mandated by liability for product defects
because manufacturers will "pass through" the expense of compensation for consumer injuries in
the form of higher prices. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55 for discussion on passthroughs and cost-shifting.
In employment discrimination, it is unclear whether and to what extent employers will "pass
through" the costs of paying liability judgments to the persons (e.g., minorities and women) who
are eligible to collect, or whether those costs will be shifted to others (e.g., stockholders, product
consumers, clients, customers, or other employees). For example, employers might avoid
employing minorities or pay them less. Or, they might respond to higher labor costs by employing
fewerworkers generally or by substituting away from labor to capital-intensive activities. See supra
text accompanying notes 151-52. Alternatively, they might raise prices to consumers, or simply
absorb the costs themselves; as reflected in lower profits for the enterprise or less gain for
stockholders. See, ag., Kennedy, supranote 153, at 604-07 (discussing distributional issues raised
by various tort liability schemes, and raising questions regarding the "pass through" assumption
that is central to scholarship in the economics of products liability).
Because any one of these scenarios is possible, any analysis-like the insurance theory of
efficient damages-that rests on the assumption that iability costs will ultimately be "passed
through" to victims must be approached with caution.
226. But see infra Part ILD.3.a for additional discussion of this issue from the vantage of
creating a rational compensation system.
227. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTINo RISK 24-25 (1986) ("[T]he use of

insurance as a wealth redistribution device is subject to many difficulties.').
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insurance system should charge persons with insuring themselves against the risks
of harms that result from their own immutable characteristics. In other words, risk
pooling arrangements should take no account of involuntary traits (such as race and
sex) that correlate with risk, On this view, individuals from groups most likely to
suffer discrimination should not be asked to insure themselves; rather, the system
should be completely blind to the factors that give rise to the special risk, and the
costs of insuring those groups against harm should be spread more widely.22
2. Compensation for Unconscious Bias: All-Or-Nothing.

Liability
The analysis up to now has offered no compelling rationale for distinguishing
between conscious and unconscious forms of bias in the provision of insurance or
compensation to victims. But the analysis has proceeded as if fairly accurate
compensation and actuarially sound insurance could be achieved. It has ignored
factors that contribute to errors in the assignment of compensation. Such errors are
important in judging the desirability of a compensation scheme from the point of
view of compensatory justice. A system that routinely misdirects compensation
cannot be justified on the ground that it makes its victims whole or restores them to
their rightful position.
For liability systems generally, the best decision rule is one that "imposes liability
entirely on the party who would indeed be liable under the governing substantive
law if only all the facts could be known with certainty."" 9 But the facts never can
be known with certainty. Although it is no great insight to point out that all liability
systems produce errors in compensation, the degree to which different liability
schemes directed at different harms can avoid mistakes in identifying and
compensating victims is a subject that has received less attention than it deserves.23
We have already discussed how the potentially limited ability of judicial fact-finders
to distinguish between "genuine" precautions against inadvertent bias and "pseudoprecautions" might undermine the deterrent potential of liability rules. In a similar
vein, an analysis of the potential for errors in assigning responsibility that is built
into different antidiscrimination regimes is important to an understanding of how
well those schemes advance compensatory goals.
The ensuing discussion examines the type and amount of error that might be
expected to occur in a system directed at compensating individual workers for
unconscious disparate treatment. It concludes that the compensation errors
generated by such a system are likely to be quite significant. If,as already
suggested,2 31 unconscious disparate treatment is "subtle"-either because it is

228. See id. at 26-29 (discussing normative "egalitarian insurance principles,' which would
"render such immutable characteristics as age and sex morally irrelevant to the appropriate
distribution of risk," including who should bear the cost of insuring against risk).
229. David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably
Naked Statistical Evidence andMu tiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND.REas. . 487, 496.
230. See, eg., Geistfeld, supra note 223, at 637 & n.85 (noting paucity of attention to errors in
assigning liability in discussions of whether liability schemes achieve aims of compensatory
justice).
231. See supra Part I.C.
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uncommon, or unpredictably sporadic, or "shallow" (in that it "makes a difference"
only in scattered cases)-many instances of discrimination may go undetected.
Victims will be unable to meet the standard of proof and will remain
uncompensated. But if the standard of proof is set lower to make up for these
limitations, undesirable errors will be made in the opposite direction. Regardless of
the standard of proof, the difficulties inherent in distinguishing true unconscious bias
from innocent conduct in the employment setting can be expected to produce
frequent mistakes in one direction or the other. There will either be too much or too
little compensation for claimants as individuals and in the aggregate, and firms will
be undercharged or overcharged for their actionable harms.
Most liability systems adopt an all-or-nothing recovery rule: Compensation is
awarded if the plaintiff proves causation and other elements of liability by a
designated standard of proof, which in civil actions is a preponderance of the
evidence. The current liability scheme for workplace disparate treatment conforms
to this all-or-nothing pattern. The key question for the judge or jury in
straightforward "single motive" or "pretext" cases is whether a decisionmaker's
consideration of the race or sex of the victim produced an adverse outcome-that
is, whether the trait was the "but for" cause of some loss to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff must ordinarily show discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence-that is, that more likely than not the action taken against him was due to
a protected characteristic.
As explained above, claims of unconscious disparate treatment will quite often
stand or fall on statistical evidence." 2 The historical practice under Title VII (with
its seminal emphasis on hiring cases), as well as the practical difficulties of
generating persuasive numbers, have influenced the statistical methods that
plaintiffs have offered and courts have accepted in the discrimination context. The
dominant methodology is "hypothesis testing," which seeks to determine with some
degree of "significance" or "confidence" the probability that observed disparities
between outcomes for protected and unprotected groups (for example, differences
in hiring rates) could happen by chance.233 This method and the inferences that
follow from it are not tied in any obvious way to the conventional requirement that
a plaintiff meet a designated standard of proof. Specifically, it is unclear how these
techniques would be related to a finding that discrimination is "more likely than not"
the cause of observed patterns.234
In contrast, the question of causation in toxic torts cases is often analyzed quite
differently by, for example, comparing the background risk of contracting a disease

232. See supra Part II.C.2.
233. See, e.g., Marcel C. Garaud, Comment, LegalStandardsandStatisticalProofin Title Vf7
Litigation: In Search of a CoherentDisparateImpact Model, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 455, 479
(1990); Paul Meier et al, What Happenedin Hazelwood: Statistics,Employment Discrimination,
and the 80% Rule, 1984 Am. B. FOUND. RcS. J. 139, 145-52. For a persuasive account of
problems with the courts' use of hypothesis testing models in the discrimination context, see
Browne, supranote 126, at 495-96.
234. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 126, at 496 ("[T]here is no simple relationship between the
significance level and the burden of persuasion."); see also Garaud, supra note 233, at 467-68
(discussing uncertainties surrounding implications of hypothesis testing models for plaintiff's
actual burden of proof).
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with the incidence among workers allegedly exposed to a disease-causing agent.235
It is often accepted that the preponderance standard is satisfied if the risk among the
exposed worker population is more than twice as high as among a comparable
unexposed group-that is, if workers are more than twice as likely as a nonworker
population with similar background risk to get the disease. In that case, one could
say that it was more likely than not that any particular worker's cancer was caused
by workplace exposure. Put another way, more than 50% of the risk of disease can
be attributed to a workplace influence.236
A toxic tort type analysis as applied to discrimination on the job would correspond
to a showing, for example, that employees from non-minority groups were promoted
without apparent justification more than twice as often as otherwise comparable
members of minority groups. Those numbers could be claimed to demonstrate
disparate treatment by a preponderance of the evidence because they provide some
basis for asserting that the failure of a particular minority or female worker to be
promoted is more likely than not due to race or sex. Yet, for reasons that are
probably both evidentiary and historical, the analysis in discrimination cases rarely
proceeds along these lines.
Although the precise relationship in discrimination law between the evidentiary
standard and different methods of statistical analysis is obscure," 7 one thing is clear:
Employment discrimination practice, even where statistics play a central part,
establishes an evidentiary threshold of some kind. That the threshold may vary from
case to case and may sometimes fall well below the theoretically appropriate "more
likely than not" mark complicates matters further, but does not alter the basic all-or238
nothing nature of the liability determination under current law.

235. Both toxic torts and discrimination cases share the problem of selecting an appropriate
control group for fixing background risk. For example, the baseline risk of cancer for a particular
group of workers might not match the risk for the population as a whole. Likewise, in the
workplace example, arguments could be made that the non-minority population of workers is not
the appropriate control for calculating background risk of nonpromotion. That argument amounts
to the familiar assertion that there are hidden variables that account for differences in treatment
between workers from different groups on the job. See supra notes 126-31 and infra note 247.
236. See BertBlack &David E. LilienfeldEpidemiologicalProofin Toxic TortLitigation, 52
FORDHAML. REV. 732,767 (1984); Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 857-59. But see Mark Kelman,
The NecessaryMyth of Objective CausationJudgments in LiberalPoliticalTheory, 63 Ciu.KENT L. REv. 579, 620 (1987) (criticizing the "greater than 50% risk" approach to the
preponderance standard in workplace harm cases as arbitrary and as conflating causation and
valuation); Joseph H. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in PersonalInjury Torts
Involving PreexistingConditionsandFutureConsequences,90 YALBL.J. 1353, 1374 (1981)
(same). Cf.Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P. 2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983) (allowing a
patient the opportunity to recover for malpractice by showing that negligence reduced his chances
of survival by less than 50%, but noting that "loss of chance.., does not necessitate a total
recovery" for all damages cause by death.).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 233-34.
238. One important complication is that the burden of proving that bias is determinative (or,
more accurately, nondeterminative) sometimes shifts. In "mixed motive" cases under Title VI, the
employer now bears the burden on the question of whether bias "made a difference" for the
purpose of awarding compensation. If the employer persuades the fact-finder that the "same
decision!'would have issued even absent discrimination, the plaintiff is entitled to no compensatory
or equitable relief The implications of mixed motive practice for compensation are discussed infra
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How does the all-or-nothing rule, in combination with the controlling threshold
standard of proof, create the potential for compensation errors in the context of
unconscious bias? If race or sex is found to be the "determinative" cause of an
adverse employment action, then the victim obtains a full "make whole" measure of
relief. If that finding is not made, the claimant gets nothing.239 If a claimant who was
in fact discriminated against is unable to meet the effective threshold evidentiary
requirement (let us say 50%) because, in effect, he is unable to prove that there is
more that a 50% chance that he was the victim of "but for" discrimination, there will
be an error in the payment of compensation against him and in favor of the
employer. If he is able to meet the standard of proof, even though he was not in fact
the victim of "but for" discrimination, the error in compensation will cut in the
opposite direction.
What determines how often "true" victims of unconscious bias will be unable to
prove their case, or how often nonvictims will be able to do so? The answer requires
returning to the insight that unconscious discrimination, by its nature, must be
proved statistically-that is, through analysis of multiple instances or examples of
similar conduct. To be sure, statistical proof does play some role in cases of
discrimination based on deliberate animus. Although people who act "on purpose"
may know their own minds, others cannot see into them. Proof of conscious bias
therefore also requires attention to outcomes. But although the proof needed to
demonstrate unconscious bias will not necessarily differ qualitatively from that used
to prove purposeful discrimination, it may well differ quantitatively. If unconscious
bias is sporadic, unpredictable, and frequently nondeterminative, whereas conscious
bias is more often predictable, determinative, and consistent across cases, then the
assignment of compensation for unconscious bias will more frequently be in error
under the all-or-nothing rule. Specifically, as the subsequent discussion shows, if
unconscious bias only infrequently serves as the "but for" cause of unfavorable
decisions against minority workers, then errors in compensation for unconscious
disparate treatment will be large and recurring.
a. The Recurring Miss, or Lost Chance,
Scenario
Suppose that the group-based biases harbored by a firm's supervisors affect the
outcome of promotion decisions for only one in ten of all minority employees. The
evidentiary "trace" left by the operation of these biases will, at best, look something
like this: The numbers will show that minorities are promoted at a rate that is 90%
of the rate among similarly qualified non-minority employees. (This hypothetical
assumes what is rarely the case: that all employees in the comparison groups match
on all attributes known to be job-relevant. If employees are dissimilar, plaintiffs
would have to resort to regression analysis to demonstrate unexplained group

note 261.
239. The same applies to members of groups claiming disparate treatment, either in agency
pattern and practice lawsuits or in private class actions. If an employer is found to have engaged
in a discriminatory practice and that practice affects the fate of a group of employees, all victims
get full relief. Otherwise they all come away empty-handed. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra
note 20, at 1777-79; Munroe, supra note 57,228-30.
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disparities in promotion rates.) Depending on the actual number of promotions and
employees in each group, this will generate a rate of nonpromotion among minority
employees that is only marginally greater than the rate among comparable
employees from other groups. 20 What the data will not reveal-nor can it-is which
specific persons within that group have actually suffered disparate treatment. Thus,
even if the standard of proof is set extremely low and the statistical evidence offered
by an individual plaintiff is deemed to meet the standard of proof, it would be
impossible to know if that plaintiff actually deserved compensation. In fact, there
would be only a one in ten chance that the compensation he received was in fact
warranted by the "true facts."
On the terms of the hypothetical, a plaintiff (or group of plaintiffs) can only hope
to show that there is a 10% chance that bias caused any one individual to miss a
promotion. This is the same as showing that the fate of one in ten employees was
affected by discrimination- But suppose that the law requires a showing of more than
a 50% chance that discrimination was the cause.24' Then any plaintiff who was in
fact discharged because of actionable discrimination will receive nothing and will
be undercompensated by the full amount of the damage he suffered. Since the best
numbers any individual employee in the group can generate are essentially the same,
no employee will be able to win his or her case. The firm will be undercharged
overall for the harm it has caused, and the employees will be undercompensated as
a whole, too. However, not every individual employee will be undercompensated,
and thus the compensation error will not be evenly distributed among the employees
in the group. Only those minority employees who were actually harmed (10%) will
be undercompensated. Assuming no other significant source of fact-finding error,
242
the rest will receive what they "deserve.

240. If 20 out of 100 nonminority employees are promoted, then only 18 out of 100 similar
minority employees will be promoted (because one in ten-or two in twenty-will fail to be
promoted due to bias). So 80 nonminorities will fail to be promoted (an 80% chance of
nonpromotion), and 82 minoritieswillfail (an 82% nonpromotion rate). The rate of nonpromotion
among minorities will be 2.5% higher than among nonminorities ((82% - 80%)180%). If30 out
of 100 nonminorities are promoted, then 27 minorities will be promoted. The failure rate among
minorities will be about 4% greater than among nonminorities ((73% - 70%)70% = 4%).
241. Once again, it is anybody's guess whether the courts do actually require a showing that
corresponds to more than a 50% chance of causation. See supratext accompanying notes 233-34.
And itis not clear what courts would in practice require if claims based expressly on accusations
of unconscious bias became more accepted and routine.
242. See Neil Orloff& Jery Stedinger, A FrameworkforEvaluatingthe Preponderance-of-theEvidence Standard,131 U. PA. L. REv.1159 passim (1983) (providing a description ofpattem,
magnitude, and distribution of errors expected under an all-or-nothing recovery scheme applying
a preponderance standard).
The discussion assumes that the plaintiff is made to carry at the least an initial burden as to
causation. Even in mixed motive cases, plaintiffs must show that discrimination was a "motivating
fbctor."CivilRightsAct of 1964 § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). That requirement almost
certainly permits plaintiffs to demonstrate something less than a 50% probability that
discrimination was the "but for" cause of an unfavorable outcome. Meeting that standard,
however, will not always entitle a plaintiff to compensation or equitable relief. See infra note 259
for a discussion of compensation in mixed motive cases.
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If unconscious bias is uncommon, or if it is pervasive but "shallow" (i.e., usually
nondeterminative), then the chance that it will "make a difference" to the fate of any
particular employee could well be less than 50%. Even assuming that the weakest
cases never get filed, employees suffering setbacks at work will often fail to prove
that unconscious bias was "more likely than not" the cause of their injury. This
scenario corresponds to the so-called "recurring miss" or lost chance situation,243
in which victims rarely win or receive compensation (and tortfeasors rarely lose or
pay) for uncommon harms. Although the large fact-finder errors that can be
expected in real-life discrimination suits will allow many plaintiffs to win against
the odds, others may lose often enough to generate significant undercompensation
overall (which will undercharge employers for the harms generated).
One way to attempt to address this scenario of underrecovery is to set the
threshold of recovery very low. Some features of current law appear to represent an
attempt to do just that: For example, the requirement in mixed motive cases that
plaintiffs prove only that group status was a "motivating factor" seems designed to
boost the chance liability will be found even when the available evidence supports
only a small probability that discrimination was the "but for" cause of an
individual's loss ofjob benefits. But setting the all-or-nothing threshold low creates
the risk of generating serious error in the opposite direction. Where there is only a
small chance (say 10%) that bias is the cause of an adverse decision-which, in the
case of unconscious bias, would produce a marginally higher incidence of
unfavorable job outcomes for similarly situated members of one group-then fully
nine out of ten of adversely affected minority employees would not in fact be the
victims of determinative bias. Nevertheless, all of them will be able to meet the
threshold standard. If all can recover in full, 90% of plaintiffs will receive a
windfall. An employer who is sued repeatedly will seriously overpay. Thus, lowering
the evidentiary standard cannot be a satisfactory solution to the problem of
compensation errors generated by a pattern of recurring misses, since that move will
give rise to large and repetitive errors in the opposite direction.
As this analysis reveals, the mere existence of errors in compensation in an all-ornothing recovery scheme is not solely a function of the low probability of the
actionable event, nor of the decision to apply a lax evidentiary standard. Rather,
recovery errors will, by definition, occur whenever the actuarial probability that an
actionable event is the "true" cause of harm falls short of 100%. Compensation
errors will favor plaintiffs if the actual (and demonstrable) probability falls above
the evidentiary threshold, and will favor defendants if it falls below. 4 Although the
very existence of error in recovery is not dependent on the features here specifically

243. See Kaye, supra note 229, at 514 n.76; Saul Levmore, ProbabilisticRecoveries,
Resitution, andRecurringWrongs, 19 J.LEAL STUD. 691,705-10 (1990); Robinson, supranote
129, at 792-93; Robinson & Abraham, supra note 188, at 1484-90; Rosenberg, supranote 67,
at 877-79.
244. If an employee can show, for example, a 90% chance that actionable bias caused his firing,
he will recover under a preponderance standard regardless of whether he was harmed or not (and
there is a one-in-ten chance he was not). Every one of his (similarly situated) fellow employees will
also recover, which will wind up overcharging the firm in the aggregate for a harm for which it
was only 90% responsible overall. Moreover, some employees (the 10% who were not harmed)
will receive a windfall.
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attributed to unconscious discrimination-intermittent or infrequent determination
of harmful outcomes-those features have a very important effect on the expected
direction and magnitude of error in an all-or-nothing system. On a conventional
preponderance standard (which may or may not be the standard under current
antidiscrimination law), very few "true" victims will be compensated. Defendants
who are repeat players will also be undercharged. But lowering the evidentiary
standard to address this problem means that many nonvictims will be compensated
and the employer will be seriously overcharged. (This aspect of inaccuracy will
grow worse as events become less probable.) An event that is relatively
uncommon-as unconscious disparate treatment may be-generates the unpalatable
choice, in an all-or-nothing system, between nonrecovery for victims coupled with
significant undercharging of firms, or large windfalls for nonvictims coupled with
significant overcharging of firms.
Which scenario-undercompensation or overcompensation-would more likely
prevail if liability were expressly extended to unconscious disparate treatment? If
cases were analyzed on the "single motive" model, the existing framework might
generate a "recurring miss" situation that threatens to undercompensate
victims-although significant variation due to errors in fact-finding could
conceivably blunt this effect. Alternatively, if unconscious bias cases were treated
as mixed motive cases (as arguably they should be),24 then the patterns generated
in litigation would depend initially on how easy it would be for plaintiffs to make
their threshold causal showing of an illicit "motivating factor." This would in turn
depend on whether courts were willing to accept simple and small disparities in
outcome by race or sex as satisfying the plaintiff's evidentiary requirement, or
whether a more rigorous statistical analysis or other kinds of evidence would be
required.246 Recovery would also depend on how hard it would be for defendant
firms to convince triers of fact that the "same decision" would have been made
absent unconscious bias-a task that would depend critically on the niceties of
statistical analysis and employers' ability to persuade fact-finders that benign factors
explain differences in outcomes. 4 7 If the employer fails at this task, many plaintiffs
might recover undeservedly, and firms might end up paying too much. In short, it is
not clear whether extending the all-or-nothing liability framework to unconscious
discrimination claims would result in a pattern of chronic overrecovery for victims

245. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
246.Although courts now generally require some type of particularized or anecdotal evidence
to trigger a mixed motive analysis, retaining this requirement for unconscious bias cases would
make little sense since the overtly biased attitudes required to generate such evidence would often
be lacking. See supra text accompanying note 58 for a discussion of "direct evidence"
requirements.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 125-32. Although there is no legal requirement as such
that employers show that the factors relied on are related to productivity or are otherwise "rational,"
the fact-finder may give more weight to such a showing. See infra text accompanying note 251
on the assumption that employers act rationally, and supratext accompanying notes 130-31 on
difficulties in demonstrating links to productivity. But see infra Part II.D.2.b for the argument that
expressly extending Title VII to unconscious bias may weaken the presumption that employers
always have good reasons for their decisions.
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(and overcharging of firms) or underrecovery (and undercharging).
But plausible
24
scenarios suggest that errors would be large in either direction. 1
b. Proving Irrationality
In addition to the difficulties already discussed, there is yet another factor that
could influence the magnitude and pattern of compensation for unconscious bias and
potentially exacerbate any tendency towards errors in recovery for inadvertent, as
compared to more purposeful, forms of discrimination. This factor relates to the
practical realities of litigating claims of unconscious discrimination. If employment
discrimination theory or practice were changed to permit claimants to frame their
claims openly as accusations of inadvertent disparate treatment, that would almost
certainly lead to further weakening or abandonment of the McDonnell Douglas
formulation, at least where claims of unconscious bias were concerned."" But
whether encouraging express allegations that unconscious racial or sexual bias is at
work would make discrimination harder or easier to prove could well depend on the
psychological consequences of introducing the idea of inadvertent stereotyping to
triers of fact Exposing fact-finders to the notion that bias can operate unconsciously
might make them more or less reluctant to infer that trait-baseddiscriminationis
the explanation for otherwise unexplained disparities in an employer's treatment of
persons from different groups.
On the one hand, juries may be more reluctant to infer actionable bias from
unexplained patterns because the idea of unconscious bias may suggest that
employers are subject to unconscious motivations generally. And such motives,
because hidden, involuntarily, and the product of poorly understood forces, need not
be rational. As the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's HonorCenter v. Hicks

248. One additional factor that might lead to overcompensation, however, is that inviting
express claims of unconscious bias might encourage more disparate treatment claims to be filed
on the basis of bare disparities in group outcomes alone, since plaintiffs can argue that the absence
ofanecdotal evidence ofconscious animus does not undermine their case. If employers frequently
make use of neutral criteria with a disparate impact, an increase in the number of these claims
could give rise to more "false positives," or erroneous jury awards in favor of plaintiffs alleging
unconscious bias. See supra note 131 on disparate treatment masquerading as disparate impact and
vice versa.
249. As discussed above, McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), does not
rule out the possibility of liability where motives are unconscious to the extent that it permits
plaintiffi to show disparities in treatment with no ostensible justification. See supra pp. 1151-52.
Also, the McDonnellDouglasrequirement that an employer supply reasons simply mandates what
most defendants will do anyway, even if the allegation is one of unconscious bias. Nevertheless,
it is hard in unconscious bias cases to justify the retention of the McDonnellDouglasrequirement
that the defendant supply reasons which the plaintiff must then prove "pretextual" if "pretext"
depends on a defendant's false report ofwhat is known to him. Where decisions may be influenced
by unconscious forces, a finding that the reasons provided were "truthful" (in the sense of sincere,
rather than in the sense of providing an accurate picture of the mind's unconscious workings)
would not establish an absence of discrimination (and no liability). Nor would a finding that the
defendant's reasons were false (in the sense that he was lying about them) even be probative of
unconscious discrimination (or liability). The question of whether unconscious bias played a role
in the decisionmaking process would be completely open in either case.
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made clear, mere disparities, even in the absence of an explanation for those
250
disparities, does not necessarily mean that forbidden discrimination is at work.
But neither does it mean that the employer had a "good reason" for what he did.
Rather, some research in cognitive psychology-research to which juries may well
be exposed as plaintiffs try to convince them of the reality of "unconscious bias"--is
2
notable in showing that human judgment often falls short of perfect rationality. 11
Thus, in addition to turning the defendant's sincerity or insincerity into a side-show,
the emphasis on unconscious bias as a factor in workplace decisionmaking suggests
to the jury that supervisors do not always act for a good reason or for reasons that
advance the employer's interests. If employers cannot help but apply irrational
group-based categories, then perhaps they are at the mercy of other cognitive
imperfections as well. To take this possibility seriously is to call into question two
of the implicit assumptions that are vital to the proof of employment discrimination
cases under current law: that employers who do not discriminate (that is, are not
motivated by race) are motivated by productivity-related criteria and, conversely,
that employers who are not motivated by criteria demonstrably related to their own
best interests must be motivated by impermissible factors such as race.1 2 The very
notion that employers are influenced by unconscious "mental habits" or
uncontrolled, irrational biases, because it suggests that not all unexplained actions
can be attributed either to discrimination or to the employer's self-conscious pursuit
of profits, may make the fact-finder more skeptical of the claim that actionable
unconscious bias is at work in any given case. This might make it easier for
employers in mixed motive cases, for example, to rebut the presumption that an
illicit "motivating factor" was the "but for" cause of an employment decision. The

250.509 U.S. 502,506-512 (1993).
251. For an extensive discussion and review, seeRobynM Dawes, BehavioralDeci'onmaking
andJudgment,in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 16; Wilson &Brekke,
supranote 11, at 118-19,126-30.See also, e.g., Malamud, supra note 39, at 2254-58 (describing
arbitrators' characterization of much decisionmaking in the employment context as irrational or
arbitrary even though not animus-based).
Although, as discussed supra Part I.D, unconscious biases may at times be "rational" in taking
advantage ofvalid group-based generalizations, stress on the rationality of some group-based biases
is not likely to loom large in the litigation strategy of plaintiffs in unconscious bias cases.
252. See supra note 53; see also, e.g., Laycock, supra note 126. As Krieger states:
Pretext analysis permits this inferential leap from an apparently irrational or
inconsistent judgmental process to an intentionally discriminatory one through the
operation ofa "presumption ofinvidiousness" first articulated by the Supreme Court
inFurncoConstructionCorp. v. Waters....
Pretext analysis thus rests on the assumption that, absent discriminatory animus,
employment decisionmakers are rational actors. They make evenhanded decisions
using optimal inferential strategies in which all relevant behavioral events are
identified and weighted to account for transient situational factors beyond the
employee's controL. ... The presumption of invidiousness permits the trier of fact to
infer discriminatory intent from flaws in a decisionmaker's inferential process.
Withoutthis presumption, one could only infer that an irrational decision was made;
such a decision, in the absence of a duty to discharge only for good cause, would not
be actionable.
Krieger II, supranote 1, at 1181.
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result would be a reduction in plaintiffs' chances of recovery overall with even less
recovery for deserving victims.
On the other hand, exposure to scientific evidence for unconscious categorization
or trait-based stereotyping might lead triers of fact to believe that inadvertent bias
against disfavored groups is a pervasive and constitutive feature of workplace life.
Information about unconsciously biased patterns of thought, by creating the
impression that stereotyping is a widespread and unavoidable mental habit, could
have the effect of"normalizing" discrimination and even destigmatizing its practice.
Inadvertent discrimination would understandably be regarded as less morally
blameworthy than animus-based bias. This might make triers of fact less reluctant
to find that employers have discriminated despite good faith disavowals of
prejudicial intent. The result would be more frequent victories for plaintiffs claiming
unconscious discrimination, with more money undeservedly flowing to nonvictims.
3. Compensation for Unconscious Bias: Probabilistic
Recovery
This Part addresses an alternative approach to an all-or-nothing recovery system:
A probabilistic system that gears the amount a claimant can recover to the
probability that a harm was due to an actionable cause. It concludes that
probabilistic recovery does not represent a viable alternative to an all-or-nothing
recovery rule for unconscious disparate treatment.
Under all-or-nothing recovery, each victorious plaintiff receives compensation for
the fall value of his claimed compensable loss. Under a probabilistic scheme, each
plaintiff is awarded an amount proportional to the calculated expected contribution
of the actionable cause-which would here be racial or sexual cognitive bias-to
the decision in his case. "The proportionality rule discounts recovery by the
probability that the plaintiff's loss was caused by some other wrongdoer, by a
nonculpable source, or by the plaintiff."2 3 In the biased supervisor example, an
individual plaintiff would, at best, be able to show that ten ostensibly comparable
nonminority employees were promoted for every nine employees like himself. But
that evidence provides the basis for, at most, a probabilistic statement: that there is
a 10% chance that any member of a group to which he belongs was, in true fact, the
victim of disparate treatment. Under a probabilistic recovery rule, the plaintiff
would be entitled to 10% of the full measure of compensation for losses estimated
to be due to the unfavorable employment outcome alleged (failure to promote). The
same analysis would apply to any group of plaintiffs suing together rather than
seriatim. Each would recover 10% of full compensation for losses from the adverse
event.
To be sure, a probabilistic recovery or "expected value" rule-unlike the all-ornothing rule-"errs in every case."" 4 In those individual cases in which bias is in
true fact the "but for" cause of the harm, the rule undercompensates. Where bias is
not in fact the "but for" cause, it overcompensates. But where statistical evidence
reflects actual frequency, it operates to award the correct amount of compensation

253. Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 881.
254. Kaye, supra note 229, at 502.
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to the "at risk" group as a whole. Moreover, unlike the all-or-nothing rule, the
probabilistic rule not only awards the claimants but also charges the perpetrator
with the right amount in the aggregate.255 The rule has the virtue, on the deterrence
side, of not mandating any systematic "overcharge" of the firm-or, for that matter,
any undercharge-for the cost of its tortious activity over the long haul.
(Unfortunately, as explained more fully below, that virtue is worth little in the
unconscious bias context: there is no reason to predict that, even under a
probabilistic recovery rule, damages will equal harm and deterrence will be
efficient. 256)
a. Strengths of Probabilistic Recovery
From the point of view of victim compensation, would a probabilistic recovery
scheme for unconscious bias be more desirable than a rule that more closely tracks
the structure of current law? That depends on whether an all-or-nothing rule would
most likely generate overrecovery or underrecovery-an empirical question quite
difficult to answer in the abstract.257 Which pattern would prevail-and whether
probabilistic recovery would represent an improvement-would depend on unknown
facts about the "true" incidence of unconscious bias as well as on whether courts
would tend to treat unconscious bias claims as ordinary "pretext" claims or as
"mixed motive" claims with burden shifting rules that resemble those now in place.
As already discussed, placing the entire burden of persuasion on claimants might
generate a "recurring miss" or "lost chance" scenario: assuming a low incidence of
determinative bias, most victims would not recover. In that case, the choice on the
compensation side would be between an all-or-nothing scheme that produces
recovery for very few "true" victims, and a probabilistic scheme of prorated
recovery that produces modest windfalls (for nonvictims) but also some partial
recovery for the deserving. If virtually total nonrecovery for "true" victims (false
negatives) is seen as worse than the combination of partial recovery for victims plus
some recovery for nonvictims (partial false positives), the expected yalue rule seems
clearly superior. Alternatively, if a "shifting burden" or mixed motive framework
were applied, and that framework resulted in overrecovery in an all-or-nothing
regime, probabilistic recovery would more effectively avoid overcharging the
discriminatory enterprise and might also reduce the amount of "windfalr' for many
nonvictims. However, it would also diminish the amount of compensation that would
otherwise be awarded "true victims"-a more equivocal result.
But apart from potentially increasing the frequency of victim recovery, the
probabilistic approach has other important features that argue in its favor: The rule
is truer to the phenomenon of unconscious disparate"treatment in the workplace and
points clearly to the nature of the inquiry that must be undertaken when investigating
unconscious bias. Given the evidentiary limitations inherent in trying to observe the
workings of other minds, unconscious bias is best viewed as presenting an actuarial

255. See id.; Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 885 ("The defendant never overpays, and the
population as a whole gains no windfall").
256. See infra Part ILD.3.b.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 245-48.
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risk of harm to an indeterminate plaintiff. By observing outcomes, it is at best
possible to assign a frequency to the harmful event. It is not ordinarily possible,
however, to identify specific victims, either ex ante or ex post. To the extent that a
probabilistic approach honors these limitations, it will lead to greater acceptance
and understanding of the uncertainties surrounding the detection of unconscious bias
in the workplace setting.
Another benefit of adopting a probabilistic approach to unconscious disparate
treatment claims is that it would implicitly resolve the question of when plaintiffs
in mixed motive cases should be allowed to recover. As explained, the mixed motive
paradigm as applied to typical cases of subjective unconscious bias provides a way
of getting at whether bias-in-the-process is in fact determinative of outcomes. The
question of whether bias in the process-that is, bias as a "motivating" but not the
"but for" factor in an employment decision-is itself an actionable harm (although
it produces no material injury) can be viewed as the unfortunate product of a
misleading reification of a fundamentally probabilistic concept. As the discussion
thus far suggests, the concept of bias as a "motivating factor" is better thought of as
a stand-in for the risk that an illegitimate factor, such as race or sex, will distort a
decision enough to issue in a tangible harm. If an "expected value" recovery rule is
adopted, many plaintiffs (in keeping with the recommendations of some scholars..),
will receive some compensation for exposure to biased decisionmaking regardless
of whether they are actually harmed by it. That recovery is better conceptualized as
a form of "compensation for risk," rather than compensation for some form of
intangible or "emotional" injury.s 9 And the right to recover is best viewed as a
practical compromise, constructed in the face of ineluctable uncertainty, that
tolerates some errors in assignment and amount of compensation to individuals for
the sake of a potentially more accurate assessment of costs to the tortfeasor

258. See supra note 222.
259. The observation that compensation to individuals who are exposed to the risk of harm,
regardless of whether that risk is determinative in their case, is not really a form of compensation
for distinctinjuesinflicted by exposure to risk is consistent with the refusal to give compensation
to persons who are exposed to risk but never suffer any harm at all.
To illustrate this point, suppose that a person is evaluated in a manner tainted by an
impermissible consideration such as race, but no adverse action is taken against him. That person
would have no colorable claim even for mixed motive recovery, since he suffered no adverse
setback in interest at all. Put another way, he never suffered the injury of which exposure to bias
enhances the risk. Yet a person who was evaluated in a biased manner, but who was fired or
otherwise unfavorably treated for otherreasons,would be entitled to recover. Both persons were
exposed to an enhanced "risk" of harm from the defendant's actionable conduct The only
difference between them is that the second person happened to suffer injury due to another
(nontortious) cause and the first did not Yet they would be treated differently under a probabilistic
regime. This difference in treatment makes no sense if recovery is seen as compensation for
distinct injuries caused by the mere exposure to a "risk of harm" in and of itself.But that is not the
right way to think about probabilistic recovery. Indeed, recovery for all exposure to risk would
result in overcharging the defendant overall because, as a practical matter, it would overestimate
the share of harm attributable to the defendant's agency. Rather, the point is to peg recovery to the
actuarial probability that the losses that did occur were in fact due to the defendant's tortious
behavior.
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overall.2W The compensation each member of the group receives is not necessarily
for any "real" injury the person has suffered through such exposure (although it
might be). Rather, compensation is geared to the actuarial possibility that each
261
person's loss was in fact caused by the tortfeasor and not by another factor.
A probabilistic rule also has the advantage of fitting with a notion of mixed
motives that is not only more psychologically accurate but also truer to the
epistemological limitations inherent in proving facts about other minds that are
hidden even from those minds themselves. Mixed motive jurisprudence appears to
assume that the employer has multiple conscious reasons for action. The idea of race
as one "motive" among many might correspond to our subjective -experience of
making decisions that take many considerations into account,262 but it provides a
poor description of what is going on when unconscious bias is at work. Going back
to the example of the supervisor whose unconscious biases cause him to disfavor
10% of his minority employees: in that case, the supervisor may report one or more
reasons for his actions. Insofar as he is privy to his own conscious (as opposed to
unconscious) states of mind, he will be telling the truth. But in fact his self-report
is incomplete: He does not know that hidden cognitive mechanisms have distorted
the application of his reasons in a few cases.

260. Since the point is also to achieve actuarially accurate compensation for tangible harms
suffered by all victims as a group, the insurance component of a probabilistic recovery scheme for
unconscious bias does not, despite appearances, build in any compensation for "pain and suffering"
or emotional harm, and thus is not vulnerable to the kinds of objections that could be leveled
against mandating insurance for these types of losses. See supratext accompanying notes 222-24
for a discussion of insurance for nonpecuniary harms.
261. At least one advocate of full compensation in all mixed motive cases has considered
probabilistic recovery as a possible solution to the problem of nondeterminative causation, only to
dismiss that approach summarily. See Weber, supra note 9, at 529. Weber's rejection of a
probabilistic averaging rule is based on the fallacious assumption that, once a defendant is found
to have "committed discrimination"--that is, once the plaintiff has met the applicable standard of
proof-all uncertainty as to cause disappears. Id. But Weber confuses the case where causal
probabilities are prospectively uncertain but become quite certain once the event occurs-as with
the lightening strike example Weber provides-with a case like unconscious discrimination, in

which the cause remains as obscure after the event as before. For unconscious discrimination,
prospective and retrospective estimates of risk differ very little.
262. Certainly, where all our "reasons" appear transparent to us, we might subjectively believe
we can gauge the extent to which different considerations actually influenced or played a part in
the decision that is finally taken. We might, for example, believe that 'tis influenced me a little,
while this other fictor influenced me a lot"We might even venture to report that a particular factor
did or did not satisfy the "but for" test for a decision because we are fairly confident that, if a
particular factor were not in play, we would have made the same decision or we would not. But
as suggested by the discussion on "source confusion," supra text accompanying notes 93-95, we
often cannot claim to issue an accurate report on the anatomy of our own deliberations. In
particular, we cannot possibly hope to know in any specific case how much each factor in the mix
influenced us.We can only hope to know something that has little to do with the workings of any
individual's mind: the probability over the general run of cases that a particular factor "made a
difference."
That the extent or nature of our knowledge might differ dramatically when our motives are
largely "conscious" ('fthere ever is such a case) as opposed to when unconscious factors dominate
should come as no surprise. Introspection is a powerful avenue of access to valuable information.
When critical deliberative processes are hidden from us, that avenue is closed.
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This story represents one type of mixed motive situation that has been almost
completely ignored in current law. The existing paradigm is geared to identifying the
contribution of a set of discrete "motivating factors" to each decision. Yet it is not
quite right to say that race made some precise contribution-let us say ten
percent-to the supervisor's judgment of each employee. There is no evidentiary
"trace" that can reveal the precise ratio of valid "motive" to suspect motive for any
particular decision. The best we can do is estimate some probability that
unconscious bias made a difference in any one case. This always requires looking
at more than one case. The mix of factors that produced each individual decision
simply cannot be known.
b. Drawbacks of Probabilistic Recovery
Although a probabilistic system has many strengths in theory, formidable practical
obstacles make this system unworkable. A probabilistic rule that requires assigning
a precise probability to the elements-including unconscious discrimination-that
contribute to any workplace decision would strain the fact-finding capacity of a
liability system to the breaking point.263 The methods of statistical estimation and
regression analysis that have been developed for use with an all-or-nothing system
will almost certainly be incapable of supporting such an analysis. The challenges
inherent in trying to come up with precise probability estimates without adequate
evidence would run the risk of producing a plethora of errors. This would surely
represent no improvement in accuracy over conventional all-or-nothing
determinations.264
The focus in this Part has been on the goal of compensating victims completely
and accurately for harms incurred. But the desirability of an expected value rule will
also turn on its incentive effects. In theory, probabilistic recovery comes closer than
an all-or-nothing recovery rule to charging enterprises for the true costs of their
'
actionable harm when firms are "repeat players."265
If the recurring miss scenario
would dominate under all-or-nothing, firns would almost certainly pay more under

263. See Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 898 ("Under the preponderance rule, the trier of fact is
concerned onlywith the question whetherthe probability exceeds fifty percent; the precise amount
by which the probability falls above or below that threshold is irrelevant. Imposing proportional
liability, on the other hand, would obviously require far more precision.").
264. Moreover, even setting aside evidentiary limitations, there would be additional problems
related to relief. The remedies available under probabilistic schemes for group recovery in other
settings are purely monetary. See Robinson, supra note 129, at 785-89, 794-95; Rosenberg, supra
note 67, at 908-24. But an important component of relief for employment discrimination has
always been equitable reinstatement, which is ideally suited to an all-or-nothing recovery rule and
cannot easily be adapted to an expected value regime. In lieu of equitable relief some measure of
prospective losses would have to be incorporated into any remedial calculation. Arguably, monetary
recovery could never be a perfect substitute for equitable reinstatement The sacrifice of this
component of relief would make such a compensatory scheme less desirable from the victim's
point of view.
265. See Levmore,supra note 243, at 697-98 (stating that accurate internalization of costs from
probabilistic recovery depends on defendants engaging in many rounds or instances of similar
conduct).
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an expected recovery rule. If the "shifting burdens" scenario is closer to reality, they
might pay less.
These observations must be considered in light of the conclusions in the first part
of this Article: having enterprises pay more is not necessarily better, even when
"more" reflects the actual costs of harm inflicted. That is, requiring employers to
pay even actuarially sound compensation could produce perverse effects by tempting
employers to reduce activity levels and take wasteful "pseudo-precautions," or by
shifting costs away from the cheapest cost avoiders. Thus, internalization of all costs
of unconscious bias to the employer, even if it could be achieved, is not an unalloyed
good. The virtues on the compensation side of more ample (and actuarially accurate)
recovery must always be traded off against the undesirable effects of potentially
greater liability for firms.
In the end, it must be understood that even if a probabilistic scheme for remedying
unconscious bias could be made to work, it would still be no more accurate than an
all-or-nothing rule in matching compensation to deserving victims. That is, it would
repeatedly fail to insure that only true victims receive compensation and that
nonvictims do not. That neither liability system can avoid significant inaccuracy in
this respect suggests an important point: The patterns of compensation for
unconscious bias can be expected to converge with the assignment of benefits and
costs from programs that extend preferential treatment to members of protected
groups. Such programs are sometimes criticized as poor vehicles for accomplishing
any valid remedial purpose because the tie between compensable loss and conferred
advantage is haphazard: There is no guarantee that persons helped by affirmative
action have been victimized by discrimination in the past, and many victims of past
discrimination will never benefit from any preferential treatment at all.266 But that
loose tie between victimization and reward will inevitably characterize any
individualized liability system designed to address unconscious bias. The more
subtle and erratic the bias, the more errors will be made in detecting it. The more
errors made, the more often compensation will miss the mark. The expectation is
that victims will frequently be rewarded and nonvictims will not. The pattern
generated will bear no necessary relationship to any prior acts of discrimination. A
liability scheme for unconscious bias will therefore engage an elaborate probative
machinery and consume considerable judicial resources to achieve outcomes that
mimic the results of diversity action or preferential treatment programs. That result,
if desired, could be accomplished less wastefully by more direct methods. 67 Electing
the more expensive and cumbersome route stands in need ofjustification.

266. This has led some commentators to disavow or downplay the importance of any remedial
purposefor airmative action. See, e.g., Estlund, supranote 174, at 58-59; see also Susan Sturm
&Lani Guinier, The Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal,84 CAL. L.
RLv. 953 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins ofDiscrimination:Last Term 'sAfflrmative Action
Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78 (1986).
267. Compare supra PartILC.5.b, arguing that, because liability for unconscious discrimination
will cause employers to adopt diversity action programs (which might include a component of
preferential treatment) as a way to reduce the risk of liability, its desirability should be assessed on
the basis of that effect
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III. DISCRIMINATION AS ACCmENT: WHAT Is TO BE DONE?
In the twelve years since Charles Lawrence published his seminal article on
unconscious discrimination,26 scholars have bemoaned the law's failure to
effectively police and penalize unconscious forms of bias.269 This Article has sought
to analyze the sources of this putative inadequacy. It concludes that the most
important obstacles to an effective remedy for unconscious disparate treatment lie
not in some defect in the design or doctrinal framework of Title VII, but rather in
the nature of the phenomenon of unconscious discrimination itself.
If the goal of a liability system is to diminish or compensate for the harms that it
formally targets in a precise and cost-effective manner, then this Article suggests
that a system directed at inadvertent bias will not accomplish those objectives very
well. Liability cannot do its job without going off in search of the harm itself. But
because we simply lack the tools to detect unconscious bias, we cannot directly
force its elimination to the extent it does occur. That we cannot know another mind
is a problem that plagues discrimination law generally. The dilemma is even more
acute when the other mind can neither know itself nor effectively control itself nor
be effectively controlled by others. The difficulties of detecting, measuring, and
monitoring unconscious bias counsel avoidance of methods of attack that require
precise determinations of causation or the accurate tracking of occurrence,
magnitude, and effects. Moreover, the paucity of evidence that can reliably
distinguish "true" bias from other causes, coupled with employers' complete control
over employees' fate, may mislead fact-finders into believing that steps that
employers take to guard against or compensate for unconscious bias work better
than they do. If employers can thus reduce their expected amount of liability without
proportionately reducing the costs of the targeted harm, they may expend more
resources than are justified by an abatement of that harm or any other positive
effects. Finally, employees may be better situated than employers to minimize biased
assessments with the fewest social costs. Then imposing liability on employers could
blunt victims' incentives to search for harm-reducing strategies or, at best, add little
to existing incentives but at great cost in judicial resources. For all these reasons,
there is no guarantee that liability will operate efficiently.
So what is to be done about unconscious disparate treatment? The answer depends
in part on one's views about how a liability system is supposed to operate and on the
legal system's proper role in effecting social change. This Article predicts that
liability for unconscious disparate treatment will be inefficient and will fail to
compensate victims accurately. One answer to this might be, "so what?" On this
view, a legal response to race and sex discrimination is not ill-advised just because
there is no guarantee of net social benefit or of individualized compensation.
Perhaps antidiscrimination laws should not be about efficiency-that is, the balance
of social costs overall-but about the fair distribution or just transfer of benefits.
And perhaps the primary concern should not be with precisely compensating
individuals at all, but rather with group entitlements and group fate. On this view,

268. Lawrence, supra note 1.
269. See sources supra note 1.
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threatening liability for a previously neglected source of harm to vulnerable groups
can be viewed as a blunt device for encouraging institutions to take an expansive
array of measures with mainly prospective effects that appear to improve the lot of
disfavored groups as a whole. More specifically, the main role of imposing liability
for employment discrimination is to encourage employers to adopt "diversity action"
type programs, regardless of whether such programs are "efficient" in light of the
costs of the judicial machinery that administers the system or the overall effects of
the programs themselves."' To be sure, proponents seem to hope that the reforms
will alter at least some of the conditions that tend to foster inadvertent stereotyping.
Alternatively, employers may change some practices that have a "disparate impact"
on women's or minorities' progress. Or they might extend frankly preferential
treatment to previously disfavored groups. They may do all of these things at once
or in different measure. In the end, it does not matter exactly how the programs
operate, as long as members of some groups do better, or appear-to do better, within
the organization."'
The desire to encourage broad-based, employer initiatives by any means possible
is in keeping with a growing skepticism among legal scholars about the importance
of the right to be free from disparate treatment as narrowly defined-a skepticism
born of doubts about the effectiveness of the law's targeting of differential treatment
"because of' race or sex. According to this view, disparate treatment-whether
conscious or unconscious-is only a small part of what is holding minorities and
women back in the workplace today.272 Many problems now stem from ostensibly

270. Extending disparate treatment liability may also expand the opportunities for ordering these
institutional changes directly or in the form of consent decrees. But this avenue will necessarily
play a relatively minor role, since complex equitable relief of this scope is principally confined to
class action or pattern and practice cases. Those cases represent a very small percentage of the
claims that are presently brought under antidiscrinination laws, and it is hard to know whether this
would change if unconscious bias were expressly covered.
271. One example of such a multi-pronged approach is a program adopted by the Department
of Medicine at Johns Hopkins Medical School in response to a poor record of academic promotion
and retention among women faculty. Among the steps taken by the department were: establishing
a formal mentoring program that paired a female junior faculty member with a senior faculty
sponsor, running regular informational meetings to offer concrete advice about career
advancement, moving academic conferences and departmental meetings to ordinary business
hours, conducting more careful and explicit periodic academic reviews, and encouraging senior
male faculty members to invite junior female colleagues to conferences or to put their names
forward as conference participants. Academic promotions among women faculty increased
significantly during the five-year period the program was in effect See VALiAN, supranote 2, at
319-20; see also Linda P. Fried et al., CareerDevelopmentfor Women in Academic Medicine:
Muliple Interventionsin a Depar ent ofMedicine,276 JAMA 898 (1996) (describing the Johns

Hopkins initiative).
272. Scholars tell stories of workplaces riddled with complex, "path-dependent" structures or
practices that are kept in place by inertia, vested interests, coordination problems, transaction costs
of switching to less discriminatory arrangements, lack of information about productivity, or the
need to discourage shirking. "Pipeline problems"--the paucity of qualified or well-trained
candidates for desirable jobs-also represent a potent source of differences in employment
prospects. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: ImprovedIndividualand Structural
Remediesfor Racialand Sexual Disadvantagesin Employment, 79 GEo. L.J. 1659, 1661-63

(1991); Jomills Henry Braddock & James M. McPartland, How Minorities Continue To Be
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neutral practices with disparate impact that would not remotely satisfy a "but for"
test for disparate treatment by race or sex. Those obstacles persist under the current
disparate impact framework, which allows businesses a great deal of leeway in
defending neutral practices.273
In light of the view that the real impediments to the advancement of women and
minorities in the workplace have so far eluded legal redress, it is tempting to argue
that the law is too timid and narrow. Since more is better than less, extending the
coverage of the liability system to reach additional harmful conduct, however
expensive, must improve on the status quo. This view gains added momentum from
the observation that judiciaUy or legislatively compelled "diversity action" programs
cannot hope to withstand scrutiny without fairly specific findings of past "sins of
discrimination."274 Within the limits established by our constitutional and remedial
regime, the liability paradigm offers one of the few legally secure avenues for
forcing broad-based changes in private workplace organization.
An uncritical positive outlook on any changes an employer might make in
response to liability for unconscious discrimination defies the analysis in this
Article, which takes seriously the traditional economic criteria for a rational liability
scheme and refuses to give the benefit of the doubt to reforms of indeterminate value
and unproven effect. Defending liability for unconscious bias not only discounts
efficiency as an important goal, but also indulges the assumption that any changes
made to avoid liability will represent an improvement of some kind for someone,
either in the form of real reductions in unconscious bias, a general brightening of
prospects for targeted groups, improvements in worker conditions generally, or
increased productivity overall.2 7' But once expected damages need not match

Excludedfrom EqualEmployment Opportunities:Research on LaborMarket andInstitutional

Barriers,J. Soc. IssuEs, Spring 1987, at 5, 6-24; Chamy & Gulati, supra note 192, at 60; Daniel
A- Farber, The OutmodedDebateover Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 893, 918-24 (1994);
Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the
DemandsofPregnancy,94 COLUM. L.RRv. 2154,2159-71 (1994); Mark S. Kende, Shattering
the Glass Ceiling: A Legal TheoryforAttacking DiscriminationAgainst Women Partners,46
HASTINGS L.J. 17, 31-40 (1994); Strauss, supra note 29, at 1640-43.
Despairing ofthe inability ofindividualized liability systems to address the myriad structural and
custom-based sources of female and minority disadvantage in the workplace, many commentators
suggest structural solutions--including outright recourse to preferential treatment-that go beyond

the formal limits of the remedies available under existing antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g.,
VALIAN, supra note 2, at 319-32 (defending a variety of concrete "progressive policies" in the

workplace as the best way to attack the myriad sources of differential outcomes); Donald L.
Beschle, "You've Got to be Carefully Taught": Justi'ngAffirmativeAction After Croson and

Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1141, 1177-81 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action is necessary to
offset intransigent racism); Brown etal.,supra note 1, at 1490-92, 1528-30 (defending affirmative
action asthe only effective remedy for racism and racial disparities); Selmi, supra note 1, at 12961308 (defending affirmative action as the only effective remedy against discrimination).
273. For a review of the current law on disparate impact and the "business necessity" defense,
see Linda Lye, Title Vli's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion ofDisparateImpact and
the Business NecessityDefense, 19 BERKILBYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 315,348-53 (1998).
274. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 266, at 82-83.
275. See, e.g., Gillian Flynn, The Harsh Reality ofDiversity Programs,WORKFORCE, Dec.
1998, at 27; Gordon, supra note 161.
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expected losses, there is no assured correspondence between the employer's
response and a socially beneficial result. Indeed, employers' expenditures cannot be
relied upon to provide minimal benefits of any kind, even for those groups the
expenditures are designed to help, because there is no a priori basis for predicting
whether expanding liability in this area will have any significant effect one way or
the other. This Article proceeds on the assumptions that making unconscious bias
actionable will strengthen the impetus to adopt "diversity action" programs beyond
the incentives created by existing law, institutional priorities, or the march of
cultural forces in general. But this may not be so. Then many of the detrimental
effects described in this Article will not be forthcoming, but neither will the benefits
posited by defenders of expanded coverage. All that will be left are transaction
costs-that is, the costs of processing additional claims or of trying to prove
unconscious bias. The point is that, in a world that uncouples harm from liability,
it is hard to predict exactly what will happen. How employers will react and the
effects of those reactions must ultimately be determined by empirical investigation.
If the law is not revised expressly to extend coverage to unconscious motivation,
should it be changed in the opposite direction? Should Title VII be amended to state
that recovery is allowed for purposeful bias only? The answer must start with the
understanding, already discussed, that current practice almost certainly awards relief
in some cases where unconscious bias is at work. Although McDonnell Douglas
stands as an impediment to favorable decisions in many such cases, the methods of
proof employed in some individual cases under existing law either do not permit
fact-finders cleanly to separate deliberate from inadvertent motive or do not require
them to do so. An important drawback of the present state of affairs is that it leaves
employers in a state of great uncertainty. Employers may well believe that they are
potentially liable for both deliberate and inadvertent bias and act accordingly.
It is unclear, however, whether rewriting the law to exclude inadvertent bias
would significantly improve on this situation. Much of the argument in this Article
hinges on contrasting the difficulties of detecting, monitoring, proving, and
controlling disparate treatment that is inflicted consciously with that imposed
unconsciously. But those differences must not be overstated. Although proving
unconscious motive will rest almost exclusively on statistical evidence of
unexplained differential outcomes, attempts to prove deliberate bias, even in
individual cases, will sometimes make use of this type of evidence as well. Because
the proof plaintiffs offer in both types of cases will often overlap, fact-finders might
sometimes end up imposing liability for unconscious bias even if the law were
expressly amended to permit recovery for purposeful bias only. It is thus hard to see
how even eliminating the formal ambiguity in Title VII could reliably separate
recovery for conscious and unconscious bias.
Moreover, forbidding recovery for inadvertent bias might also have the effect of
creating a new type of argument that Title VII defendants could use to avoid
liability. Perhaps because current law is ambiguous, employers are not in the habit
of defending themselves against charges of discrimination by admitting race or sexbased differences in judgment but pleading inadvertence. Yet changing the law to
distinguish sharply between conscious and unconscious causation would invite such
a tactic by creating a "safe harbor" for unconsciously inflicted discrimination. By
focusing attention on the conscious/unconscious distinction, this change might result
in fact-finders demanding more persuasive evidence of the deliberateness of
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defendants' discrimination than is now required. Plaintiffs' proof might fall short in
significantly more cases and meritorious cases of purposeful discrimination could
become harder to win.
Current law may well represent a "second-best" compromise between unattainable
alternatives rendered problematic by uncertainty about how the system now works
and how it would work if changed. As such, the argument for maintaining the status
quo might go something like this: The system should focus on discriminatory
behavior that can most cheaply and effectively be deterred or that permits the most
precise assignment of compensation. Purposeful bias fits this bill as being most
amenable to self-regulation, most responsive to the threat of sanction, and generally
easiest to prove. As noted, current law may also catch within its net some examples
of unconscious disparate treatment. Most likely these will include the most
egregious cases of stereotyping, which generate the largest and most systematic
unexplained differences in treatment. As argued, those cases will be atypical and
thus uncommon. Although the price to be paid for this hybrid state is uncertainty
about the law's coverage, which may spur employers to adopt an excessive number
of self-protective measures, that cost is mitigated by the realization that, due to
evidentiary overlap, some degree of imprecision in scope probably cannot be
avoided even by the clearest statutory language. And leaving the law as it is avoids
the possibility of making conscious bias significantly harder to prove.
Although this Article concludes that nothing more should be done within the
existing legal framework to address unconscious disparate treatment, the conclusion
is tentative. The issues raised in this Part would benefit from further analysis.
Nonetheless, this stance should not be construed as denying that unconscious bias
might play some role in impeding the progress of disfavored groups in the
workplace or in society in general. It is simply impossible to know for sure how
pervasive or important it is relative to other factors. Those who believe themselves
victims of unconscious discrimination should recognize that unconscious bias is an
unpredictable, mysterious, and elusive phenomenon that can only be tentatively
inferred but never observed directly. They must be willing to acknowledge that
suspicion is not fact, that "one is never one's own control group,"276 and that the
current state of understanding almost always impedes definite attributions of blame
or cause. Finally, they should accept that, because subconscious reliance on
stereotypes may be sensitive to the attributes and presentation of those being judged,
individuals are not entirely powerless to affect the degree to which they will become
victims of unconscious discrimination. On the other hand, those who would ignore
the potential influence of group-based biases on human judgment should adopt a
more agnostic stance.277 They should acknowledge that there is a substantial body
of experimental evidence that suggests that unconscious stereotyping can distort
even the most seemingly fair and "neutral" judgments. They should accept that,
because evidence of the workings of inadvertent bias is hard to generate and

276. Fiske, supra note 88, at 384.
277. The topic of unconscious discrimination rates little discussion and no index entries in recent
books on race relations by conservative public intellectuals and academics. See DINESH D'SoUzA,
TH END OF RACISM (1995); EPSTsI, supra note 152; STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, AMERiCA IN BLACK AND WHITE (1997).
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unavoidably actuarial in form, abating its effects ought properly to be a collective
responsibility. Finally, they should understand that creative, voluntary initiatives in
the private sector, by perhaps making the law's heavy hand less necessary in the
long run, may well promise the most social benefit at the least cost.

